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ABSTRACT
THE DIGITAL BAHDALA: RECODING NATIONAL HUMILIATION ACROSS
POSTREVOLUTIONARY LEBANON AND EGYPT
Heather Jaber
Marwan Kraidy
This dissertation analyzes three transnational social media scandals in the
postrevolutionary contexts of Egypt and Lebanon. It offers these as cases of digital
bahdala, or the didactic performative mode and state of humiliation, embarrassment, or
shame which utilize the affordances and imaginaries of digital media platforms. It
examines the rhetorical techniques, performances, and symbols used by transnational
publics on three different social media platforms around these scandals. It finds that
audiences engage in recoding, or the cultivation of alternative feeling states, to repair
national imaginaries which are exposed as incompatible with a cosmopolitanism which
was once promised. It also finds that activists can leverage the digital bahdala and its
reliance on digital affordances meet demands for national accountability in exploitative
labor conditions. In doing so, it offers digital bahdala as a diagnostic for a national
belonging which is threatened but which carries the potential for repair.
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INTRODUCTION
If the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in 2010-2011 were the beginning of a
metanarrative of possibility about the MENA region, then the Beirut port explosion of
August 4, 2020 was a tragedy of epic failure. What happened in the decade in between
involved speculative scholarship and coverage of the region, investigating the uprisings’
causes, effects, successes, and failures. Since then, Lebanon and Egypt have been
speculated to be “failed states” in Euro-American media (Carnelos 2021, Cordesman
2020). Lebanon is described to be tragically descending into socioeconomic failure, while
Egypt has taken on a brand of human rights failure (Hessler 2016). These headlines
populate the news feeds and timelines of transnational publics who are invested in these
narratives of economic and therefore moral failure, whether as intimate insiders or
‘global’ audiences watching on.
This dissertation explores these narratives of failure and their relationship to
bahdala, a colloquial Arabic term which refers to the feeling or the didactic performance
of ridicule or censure. In particular, I examine the way that transnational audiences
contend with narratives of national failure and how these narratives are mobilized in
popular press, entertainment, and activism. Taking the term from its roots in performative
admonishments and ridicule in social settings, I show how it is a diagnostic of digitally
mediated revolution and its aftermath. The digital bahdala, like its older form, works
didactically to recuperate national failures by implying that the path to repair is through
reincorporation. Differently than the public square or street, digital bahdala exposes the
anxieties of sovereignty in an era marked by seepages and flows of bodies, viruses,
1

toxins, across national and bodily thresholds. This is not the revolutionary discourse of
the exposure of oppression and exploitation, but a post-revolutionary discourse of
reconciliation within an economic global order.
In this dissertation, I analyze digital media content related to three controversies
around slighted nationalisms across Lebanon and Egypt as these two countries contend
with the aftermath of national mobilizations. At these sites, publics negotiate national
imaginaries that are under threat, working to cultivate better political feeling around their
circulation. They give way to entertaining and profitable media spectacles where
influencers, news anchors, and television networks capitalize on the post revolution,
when conferrals of failure are not only entertaining content for global audiences but have
material effects.
I have operationalized digital bahdala here to mean performances of ridicule and
authority which are mobilized transnationally, activating colonial relationships. In the
digital realm, bahdala is not only performed locally, but crosses national borders. This
analytic then directs us to transnational spectators who engage in performances to
remediate the bahdala on digital platforms. Despite sometimes divergent reactions to the
bahdala, all are audiences invested in politicians’ performance at international forums,
the opinions of tourists on holiday, and the journalistic coverage of migrant workers'
conditions. Rather than agreeing on their politics, they share an orientation toward an
‘external’ community. I offer that they share investments in the way that the nation is
represented to the ‘international’ community, working didactically to bring it back into
the fold.
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In this way, digital bahdala is a way of placing the transnational at the foreground
of digital media and embodiment at the foreground of communication. In a digitally
mediated world, where we are constantly reminded of who we are to others, affect is
central to these cases, as people again and again express a desire to see blame-worthy
others feel something—shame, sorrow, regret—for their role in national failure. In doing
so, they work toward an aspirational cosmopolitanism that is at risk of being lost. I look
at the kinds of value which can be mined from these moments and their aftermath, where
journalists, politicians, and emerging content creators build followings by channeling
bahdala and its cathartic function. In doing so, they fulfill a desire for globally conscious
publics who are concerned with their place in a global body politic.
The three sites this dissertation turns to take place as post-revolutionary Lebanon
and Egypt are experiencing contrasting but related structural shifts. In Egypt, a decadeslong regime gave way to a military rule which has in some ways wielded a harder hand
than predecessors but has revived a narrative of continuity with Egypt’s civilizational
past. Egypt in this way represents a broader trend in nation-branding, where distinct
cultures are foregrounded through links to a prior era. Lebanon, on the other hand,
sustains its debilitating fragmentary imaginaries, with its sectarian and extra-national
imaginaries drawing out legacies of civil war and proxy war. It has been circulated as a
tragic story of lost cosmopolitan promises. Both countries grapple with the loss of
exceptional status—Lebanon as a Christian Western experience in the colonial period, a
mosaic of identities with its Muslim-majority but also celebrated and criticized multisectarian system, and Egypt as the heart of the Orient and Arab culture—invoking them
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as their saving grace. They both do this looking outward, at an imaginary “international
community.” After all, to whom or what can a nation be exceptional?
With these current events in mind, this dissertation turns to the emotional
dynamics of these imaginaries, investigating the kinds of symbols, ideas, and bodies that
circulate to recuperate lost cosmopolitanisms. This comes at a time when both academic
and popular culture are increasingly concerned with ‘affect’ or ‘emotion.’ From poppsychology memes to documentaries around tech corporations’ manipulation of our
emotions, the way we feel has become a dominant discourse in popular and political
culture. Questions of shame and exposure have accompanied an increasing reliance on
digital technologies to mediate desirable and undesirable realities. There is no
coincidence that the rise of commercialized digital platforms and the preponderance of
emotion and affect discourse have accompanied what some call neoliberalism, late
capitalism, hyper-capitalism, or globalization. The desire to map networked flows of
feeling has been one way of rendering the world around us legible, visible, and
manageable (Ahmed 2004, Chun 2016). Each of the sites I turn to in this dissertation
offer an example of this, where Internet users are made aware of themselves in relation to
global others.
This orientation, the feeling of a direction toward something beyond one’s own
national imaginary, is rooted in a longer history of asymmetrical power relations between
postcolonial nations and their others, including occupation, intervention, war, and proxy
battle. It has also meant histories of local struggle to confront both colonial and
postcolonial aggressors, forged between these dualisms. In this context, both digital
media and the uprisings have offered both rupture and site of possibility, where political
4

expression was framed as being freed from these discursive trappings. Emotion became a
central area of interest, with think-pieces and articles describing the impetus to forge new
political futures less in instrumentalist narratives and more in affective ones (Papacharissi
2015, Pearlman 2013, Weitzel 2019). In the aftermath came the evaluation by
international media, where the success or failure of these mobilizations became
consumable content. As publics who have been constituted in international discourse
through speculation and metanarrative, they are particularly capable of telling us what the
threat of ‘national failure’ can look and feel like.
While much work has examined the uprisings and the revolutionaries, activists,
and journalists who held central places in the mobilizations (El-Ariss 2019, Kraidy 2016),
this dissertation turns to the less revolutionary—those who are losing access to an
imagined cosmopolitanism. This project is concerned with the desire for global legibility
that takes place on digital platforms and in the context of revolution, investigating the
ways that national publics recode these narratives, utilizing dominant encodings of
national exceptionalism to recuperate a sense of global belonging. Through a variety of
performances, rhetorical techniques, and aesthetics, people work to join in, accept, or
reroute the humiliation that is doled out on the nation.
These case studies take place between 2018 and 2021 across Lebanon and Egypt,
in the lead-up to or aftermath of their mass mobilizations. The first chapter covers the
case of what many called the “grilling” of Lebanese politician Gebran Bassil at the World
Economic Forum in January 2020, just months after the revolution broke out in Lebanon,
introducing the idea of the affective trial, where those responsible for national failure are
made to atone. The next chapter discusses the case of Lebanese tourist to Egypt, Mona
5

Mazbouh, who was arrested and deported after sharing a video where she lambasted the
Egyptians and Islam after an experience of sexual harassment. Here, publics engage in
recoding practices through several conversion points, reaching for figures and symbols
who would help generate the right kinds of political feeling—pride in the place of
humiliation. In the final case study, I discuss This Is Lebanon, the group which works to
exploit cases of exploitation in the kafala system, or the migrant worker sponsorship
system in Lebanon. Here, I theorize the digital pressure group as harnessing the power of
digital bahdala to provoke paranoia, or the threat of shame, to meet their demands.
Heeding the ever-relevant call for a “triple analysis of socio-political context,
technical developments and major events” (Kraidy 2007, p. 140–41), I turn to
transnational scandals in the aftermath of the revolution for the way they articulate
national belonging when the stakes are high. From staging to recoding to engineering the
bahdala, this dissertation charts the way that this media genre is activated at the
intersection and disjuncture of conflicting national imaginaries—one that wants to
recuperate a belonging in the world and another which wants to forge a more autonomous
sovereignty. In the context of speculation about the status of nations as failed states,
bahdala is a diagnostic of a crisis in national and bodily sovereignty. Confronting the
reality of an unescapable relationality with other nations and bodies, it is a way of
remediating a conferred unbelonging from places which were one open to these publics.
By paying attention to the things people do through screens, I offer bahdala as an
intervention into the study of digital media and affect, arguing for a reparative approach
which recognizes the very desire to map and name what it is that pulls us in one direction
or another as part of a coevolution of digital technology.
6

(Un)belonging and the global body politic
In the context of what many have called neoliberalism, hyper capitalism, late capitalism,
or globalization, the moves toward multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and
connectedness have become favored modes of being in the world. This happens at the
same time as structural shifts, from the environment to mass mobilizations to a pandemic,
have reactivated interest in the global as a mode of analysis. What all share is a
recognition of increasing precarity for most people. In postcolonial contexts, this sense of
connection and relationality is built upon legacies of asymmetrical power relations. After
a wave of literature and coverage of mass uprisings across the MENA region (Castells
2015, Howard & Hussain 2013, Papacharissi 2015, Weitzel 2019), the post-revolution
has been judged in popular discourse for its potential success or failure.
Lebanon and Egypt are two countries which have housed some of these
mobilizations, serving as connected sites of analysis. In both contexts, international
media have followed the countries’ futures, lamenting on their successes and failures to
live up to their imaginaries of national exceptionalism, reflecting their almost opposite
national imaginaries. Egypt boasts a long history of relations with Western nations,
including the US, due to military, academic, and other strategic relations. It has been
viewed as the birthplace of the most material and popularly produced form of pan-Arab
nationalism, invested with the lost potential to cultivate an anti-colonial and anti-imperial
imaginary, and at the same time it was enjoyed as a site of civilizational continuity.
Lebanon, on the other hand has been imagined as a haven for the colonial, comprising an
experience for French Christians for whom a creeping and increasing Muslim population
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threatened sovereignty (Traboulsi 2007).1 Its governance structure institutionalizes a
sectarian power-sharing agreement meant to maintain a diversity of representation and
more specifically, avoid a Muslim majority (Traboulsi 2007).
Their relationship to Islam is one vector through which questions of global
belonging are framed, reflecting histories and anxieties of secular nation-building (Asad
2003). Europeans imagined Lebanon as a site for Ottoman reformation—their “[w]ritings
and paintings evoked a timeless biblical land, a mountain refuge, that pleaded to be saved
from Islamic Ottoman domination” (p. 15). Egypt’s post-independence entrenched a
tenuous relationship between the state and Islam. The manifestation and continued
existence of the Muslim Brotherhood played a major role in the uprisings and their
aftermath, when fears of a fundamentalist and democratically elected Islamic rule led to a
military coup to wrest back governance.
It is also a vector through which the publics in Egypt and Lebanon differently
carve out forms of sovereignty as they articulate their brands of cosmopolitanism.
Lebanon has been constructed as a cosmopolitan space, from its multiculturalism to its
luxury real estate to its tourist destinations. Its multiconfessional system produces this
imaginaries of diversity and consensus, one which maintains peace among what are
hegemonically constructed as adverse religious sects. Egypt on the other hand, as a
Muslim majority country, has experienced Islamic revivals and houses some of the most
significant Islamic institutions in the world. At the same time, its centralized state has

1. During Lebanon’s independence, Lebanon’s Christian Maronite community represented a pull
away from notions of pan-Arab nationalism, fearing broader unity based on Islam. When
Lebanon was added to the Arab League to establish its sovereignty, it also linked it to Arab
relations (Kalawoun 2000).
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long grappled with questions of the secular and religious. While Egypt has been and
continues to be imagined as a site of antiquity for the region and world, Lebanon has
been and continues to be imagined as a multicultural enclave. Egypt works on reviving its
narrative of historic continuity and homogeneity and Lebanon maintains a narrative of
tolerance and modernity.
These national imaginaries are valuable in a global marketplace. Both countries
rely on foreign flows of goods and capital. They have witnessed steady privatization
through crediting by groups like the World Bank and International Monetary Forum
(IMF). Both have a significant tourism and hospitality industry, attracting foreign visitors
and laborers who travel to learn Arabic, to see its attractions, or to work.
The revolutions and their aftermath jostled and threatened these very imaginaries.
Egypt’s mobilizations were some of the first in the region, serving as an initial object of
inquiry for speculating international discourse around statehood. They began in 2011,
resulting in the toppling of the decades-long rule of Hosni Mubarak, who ruled for thirty
years in a state of emergency. What came next in 2012 was the short-lived election of
Muslim-Brotherhood leadership, followed by a military coup in 2013 which pushed the
Musli—Brotherhood back into dissident status. The former defense minister and current
president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, took over, running on the promise of an improved
economy. Since then, he has led campaigns on what is considered state extremism,
enacting crackdowns on both Islamists and the secular alike. Some have described elSisi’s rule as wielding an even harder hand than his predecessor and offering a
continuation of older policies which align with wider regional state crackdowns, as well
as crackdowns under the guise of moral policing in the Global South more widely (Amar
9

2013). This has accompanied what the military state has framed as economic growth but
is fueled mostly by debt in the form of interest rates meant to attract investors which in
turn has placed pressure on the poorest who bear the brunt of less government spending
and support (Mandour 2022). This reliance means that the economy is also vulnerable to
geopolitical tensions which have helped trigger market crashes in places like Lebanon.
In contrast to Egypt’s centralized state which wields a more unified hand and
approach to collapse, the Lebanese state has a multisectarian makeup which has proven to
foster fragmented and conflicting visions of the country’s past, present, and future. For
this reason, when the uprisings broke out years after Tunisia, on October 17th, 2019, as
some of the most recent mobilizations in the region, popular discourse framed the
mobilizations as unprecedented. Building on prior movements,2 the 2019 “October
Revolution” was unprecedented especially for its composition of citizens across
sectarian, religious, and class lines. These protests brought about millions of people to the
streets to demand the fall of the decades-long ruling order, systems of corruption,
clientelist networks of resource provision, and rising inequalities. These can be traced to
the aftermath of the civil war, when Lebanon entrenched a reliance on tourism, its
financial sector, foreign aid, and diaspora remittances (TRT World 2021).
The eventual collapse of 2019 took place after foreign aid and investment was
withheld following a variety of regional events and tensions, from the Syrian civil war to
geopolitical tensions with Iran and Saudi Arabia. This led many depositors, especially in
the Gulf, to rescind their investments and pull out their deposits, rocking the tiny nation.

2. In 2015, the garbage crisis became the most visible and symbolic failure of the Lebanese state
in decades, ushering in the largest recent demonstration since the 2005 protests against Syrian
occupation.
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This mobilizations which began in October demanded accountability for what was to
become an economic collapse of epic proportions, bringing the state’s strategy of
“financial engineering”3 into public discourse.
In the aftermath of revolution, collapse, and conflict, the majority of national
inhabitants bear the burden of such economic policies and geopolitical tensions. Both
countries in the post-revolution have increased the burden of social welfare on the people,
decreasing public services from the jurisdiction of the state. Part of this is related to the
history of neoliberal restructuring in the 1970s and 80s, when dependencies were
entrenched in the MENA and other countries in the Global South by setting up debt
programs with the IMF and the World Bank. Today, discussions around political reform
predominantly take place with an eye to negotiations with such creditors, setting up
implicit and explicit expectations which help maintain the Global North and South as
differently sovereign.
While much important work has described the creative revolutionaries and digital
leakers who moved power around from ‘below’ (El-Ariss 2019, Kraidy 2016), the less
revolutionary, more ‘globally conscious’ public I turn to is part of this circuit of
cosmopolitanism. This is not to say that they are not political in their own rite, but rather
that they make legible the cracks and disjunctures of such imaginaries, showing us what
it looks like when those who have previously felt close to those imaginaries lose access to
them. These are not only the wealthy or mobile, but also those who are invested in the
stakes of national representation and global belonging. As postcolonial contexts like

3. What is now known as “financial engineering” created a muddied, mutually beneficial
relationship between the banks, state, and ruling elite for years, leading to a dependency on the
flow of fresh US dollars into the economy (Halabi & Sami 2019).
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Lebanon and Egypt show, these narratives have real, material effects. Narratives of
national failure impact decisions about loan crediting, intervention, and even coups,
cycles which are part of postcolonial conditions. Further, these narratives have great
circulatory power online, revealing undergirding economies which help sustain
imaginaries built on national exceptionalisms.
Social media platforms were a key site of fascination through which judgments of
revolution took place due to the imaginaries they are embedded in. They are not neutral
sites through which information spreads but exist in overlapping media systems where
narratives of global connectedness are intrinsic to their design and usability (van Dijck
2013). Developing out of an infrastructure which cultivates techno-utopian imaginaries of
connectivity, platforms have promised interconnectedness and community as vital parts
of everyday life, even while they have become increasingly corporatized and baked into
everyday functions. While concepts like “following,” “sharing,” and “liking” are
expressed in human-centered ways, they are also guided by forms of value-acquisition
and goals of growth which guide and sustain these platforms. This is key to thinking
through their connections to desires for global belonging. In these ways, the imaginaries
of connectedness which shape platforms align with the cosmopolitan imaginaries of these
differently ‘exceptional’ nations.
This also means that they are prime sites for the staging of failures to live up to
ideals of tolerance, connectedness, and openness. It is to these scandals of economic and
moral failure that I turn to next through the lens of the digital bahdala. These are
transnational scandals where national figures are invested with shame, embarrassment,
and humiliation for their failure to instill cosmopolitan nationhood. These show how the
12

digital bahdala, as an event and state of feeling, is a way of contending with the threat of
unbelonging in what feels like an increasingly precarious world.
Each of the selected case studies were chosen because of their relationship to the
idea of bahdala. Publics specifically reference bahdala in some form, whether it is
accepted as deserved or refuted in resistance. These reactions have included conferrals
and rejections of Third World status, worldliness, and national exceptionalism. These are
sites where a threatened modernity is conjured and feelings like shame, embarrassment,
and humiliation are mobilized. In these ways, bahdala can be thought of as an orienting
emotion and event, cohering subjects into divergent collectivities. It is both a framework
and a phenomenon through which to understand how people work to repair slighted
nationalisms.
The next section will discuss and contextualize the digital bahdala through related
concepts in communication and media studies. I will first situate it within work on affect
and emotion, and then discuss its manifestation online.
Bahdala, affect theory, and digital media
As a digital genre, bahdala has a set of conventions and codes that relate to both the
content and way in which the content is being communicated and shaped. As a social and
technological concept (Gledhill 2000, Neale 1980), genre provides frames for
recognizing interrelated codes and meaning in a digitally mediated world. Other
scholarship has explored the genre conventions of political speech, viewing US political
discourse post-911 as melodrama (Anker 2014), or analyzing public discourse around the
ICC and pan-Africanist pushback through genre conventions like victimhood and
martyrdom (Clarke 2018). The leak has been offered as a digital genre through which to
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understand the scandals and movements in the MENA region over the last decade, but
also beyond, to the limitations of understanding Wikileaks or the leaks of images at Abu
Ghraib as liberal Enlightenment rather than embodied communication (El-Ariss 2019).
This dissertation draws on this work to similarly offer bahdala as a digital genre which
explains the maintenance of contemporary national imaginaries through a focus on
embodied communication.
Bahdala can be linked to other embodied concepts and practices like the
“clapback,” the “read,” the “call-out,” and respectability politics through its relationship
to authority, respect, and performance. It has been described as ridiculing someone to
make others lose respect for them, often by commenting and messing with their
appearance and dress (Abdelhamid 2018, Fakhry 2016). As defined in the Hans-Wehr
Dictionary, its verb form means “to insult,” “to treat contemptuously,” “to expose,” and
“to make a laughingstock of” (Wehr & Cowan 1994). It has also been linked to colloquial
terms like tajris, which relates to the days when suspected criminals would be placed on a
donkey and paraded around town while someone rang a bell and announced their crimes
(Abdelhamid 2018, Fakhry 2016). In this way, bahdala is an entire event which involves
a subject, an audience, and an embarrassing talk-down.
Bahdala has a strong didactic component which is apparent in the colloquial
usage of the term to describe a familial scolding, often one which comes from an elder.
There is a material component to bahdala, evidenced by colloquial phrases like, “‘akalet
bahdala,” which translates literally to, “I ate humiliation.” Across Twitter, a search of
variations of the word bahdala will return images of animals, dumbfounded facial
reactions, and embarrassing situations which warrant embarrassment.
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Bahdala can be compared productively to respectability politics due to this
didactic nature and its relationship to mobility imaginaries. Respectability politics, or
what Frederick Harris (2014) has called “the turn-of-the-twentieth-century black middleclass ideology” refers to practices which are enforced to ensure upward mobility (Pitcan
et al 2018). Its reliance on individual progress and its moral policing of appearance and
behavior are argued to promote neoliberal aspirations, “where uplift entails transforming
individuals rather than transforming communities” (Harris 2014, p. 34). The emphasis on
correction of bad behavior finds links with bahdala through similar commentary on
individual dress, speech, and bodily comportment as a site of moral policing.
Bahdala and respectability politics are intertwined through their relationship to
didactic performances within family and authority structures. In the US context, this
occurred through policing and self-policing in order to facilitate socioeconomic success.
Extrapolating this diagnostic of socioeconomic dependency to the global context, it is a
useful framework for thinking about postcolonial countries and their relationship to
former colonial countries and international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.
Both concepts relate to an economic viability which is sought and reproduced,
highlighting the way that national structures are maintained through relationships of
dependency.
Both bahdala and respectability politics share a connection to shame. Shame has
been a central affect in the discussion of digital media. In communications research,
shame has been central to discussions of media and exposure (Banet-Weiser 2018, Chun
2016, El-Ariss 2019, O’Neill 2022, Paasonen 2021). This research describes the
proliferation of shame through networked communication and the very reliance of social
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media platforms on the power of shame. Shame is recognized for its troubling of the
boundaries of the public and private, boundaries which digital media remap. It is also said
to be increasing, if the critical mass of literature is an indication of its perceived
prominence in digital life.
Shame has also occupied a central position in work on affect theory. In one of the
first texts that ushered in the “affective turn” in the 1990s, Evelyn Sedgwick (2003) wrote
of shame’s important role in both affect theory and communication. Locating an
important origin of affect theory between structuralism and poststructuralism in the work
of Silvan Tomkins, Sedgwick and Frank (1995) offer that this helped to recognize the
cognitive and the affective as inescapably intertwined. Relevant to this project, shame
becomes part of a thinking and feeling mechanism which is connected to ideas of failure
and rejection, but also a potential interest or enjoyment which has been cut off and leads
to shame. Shame can be understood as a communicative event which says something
about personal, social, and political desires.
At the same time, a significant segment of communication studies opts toward a
different strand of affect theory which recognizes affect as networked. Drawing on an
alternative to the Sedgwick-Tomkins dialectic of affect theory, the Massumi-Deleuzian
dialectic of affect theory views affects as autonomous and outside of structure. In his
work, Massumi offers the contemporary networked media moment as a particularly
affective time. While both dialectics recognize the need for non-linguistic theories of
power, this first branch adopts a less rigid binary between affect and emotion. In contrast,
Massumi’s (2002) autonomous affect stands apart from emotion based on consciousness
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and signification, separating feeling into things that bodies feel and things that make
those bodies feel. Affect here takes on a relatively disembodied quality.
Proponents have utilized this strand to offer accounts of networked publics and
affect (Dean 2015, Paasonen, Hillis & Petit 2015, Papacharissi 2015), describing the
ways that intensities are transferred through complex configurations of humans, nonhumans, and machines. Such accounts note that “networked digital structures of
expression and connection are overwhelmingly characterized by affect” (Papacharissi
2015, p. 8), describing the ways that affects have become central to the analysis of digital
publics. These also align with earlier work on affective and immaterial labor. In an
illustrative example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) have referred to the
“production and manipulation of affect” which is indicative of what they call a new
“informational economy.”
We can see that when we utilize this autonomous notion of affect and its capacity
to move through networks, we lose sight of important questions of power that the
performative practices of respectability politics and bahdala foreground. For one, the
power differentials and distribution of resources are flattened, suggesting that affects like
shame move across national boundaries through digital technologies. Bahdala, as a
communicative event, disrupts the idea that digital technologies have the power to move
emotions in and out of bodies. It recognizes instead the politics of mobilizing emotion,
questioning metanarratives of the revolution and their role in this body of literature.
Introducing a transnational perspective can help complicate the above assertions
of a networked affect and attenuate material histories as integral to the discussion of
affect. Recognizing this, Dan Schiller (2015) questioned Hardt and Negri’s
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conceptualization of “information society” and claims that networks constitute a whole
new realm of affective, immaterial, and intellectual labor. Schiller (2015) notes that
rather, part of the issue is the focus on the work of those in wealthy countries who have
outsourced manufacturing labor. In other words, he emphasizes the need to carefully
interrogate power relations as they take place across nations, shifting view from vantage
points or a focus on the computerized side of labor. These and related interventions
(Ahmed 2004) show how labor produces affects and imaginaries, complicating notions of
disembodied, networked affect moved by machines and into bodies.
In doing so, we can see that some of this literature on networked affect as not only
relevant to the Arab uprisings but formed directly through a fascination with the uprisings
and their narration as technologically mediated and sparked call to action. Much of the
work on networked affect has referenced or focused on the uprisings as prime examples
of networked communication in action, facilitating the spread, flow, and transmission of
affect into bodies across the region (Boler & Davis 2021, Castells 2015, Papacharissi
2015). In such formulations, affect becomes “the energy that drives, neutralizes, or
entraps networked publics” (Papacharissi 2015, p. 7). Affect here is described as the glue
that binds publics through Internet technologies.
Such approaches to digital media which describe affect as autonomous energy
help extend metaphors of platforms as purveyors of liberation and autonomy from
oppressive structures, like the nation. This form of networked affect comes to resemble
the way that “networks have helped in a myriad of ways to enable the extension and
recomposition of global commodity chains” (Schiller 2015, p. 11). Indeed, in 2010, the
year before the uprisings took place, Facebook executive noted the significant size of
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their market in the Arab world, saying, ““Now is the time where there are enough people
[to make] brands sit up and listen” (Schreck 2010 as cited in Sakr 2013, p. 324). This is
important considering that imaginaries of cyberspace were themselves predicated on
Orientalist fantasies of navigation (Chun 2021). As Chun (2016) notes, formulations of
networked affect must be understood with these histories in mind, as they tell us more
about the conditions which give rise to them than they do about the technological power
they describe.
Rather than opting toward networked affect, I identify digital bahdala by opting
toward Sara Ahmed (2004)’s approach to emotions as operating through affective
economies. In Ahmed’s formulation, emotions are generated as objects circulate. Like
capital, they gain value by circulating and moving through the world. Through this
framework, an emotion like shame is powered through affective economies. This
approach to the sociality of emotions in what Ahmed (2010) calls ‘feminist cultural
studies’ (Ahmed 2004, Cvetkovich 2012, Schaefer 2015) gets us away from essentialist
notions of what emotions or affects intrinsically are, and closer to materiality, or what
they do in the world. Ahmed’s phenomenological approach does this by recognizing
embodied life as part of any analytics of power. This has helped to complicate the
literature on the psychology of emotions, offering a framework for the sociality of
emotions. It critiques an “inside-outside” or “outside-in” model of discrete emotions
which exist inside or outside the body, complicating the idea of disembodied and
networked affect.
By viewing emotions as produced through affective economies, bahdala can be
examined for the value it creates. Rather than focusing on the shame of the recipient of an
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embarrassing talk-down, bahdala is a pedagogical and didactic performance meant to put
someone in their place. Its definition focuses not on the individual subject and its feeling,
but on making others lose respect for someone. As a moment of impression-making,
bahdala focuses more on the audience that is implied as watching the person who is
being made a laughingstock. Through its links to older practices like tajris, it recognizes
the embodied and pedagogical spaces in which objects and subjects are made and
remade. Bahdala is a way of maintaining and repairing sutured nationalisms.
Taking a cue from Edward Said’s understanding of Orientalists, I find that the
understanding of networked affect as sparking the MENA uprisings says more about the
imaginaries in which those discourses are shaped than it says about the uprisings in the
region. Here, the Arab world can be a framework for complicating the fantasy of
autonomous, networked affect. Some scholarship at the intersection of media and the
uprisings has adopted a more capacious understanding of communication which brings
performance into the picture. This work has investigated cultural traditions which can
complicate contemporary digital media practices as inherently more affective. For
example, “tagging” in late 19th century Egypt can be connected to contemporary forms of
tagging on social media platforms, helping Egyptians turn British officials into comedic
devices rather than centers of authority (Fahmy 2011). This foreshadows and sustains
into the digital practices of the contemporary moment, when creative insurgents projected
their body in the mobilizations (Kraidy 2016), as well as the data leak, as ‘leaking’ is also
a trope in Arabic literature and therefore an affective condition across place and time (ElAriss 2019). This work productively examines the region and its uprisings as a
framework and not a case study for the study of media and mobilization.
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This approach homes in on a pedagogical dimension, cultivating subjectivities in
the face of threatened global belonging. One framework for this pedagogy which this
dissertation relies on is Ahmed’s (2004) approach to the transmission of affect.
Describing it, Donovan Schaefer (2015) writes:
“The pedagogical space is not constituted simply by a passive field of receptors,
but by a recursive dynamic of embodied histories receiving impressions, marking,
scoring, and reshaping them, then rebroadcasting them to other bodies. TOA is
not only a unidirectional broadcast—a signification—but a queer recursion, a
dynamic of spiraling transmission and reconfiguration” (p. 66).
Bahdala and the recoding that takes place are one example of this pedagogical space. It
orients our attention to the communication that takes place through learning. For Ann
Pellegrini (2007, 2009), evidence of this pedagogy comes in the messages which teach
the more mundane things, or the very transcendent things. Drunk driving videos, for
example, work to recode feelings of recklessness that might be associated with driving,
into feelings of fear around crashing. Religious conversion performances, similarly, work
to recode practices or experiences that might seem pleasurable—like adultery, drugs, or
homosexuality—seem fearful.
In this way it allows us to develop the link between recoding and communication.
In this formulation, we must look at the points of recursion that are part of
communication. While shame has been described as a “an immediate situation of twoway communication, something seemingly denied when in actuality amplified in
networked communications,” (Chun 2016, p. 154) bahdala alerts us to the recursive,
relational, and social dimension of affect. For this reason, we need to understand the
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kinds of symbols, performances, and rhetoric used to cultivate different ways of feeling
in the world. It is to this dimension in popular media that I turn next.

Staging, recoding, engineering bahdala
Of interest to this dissertation is the way that people perform online the kinds of
admonishments, refusals, and acceptances that will help them to recuperate the economic
and moral failure of the nation. As an event which relates to one’s status and place in the
world, it is helpful to think of bahdala as a genre along longer histories than the digital in
which this social dynamic is present. This opens opportunities to think about linkages
between digital phenomena and older performative practices in which public shaming
took place (Clark 2020, El-Ariss 2019, 2020; Fahmy 2011; Kraidy 2016, Stewart 1996).
For example, the practice of radh, a speech pattern of verbal mudslinging (Stewart 1996)
in Egypt serves as a diagnostic of Sunni and Shiite Muslim tensions, as it has pointed to
public forums where sanctioned denunciations of the Shiite were performed.4 Fahmy
(2011) also writes of the collective shaming which took place in pre-independence Egypt
coffee shops where anticolonial revolutionaries publicly denounced as traitors those who
wanted to take a more moderate stance toward the British. During the recent uprisings in
the MENA region, satirical and carnivalesque performances and visuals were produced
and performed to ground the classical leader, or the one who is untouchable in less
revolutionary times (Kraidy 2016). Such performances, wielded from ‘below’ or ‘above,’
have longer communicative traditions. The semi-public and public sites here range from
4. Stewart identifies this speech pattern to show how leadership in the Egyptian region cultivated
negative feelings around the Shiites through performance, even linking this speech pattern to
public conversion rituals to Sunni Islam
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coffee shops and streets, where people wielded the power to ground or embarrass, to
social media platforms where it can be returned across national contexts.
As the first case study in this dissertation shows, they may be seen as “cutting
through” systems of signification to ground the responsible. These can be thought of as
quasi-trials, or justice-making sites in spaces where more formal mechanisms are felt to
have failed. This is itself a belief which is itself embedded in a cosmopolitan imaginary
of international frameworks of justice (Brants 2012, Clarke 2018), especially about
postcolonial contexts. Such trials have been recognized at colonial contact zones in
Arabic literature and political texts (El-Ariss 2013), the ushering of the satellite era in the
region (Kraidy 2009), the role of television in contending with proxy war and violence
(Osman 2020), and the real and felt sites of justice-making around the ICC and PanAfricanist pushback (Clarke 2018). These trials stage “performances and contestations…
of modernity” (El-Ariss 2013) and make the body a site of contestation (Mourad 2014),
where it is mined for its representational value. Wazmah Osman (2020), writing of the
Afghan context, notes that television serves a justice-making function, operating “as the
judge, jury, and executioner of warlords and criminals” (p. 184). At these sites, national
imaginaries are contested and reproduced.
If national imaginaries coevolve with media technologies, then tracing digital
scandals along a longer history of media development shows that the satellite television
era is an important precursor to social media platforms for their own trials of national
failure. The introduction of satellite television in the 1990s offered the Arab world the
“largest share of the public sphere” (Mellor et al 2011, p. 96). Since then, much work was
done on journalistic practices during this time, especially Al Jazeera, but another group
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of work has examined popular media and the national scandals which took place on
television programming (Della Ratta 2014, Kraidy 2009, Salamandra 2012). Musalsalat,
or Arabic-language television drama stirred controversy around notions of modernity and
desirability in imported Turkish programming (Salamandra 2012). More relevant to these
case studies is reality television due to its framing as a predecessor to social media
content production and consumption in offering audiences the chance for what has been
called “the promise of interactivity” (Andrejevic 2004, p. 11). In the MENA region
especially, reality television brought new modes of engagements by publics who engaged
in spectatorship and judgment around contested forms of authenticity (Kraidy 2009).
These included contestation around proxy war, intervention, social custom, and other
dimensions of national politics.
With this literature on popular media in mind, I turn to the way that publics
recode the bahdala, or perform and cultivate more desirable ways of belonging in the
world. As a way of creating and resisting structures of respectability and belonging, the
digital bahdala attunes us to the way that people wield resonant symbols, artifacts, and
rhetorical moves to cultivate more favorable ways of belonging in the world. These
recoding performances involve the restaging of events or experiences marked as
embarrassing or humiliating and turning them into the grounds for pride, strength, and
dignity. To understand the meaning of these processes, I offer the notion of recoding to
describe the ways that people take part in processes and performances of cultivating
different affective states. I do this by turning to scholarship in not only communication
but studies of affect, religion, and gender (Anker 2014, Butler 1993, El-Ariss 2019, Hall
1973, Pellegrini 2007, Schaefer 2015). This literature offers ways of building a theory of
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recoding as cultivating new feeling patterns around events and experiences, such as the
ones that contribute to national imaginaries.
Perhaps the most notable contribution to this literature is Stuart Hall’s (1973)
discussion of the encoding/decoding model. This describes the production and reception
of messaging and involves a range of approaches which explain how texts are ascribed
with meaning. This includes analyzing production by considering socioeconomic and
cultural factors and patterns, decision-making, and motivation. They also include
analyzing the reception of texts by analyzing whether decoders and encoders recognize
the same meaning in texts, leading to preferred, negotiated, or oppositional meanings
(Hall 1973). This means that scholarship working through this framework has often
investigated whether there is a gap between intended and received meanings. Recoding
helps to introduce alternative problematic to this process as it takes place online, offering
meaning as interpreted and performed.
Hall’s model of social reproduction was instructive for an analytic like recoding.
Hall’s project was different from behaviorist models of communication at the time which
adopted sender-receiver models. He recognized the discursive realm of communication as
capturing a set of institutional conventions and structures of production which inform
messages, such histories, events, and institutional structures which enter the discursive
realm at a particular moment of production. This leaves room for an analytic which
works beneath, beside, and around the discursive, not quite encapsulated by it but related
to it. Hall’s (1985) later mediation on Althusser’s recapitulation of Marx emphasizes this
through the idea of social reproduction, offering a model of structure which is based on
past practices—“practice is how a structure is actively reproduced” (p. 95-6). This offers
25

a way of thinking about the reproduction of social structures as they are actively lived. In
the production and circulation of these digital practices, social reproduction helps explain
the way that practices of recoding utilize encoded meanings to forge new decodings.
In the digital media context, where social media consumers create new media
texts as they respond to others, retooled frameworks are required to understand how
meaning is created. Recoding is especially relevant to digital practices and brings affect
into the discussion of media texts by considering them as not only texts but
performances. Such approaches recognize performativity as enacting and producing
reality through speech acts which connect to broader accepted codes and norms (Butler
1993). This can be mined by examining rhetoric and symbols used in such performances,
recognizing the way that emotions are mobilized to enact meaning and accord value to
ideas. As Ahmed (2004) notes, these are “performative and they involve speech acts,
which depend on past histories of association, at the same time they generate effects” (p.
13). In performance, such codes are relied upon even as they are reworked to feel
differently. For example, Ann Pellegrini (2007, 2009) offers that evangelical
communities utilize secular pedagogies of fear to cultivate belief and the feeling of
marginalization. In theatrical performances like the Hell House, or the evangelical
church’s version of the secular haunted house, identity is reaffirmed through the recoding
of scenes of pleasure into scenes to be feared. As such, what they confirm through
performances is a vulnerability which motivates them to craft new feeling states in
response to undesirable ones.
Taken together, Hall (1973, 1985) and Pellegrini (2007, 2009) offer a way of
recognizing the world outside of discourse but also its relationship to discourse as a
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tangible way of tracing it. Hall’s recognition of the realm outside of the discursive which
must be structured into the discursive to be mediated, and Pellegrini’s recognition of
performance’s mobilization of dominant codes to change one’s feeling toward them, offer
a way of studying the role of embodiment and feeling in communication. Recoding
emerges as an analytic that describes the interface between publics remediating cultural
texts by utilizing encoded meaning.
These modes of communication which foreground performance and embodiment
take on important meaning in the aftermath of revolutions which became entertainment
for international publics watching on, inevitably shaping metanarratives of their rise and
fall. Since the uprisings, much work has studied the relationship between platforms and
political mobilization, including news practices, protest organization, and public
discourse (Castells 2015, Howard & Hussain 2013, Lim 2012, Khatib 2012, Papacharissi
2015, Papacharissi & Olivera 2012, Tufekci 2017), investigating them for evidence of
challenges to dominant structures. Across this literature, the power of citizens and
protestors to wield counter-hegemonic meaning that challenges dominant power
structures.
Less work has examined digital practices after the uprisings, where publics work
to reproduce national imaginaries and ideals, contending with a status of worldliness that
is under threat. There are new opportunities to channel narratives of national failure,
including through social media ‘influencers’ and ‘microcelebrities’ who generate rewards
for their digital practices (Banet-Weiser 2018, Marwick 2015) as well as the
entrenchment of persisting centers of power, such as politicians and television networks
(Sakr 2013). In this dissertation, television networks, news anchors, and media hosts
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converge with emerging digital activist groups and content creators, all on social media
platforms to recode conferrals of national failure, rendering legible the purchase of
national exceptionalisms mobilized in defense to these conferrals.
Cosmopolitan imaginaries of the nation and social media platforms then converge
in this dissertation. Rather than neutral sites of public discourse, platforms may present as
neutral sites which offer real-time empowerment but are inseparable from the regional
and state politics, as well as the commercial logics of broadcasting, production, and
publishing industries (Gillespie 2010). What is of interest to this dissertation is the way
that imaginaries around digital technologies foreground the performative dimension of
communication. For example, Taina Bucher (2018) notes the importance of recognizing
the cultural power of algorithms, drawing attention to not necessarily their technical
components, but the ways that they are inseparable from widely accepted imaginaries of
what they do. What is more, gendered economies are revealed to prop up these
imaginaries, revealing the forms of value for some which are conferred through the labor
of others (Banet-Weiser 2018, Hochschild 1983).
This dissertation takes a transnational approach to the above literature, positioning
the nation-state as a vital organizing framework for understanding popular digital culture
today. In doing so, it joins other work which recognizes the ways that digital cultures
require a retooling of concepts like “cultural imperialism, dependency, heterogeneity,
resistance, cosmopolitanism, and hybridity” and an incorporation of newly resonant
concepts like “precarity, data, affect, circulation, and sharing” (Punathambekar & Mohan
2019, p. 4), bringing together scholarship on global media, popular culture, and affect. I
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next describe my methodology for investigating such questions, aiming for a relational
approach to communication through the foregrounding of affects and emotions.
Methodology
This project utilizes a mix of qualitative and interpretive approaches to the study of
digital media, large-scale events, and sociocultural and geopolitical contexts. To
understand the world around these events, I employ boundary-making strategies for my
case studies and analyze them using a mixture of textual, thematic, and hermeneutic
approaches. These approaches have allowed me to examine the production and
maintenance of national imaginaries, as well as the kinds of value and legitimacy they
generate in the media and political landscape.
My approach and interest in asking such questions is the result of my experience
living in the US and Lebanon and attending schooling and university across both
countries. As a PhD student at the University of Pennsylvania, I was faced with questions
about context which forced a constant reflexivity and produced the very context that was
sought out. These questions of context, combined with the ‘canon’ of communications,
led me to seek out topics which I could converse with fellow peers about. I turned to
cases around economic collapse, sexual harassment, and what has been called ‘modernday slavery,’ or the kafala system. In the process, I found that what resonated were
feelings of shame or embarrassment about the stories I was reading and writing about in
the US context. As a Lebanese American, I sought to trouble this feeling and question its
structural source and analytical utility. Each case was then both personal and structural,
making affect theory a useful framework to consider political imaginaries.
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For this reason, I considered the kinds of affects which were being invoked in
these postrevolutionary events, in parallel considering the material structures I was
situated within. This lens then shifted from shame or humiliation to a more targeted
notion of bahdala. This was twofold: I found that each case had several social media
posts which described the events as bahdala. This helped to complicate the popular
discourse around social media and shame, which tended to focus on the potential feelings
of shame in those who were being exposed online. With bahdala as a framework, I was
able to consider the kinds of value and labor which were being produced through these
practices, rather than being able to specify whether shame was being transferred into
bodies. This helped inform my methodological approach to bounding these case studies
and my conception of emotion which approached it as part of an affective economy.
I rely especially on Sara Ahmed (2004, 2010) as a guiding methodological
framework to tether together and analyze my media artifacts as case data. Ahmed’s
(2004) approach identifies affective economies channeled through rhetoric in public
culture. Through the mobilization of narratives, such as the shame of the nation or the
strength in resistance to attack, concepts and ideas are produced, such as Egypt as the
“mother of the world” or Lebanon as a “mosaic” of diversity. Attention to these “sticky,”
or affectively resonant, symbols (Ahmed 2004)—like the international football star or the
adult film star— helps identify the “links between bodies and power” (Schaefer 2015, p.
9). I gathered my case data by following such rhetoric and its objects and analyzing the
social media commentary, online news media, and television programming which were
referenced in relation to the events I analyzed. Further, Ahmed’s (2004) approach
recognizes the inherently relational and social nature of emotion and the subjects and
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bodies they bring to life. Commensurate with feminist scholarship, this was integral to
considering the way that the good feeling of some depends on the labor of others. In this
way, a focus on the economy of affect allowed me to consider questions of power and
value as they become legible in moments of national scandal. This is especially important
for a geopolitical analysis which considers the way that imaginaries are channeled
through both rhetoric and capital. Such an approach is not only useful but imperative to
understanding the way that value is created and invested into the subjects and objects that
circulate through digital media.
I join other scholars who are using Ahmed’s (2004) framework as methodology,
developing a hermeneutic phenomenological approach to the study of affect. As Anna
Berg, Christian von Scheve, Yasmine Ural, and Walter Walter-Jochum (2019) write in
their work on the methodological links between discourse, language, and affect, this
approach “foregrounds affective phenomena as a hermeneutic lens, capitalizing on affect
and emotion as sensitizing concepts in the interpretation of discourse” (p. 51). The
hermeneutic circle (or spiral) is an apt way to consider the meaning of affective
articulations as part of an interpretive practice. This recognizes the traditions through
which communicative communities make sense of and interpret, making a recognition of
the sociohistorical context imperative. It also privileges the social nature of meaningmaking, understanding, and interpretation, making it a useful approach to recognize that
the rhetoric about affects like shame is employed to mobilize more desirable realities.
Approaching texts in this way allowed me to consider digital practices as recoding,
considering the meaning they interpreted and applied to national scandals. In the process,
I also engage with the historical and cultural traditions which inform bahdala and the
31

meanings of folkloric and colloquial language, considering their meanings as
communicative traditions. By supplementing a hermeneutic approach with a
phenomenological approach, it also introduces a “systematic attempt to uncover and
describe the structures, the internal meaning structures, of lived experience” (Van Manen
2016, p. 10). These structures of experience were invoked as national publics contended
with the aftermath of revolution and narratives of state failure. Adopting this approach
helped me to think through this rhetoric as part of both everyday life and major events
which alter these structures in profound ways.
To complicate the idea of networked autonomous affect through these
frameworks, I focused on the connections between platforms, publics, and the
sociopolitical and geopolitical context as I collected data. To do so, I combined two
approaches. The first was to incorporate Marwan Kraidy’s (2009) approach to studying
reality television in which he examined several transnational scandals, a media form, and
a geopolitical and industry analysis. The second approach was to borrow methods from
anthropology as a boundary-making strategy. These methods included George Marcus’
(1995) approach to multi-sited ethnography, Jenna Burrell’s (2009) extension of this
work into networked field sites, and Kraidy’s (2016) method of ‘scraping’ historical and
popular archives to investigate symbolic practices of creative insurgency. Marcus’
instructive to “follow the metaphor” provides a productive way to track and trace
affective economies that generate bahdala. Burrell’s extension also applies some of
Marcus’ approaches to networked multisite ethnography, including “follow the person,”
“follow the object, and “follow the metaphor” (1998a:79 as cited in Burrell p. 183).
These are ways of recognizing the materiality of the person, object, or metaphor (as
32

discourse) while also opting for attention to movement and mobilization. She writes,
“These arguments highlight how movement is central to social practice but also that
coherent cultural processes may take place across great distances, linking up disparate
entities” (1998a:79 as cited in Burrell p. 183). Kraidy’s (2016) and El-Ariss’s (2019)
approaches allowed me to link bahdala and relevant symbolism to older performative
practices in the Arab world. By following metaphors and objects, I sketch out episodes of
bahdala as digital genre. In each chapter, I follow the metaphors of humiliated nations,
proud soldiers, and suspicious outsiders, as well as textual objects like memes, videos,
and phrases which are continually invoked. In doing so, I sketch out the symbols and
ideas that are particularly useful in engaging in bahdala. This gave me a sense of the
desires and fears that shape these publics.
I focused on a different platform in each case to highlight a different aspect of
bahdala, selecting case studies which predominantly took place on one platform over
another. This meant incorporating understanding of the affordances and sociotechnical
qualities of the platform which are part of the imaginaries they project. Social media
platforms, landing pages, and mobile applications cultivate alternative forms of
interaction due to their different affordances. This also helped to theorize the interface
between bodies and machines as just that—embodied. With these in mind, I was able to
consider these media texts as evidence of performances toward an imagined audience, as
evidenced by the rhetoric and the platform logic itself.
To begin collecting this data once I bounded the sites of study, I began with the
original pieces of media which ignited controversy across Lebanon and Egypt and
collected social media content which came in response. I used these as orientation points
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through which to collect other kinds of social media content. After familiarizing myself
with the original content and examining the keywords and hashtags that were being used
to be part of conversations about the events, I began conducting keyword and hashtag
searches on the different platforms.
My ability to find this content was dependent on the platform affordances
themselves and the algorithms which affect which content becomes visible to account
holders (Rieder et al., 2018). However, in considering myself, as researcher, as a part of
an assemblage with algorithms, I did not separate myself from the world of social media
content in order to record all data around the scandals. I rather viewed myself as part of
the Lebanese-American diaspora interacting with, consuming, and producing such
content daily. At the same time, I balanced this subjective position by first examining
several social media accounts who posted about the events in question. I was interested in
those with social and economic capital, especially journalists, politicians, and influencers,
due to their reliance on nationalist rhetoric to gain rewards and legitimacy around what
was framed as national humiliation. With this iterative process, I found the keywords and
hashtags which were being utilized and conducted broader searches to examine the most
popular pieces of content. My goal was to identify the major themes and trends in the
most popular commentary about the scandals which were popular in diaspora networks,
allowing me to follow the stories and pull in related content which addressed these
themes across different platforms.
Because I was interested in the content which achieved traction with social media
personalities and news networks, I utilized hashtags and keyword searches across
platforms. While hashtags have been critiqued as a way of studying political resistance
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and activism (Frost 2020), I turned to them to understand which kinds of content were
popular amongst social media influencers, journalists, and politicians who engaged in
nationalist messaging around these scandals. Hashtags have been utilized in work around
affect for their ability to “makes complex phenomena…addressable in a concise way”
(Slaby et al., 2019, p. 30). Hashtags were most useful on Twitter, where I conducted a
preliminary analysis of major accounts who were posting about the event, including the
journalist and politicians on the panel, as well as Lebanese social media influencers,
journalists and media networks commenting on the event. By beginning with these
popular accounts and finding the hashtags that were being used most often, I collected the
top Tweets which used these hashtags. In doing so, I identified three major trends in the
data and stopped collecting once I achieved thematic saturation. These themes, discussed
further in the first case study, were similar to those collected in the third case study which
also took place in Lebanon, allowing me to distinguish between Egyptian and Lebanese
bahdala. Additionally, I examined Tweets by notable media figures who received
substantial engagement on Twitter through quotes, replies, and retweets. These included
the panelists in the case study, but also journalists, entertainers, and political figures with
substantial Twitter followings.
Keyword searches were most useful on YouTube and Facebook, in the second
and third cases, respectively. While on Twitter the hashtag is a useful way to contain an
analysis to those who wish to flag their posts as part of broader discourse about a topic, I
used keyword searches on one profile on Facebook and more widely on YouTube. In this
second case study on YouTube, I additionally I drew from Charles Hirschkind’s (2012)
approach to analyzing YouTube videos, examining the profiles of YouTube accounts and
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watching other content that they produced. With this approach, I identified a group of
digital content creators who regularly post vlogs about social issues in Egypt. I also
analyzed the television programming that was uploaded to YouTube by Dream TV, one
of Egypt’s first two satellite networks launched in 2001, around the Mona Mazbouh case
and analyzed the comments from these videos to get a sense of the traditional media
coverage of the event.
In the third case study about This Is Lebanon, I turned mostly to Facebook. I
examined all posts which took place around one case, identified resonant themes from
these posts and their comments, and connected these themes to commentary in the wider
media landscape. After following the event for some months, I collected all content
around the event by conducting keyword searches in English and Arabic using Tufa’s
name as well as her employers, the Ajami-Khalil family. I then analyzed the posts and
comments, finding general themes which paralleled results from the first case study about
the Lebanese context. In parallel, I followed the page for several months and collected
secondary content which related to the case.
With these frames in mind, I collected and analyzed 62 YouTube videos, of which
24 made it into the final analysis (Appendix B and C), 29 Facebook posts (Appendix C),
and 254 Tweets of which 30 made it into in my final discussion (Appendix A), removing
content which was not centrally related to my chosen cases but which reflected elements
of bahdala that were replicated in the chosen content. All content was found by using
Arabic or English terms, or a mixture of both.
I also considered, as a secondary layer to these social media interactions,
developments in these cases that were central to my analysis as they emerged over the
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last three years. I followed these cases by following hashtags, Facebook profiles, and
YouTube accounts, identifying patterns in their activities. This has allowed me to
consider 1) the way that content was erased and removed from these archives, 2) the role
of censorship as well as feelings about posting after the fact, and 3) the effects of major
events like the Beirut port explosion in Lebanon or the Egyptian state’s recent military
spectacle and how they figure into the meaning of these events as precursors to what is
emerging today. This approach of following the cases over time revealed a gender
dynamic to the kinds of content posted, suggesting feelings of vulnerability about
repercussions to expressing feelings of anger online. It also revealed the ways that these
cases are imbricated in the aftermath of revolution and the maintenance of national
imaginaries.
With this data, I identified major themes using Van Manen’s (2016) thematic
analysis until achieving thematic saturation. I analyzed the narratives, rhetorical frames,
and tone to identify the affects that were being channeled and thus how these publics
performed different ways of interpreting the events. This in turn allowed me to consider
bahdala as a kind of digital genre, where codes and conventions are established and
shared across contexts and forms. Genre conventions constituted one way of grasping the
political import of these events and the kinds of reasoning that they legitimate. Combined
with attention to affect, I found that feeling patterns emerge around bahdala, likening it
to the feeling patterns that are part of, for example, the communicative traditions of
melodrama (Anker 2014). Identifying these patterns led me to the conception of digital
genres as invoking performances from interpretive communities.
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With this thematic framework in mind, I utilized a form of rolling, inductive open
coding to identify the themes across the social media content as I was gathering it. By
both identifying the codes as I searched and reforming codes as I gathered new data, this
approach allowed me to get a sense of the kind of data as a whole as well as the way that
each piece of content fit together and apart from the whole. This approach is
commensurate with the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 1994, Van Manen 2016) and
allowed me to differentiate between Egyptian and Lebanese imaginaries, as well as the
relational labor which produces these imaginaries. Van Manen’s (2016) approach to
hermeneutic phenomenology recognizes the pedagogical dimension of everyday lived
experience, writing, and theory-building. As such, it is relevant to theories of affect
which recognize the pedagogical component of everyday life and theory construction
(Pellegrini 2007, Schaefer 2015, Sedgwick 2003).
I achieved thematic saturation once all of the data I was analyzing could be
grouped into two broad categories with two subcategories within each: invoking
bahdala—either as the nation’s, or as the fault of a problematic minority—or rejecting
bahdala—as the nation’s or as one’s own. This led me to view both broad categories as
similarly concerned with albeit differently oriented toward a ‘global’ community. As
such, these informed my understanding of cosmopolitan imaginaries as those which do
not necessarily determine political orientation but orient it. This interpretation of the data
follows from work on affect theory which recognizes its non-deterministic but orienting
nature.
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Recapitulation
I consider these frameworks, histories, and approaches to examine digital practices
around national failure in two countries which share relational but distinct national
imaginaries—Lebanon as a moral and economic failure of multicultural governance and
Egypt as a moral and economic failure of human rights. In this way, bahdala becomes an
intervention into universalist theories of affect as well as notions of an autonomous
networked affect. It merges communication and performance theory to bring an
embodied dimension into studies of digital media, geopolitics, and scandal. In the
following chapters, I examine the production of national imaginaries as they are produced
online, focusing on how they are staged, recoded, and engineered.
My methodological approach combines affect theory, communication theory, and
communication’s interdisciplinary others, like anthropology, to draw the boundaries of
the bahdala. I do this by identifying affective economies and following their discursive,
rhetorical, and performative dimensions in popular media. Of particular interest are the
symbols, ideas, and people that are invoked to recode the bahdala and to utilize it toward
activist and entertainment ends. In this way, I carve out a method for studying affective
economies in digital media.
The first chapter turns to the staging of the bahdala, where a public invested in
cosmopolitan imaginaries channels it toward a member of the ruling regime. This chapter
highlights the way that bahdala is an entertaining and didactic event—it establishes as it
draws on a hierarchy of global belonging by activating colonial relationships between
nations. It previews the second chapter and its focus on recoding, or the process of
turning an experience felt as humiliating into an event which becomes the grounds for
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pride. In this way digital bahdala becomes the means through which to launch nationalist
resistance, where publics take hold of encoded symbols in the national imaginary and use
them to convert conferred shame into strength. Here, I examine the gendered labor which
constitutes the bahdala, as national imaginaries rely on the labor of women, the gender
non-conforming, and exploited others to maintain them. In the third chapter, I flesh out
what is different about this gendered labor as it takes place online by examining the
temporal dimension of digital bahdala. This chapter reveals that digital bahdala relies on
paranoia, or a future-oriented exposure, of . In the last case study, the bahdala is a tactical
method to meet activists’ goals, at the same time drawing on the labor of the exploited to
make others feel something.
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STAGING THE BAHDALA AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM: THE
AFFECTIVE TRIAL OF LEBANON
“What does it mean for the theory and practice of social transformation when feeling
good becomes evidence of justice’s triumph?” (Berlant 1999)
“Shame can linger, layer, and grow into a sense of humiliation, it can be perceived in the
much lighter hues of embarrassment, and it can slide by so that others become
embarrassed for the one who shows no shame.” (Paasonen & Sunden 2021)

For a Lebanese public on the heels of a revolution, the 2020 World Economic Forum
(WEF) became a curious media spectacle. The annual event which gathered the global
elite—corporate leaders, politicians, media moguls, NGO directors, and select
academics— was not widely considered to be primetime entertainment. However, the
invite-only event which took place on January 23 in Davos, Switzerland made headlines
across the country due to the controversy that erupted around the presence of one of
Lebanon’s most notorious political actors, Gebran Bassil. Bassil was not only the leader
of the largest Christian bloc of Lebanese parliament but was the son-in-law of Lebanon’s
president and had served in a host of ministerial positions in the years past. In the context
of mass mobilizations that had erupted on October 17, 2019, Bassil’s was one of several
names chanted in calls for the downfall of the ruling regime. In an unprecedented if
cosmetic and ultimately temporary move, the cabinet stepped down following weeks of
protests against corruption and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions.
Following the announcement of a panel entitled, “The Return of Arab Unrest”
which was to include Bassil as a speaker, a petition circulated online calling for him to be
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disinvited. It cited his inability to represent Lebanon “on the world stage” (“Gebran
Bassil no longer” 2020), asking Klaus Schwab, Chairman of the WEF to remove Bassil
as a speaker. However, Bassil was not disinvited, and the event became an anticipated
one after CNBC International correspondent Hadley Gamble promised through the screen
not to go easy on Bassil. Keeping her promise, her questioning of Bassil became
something of a spectacle for its performative dimension. As the panel vacillated between
a grilling, a roast, and a trial of Bassil, spectators watched on, releasing a flurry of
memes, jokes, and admonishments online. These material tracings of Internet users’
feelings ran the spectrum from articulations of humiliation to joy. Some opined Bassil as
a dignified martyr who stood in the face of Western imperialism while others celebrated
correspondent Gamble as the heroic journalist that the Lebanese public deserved. Some
contested his complicity in a nepotistic ruling order and others couldn’t stomach
Gamble’s posturing, contrasting her comportment with friendly allies.
Of particular interest to this chapter is the WEF ‘grilling’ as bahdala, or the
moment or state of didactic humiliation or ridicule. Building on work on scandals in the
region (Kraidy 2009, 2016; El-Ariss 2019) I offer bahdala as a framework to consider the
way that national publics recuperate the nation in the context of economic turned moral
failure. While exposure and scene-making marked the revolutionary period of activist
mobilization and artistic production, the post-revolutionary audience I turn to is invested
in recuperating the national structures that were exposed to mend them. At sites like the
World Economic Forum, where global capital is evaluated, dissected, pledged, and
recirculated to an elite minority, bahdala is a way of teaching a nationhood that is
economically viable. Digital bahdala in this chapter is a postcolonial pedagogy of
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national respectability which utilizes the affordances of the Internet to playfully point out
the source of failure and ultimately recuperate the nation.
In the digitally mediated post-revolution, such mobilizations of bahdala become
entertaining content for global audiences. I examine the joyful expressions of catharsis
and vengeance which reflected a desire to see the state put on the spot and humiliated.
These moments become quasi trials, where national figures in the region are tried by
media personnel to perform affective justice. I offer that national publics are attuned to
the way that digital media seems to “cut through” systems of signification and embarrass
leaders who show no shame. They take evidence from these performances, using them to
recode symbols and scenes of humiliation and shame into ones of dignity and pride.
However, by incorporating notions of embodiment in communicative practices, I
find that while some wish to feel joy by watching the ousted leader be roasted it has
relational effects on spectating others. In wielding shame through the digital bahdala,
there is no guarantee that it will hit its target. Rather, while social media platforms like
Twitter may make the untouchable leader feel like they are closer to touch, it is spectating
others who will be impacted by conferrals of not only failure, but inferiority. In this way,
this chapter discusses the relational dimension of affect and the embodied dimension of
communication. It does so to complicate notions of individual nations and bodies which
propagate in liberal discourses of sovereignty.
In what became a media trial, the international forum becomes the backdrop for
narratives of national failure. Lebanon has been many things to many people since its
inception, and the digital commentary around the spectacle reflects the quagmire of these
alternative imaginaries. These come to the fore as nationals and diaspora contend with the
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reality of a revolution, in all its hopes and defeats, but contend with the impending loss of
what has been produced as an exceptional space by colonial powers and local elites.
These affective economies also bind transnational publics together, from Lebanon to
Pakistan, where others contend with similar discourses of shame and humiliation of
“global” proportions. These connections show how such forums give publics the
evidence needed to perform better political feeling about narratives of failure, and the
way that wielding it elsewhere impacts other bodies beyond the one who allegedly shows
no shame.
I offer the WEF as one node in affective economies of bahdala. To do this, I first
offer an overview of the relationship between Lebanon and institutions like the World
Economic forum. I then turn to the interview which took place on the Davos stage and
examine the affects channeled through the performances of the panelists and interviewer.
To further elucidate the affective work, I turn to commentary around the interview on
digital platforms like Twitter, where transnational publics shared their interpretations and
declarations of feeling. I then discuss the implications for recoding performances as they
relate to practices of conversion, where national figures utilize the rhetoric of
embarrassment, shame, and humiliation to advance geopolitical and class/political
economic interests.
Lebanon, the WEF, and the 'world stage'
The scandal at the WEF must be understood by contextualizing Bassil’s place in the
Lebanese landscape. Bassil is a member of a political class that is commonly in
attendance at the annual meeting of global elite at Davos. He has lauded several titles in
Lebanese politics, including the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Former
44

Minister of Energy and Water, and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants in
Lebanon. He is also the son-in-law of the president, making him the symbol of a
nepotistic regime by detractors. The FPM, which Bassil took leadership of in 2015, is one
among several political parties in Lebanon. As the largest Christian bloc and political
bloc in parliament, it retains the ability to oppose various measures. The FPM is also
allied with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’ite group and political party, an alliance which
has been increasingly criticized by the US for the group’s alliance with the Syrian and
Iranian regimes.
This is a short preview into the sectarian makeup of Lebanon’s power-sharing
system. In the twentieth century, sectarianism has persisted as a more institutionalized of
governance as pacts and agreements which have attempted to settle questions of
economic interests and regional balances. It also has roots in independence from France
in 1943, when a National Pact distributed quotas for governance along sectarian lines,
making Lebanon a state which operated through a ‘balance’ of the confessional
denominations of the various groups. While the pact helped reach a kind of compromise
for alternative visions of what Lebanon was and to whom its sovereignty was defined, the
post-war Ta’if Accord of 1989 became another institutionalization of sectarian powersharing as well as a peace treaty for the end of the civil war. This became a “more
pragmatic approach to Lebanon’s changing demographics and the sectarian military
balance in the country” (Salloukh et al 2019, p. 21). However, the quota of government
posts were made to reflect population ratios without accounting for population change,
meaning that population control is baked into to the anxiety of the nation state today.
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Today, sectarianism is often cited as the reason for Lebanon’s failure as a national
project, revived again and again in international news around the 2019 uprisings.
Sectarianism appears in Orientalist imaginaries as an essentially archaic mode of
governance and culture, referenced in policy, research, and journalistic commentary as a
relic of the past and an obstacle to move beyond on the path to democratic reform. It has
been linked to “tribal” identities (Gause 2013), cited as the reason for economic failure
(Collard 2019). These are not new sentiments, as even Ottoman and European voices of
the time described conflict in Lebanon as part of an archaic and historic clash of tribes
which prevented it from achieving a secular and tolerant state (Makdisi 2000),
minimizing their own role or ideological complicity. Tempting as they might be, such
narratives paint a complex set of historical junctures into a neat box.
These views of sectarianism as an archaic past to be overcome positions Lebanon
has a failed project. It offers Lebanon as “a metaphor for a failed nationalism in the nonWestern world” (Makdisi 2000, p. 3), a discourse which is prevalent in the WEF
interview discourse about its national failure. Rather, as Ussama Makdisi (2000) has
noted, “sectarianism is an expression of modernity” (p. xi). It was a mode of exchange
and problem-solving between local, European, and Ottoman powers, inseparable from
colonial, imperial, and local contact zones (Makdisi 2000, Mikdashi 2014). As such, it
was less an imposition of colonial or imperial rule, and more an asymmetrical exchange
of practices and knowledge (Makdisi 2000, p. 8).
Recognizing sectarianism in this way allows for an understanding of competing
imaginaries which persist to the present day. Up to the nineteenth century, Lebanon (then
Mount Lebanon) was part of Ottoman Empire’s own modernization efforts, where they
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tried to establish an Islamic State while still maintaining friendly relations with other
bodies of power. However, in a problem which would continue to renew itself in new
forms, they struggled because “they were still confronted with the problem of elaborating
a notion of modern Ottoman sovereignty in an age of European hegemony” (Makdisi
2000, p. 11). This European hegemony included interest in what they viewed as
subjugated Christians in the empire and the production of secular statehood. Makdisi
(2000) describes the intermingling of colonial and imperial visions of Lebanon in the
mid-nineteenth century through this politics of religion, writing:
“This context of flux created the conditions for sectarianism to arise not as a
coherent force but as a reflection of fractured identities, pulled hither and thither
by the enticements and coercions of Ottoman and European power.” (p. 11)
Sectarianism then sets the stage for Lebanon’s conflicting and overlapping imaginaries
within and without, internally and externally. In the 20th century, the country’s borders
were negotiated by imperial, colonial, and local powers, with tensions between the
country’s economic autonomy and visions of a French protectorate, a Christian refuge,
and a cosmopolitan pathway to the ‘Orient’ (Traboulsi 2007). These questions were also
fueled by anxiety around the majority Muslim population of Syria, of which Greater
Lebanon was part. As such, there were conflicting visions of sovereignty between a
sovereign Lebanese state or one that identified with a pan-Arab nationalism.5 The former,
which resonates with Bassil’s rhetoric, drew on a supposed Phoenician heritage of the
Lebanese (and mainly Maronite Christians) as direct descendants of a “modern” and

5. These have also been referred to as Lebanism and Arabism, essentially constituting either a
Lebanese or an Arab nationalism (Salloukh et al 2019).

47

culturally and racially distinct Phoenician people (Salloukh et al 2019). On the other
hand, the pan-Arab vision drew on a distinctly Arab territory and people. These tensions
were not always or primarily dictated by religion or sect, but rather conflicting visions of
Lebanon’s exceptional status.6
These tensions played out in the interview, where the US journalist Hadley
Gamble, the Dutch official Sigrid Kaag, the Emirati real estate mogul Hussain Sajwani,
and the ousted Lebanese minister Bassil channeled discourses of secular nationalism, the
value of Lebanon in the region, and comparisons of European and MENA states. While
geopolitically, those on the stage appeared to have an adversarial relationship with Bassil,
they all channeled popular discourse of Lebanon as exceptional, building on hegemonic
and colonial visions from nineteenth century discourses about Lebanon as a Christian
protectorate in an otherwise Muslim region. In many ways, they agreed with Bassil’s
history of emphasis on Lebanese national identity as separate from regional Arabs and
crises.
However, the interview revived historical tensions of the Europeans and
Ottomans doing their part to enact their visions of what Lebanon was to mean for their
own empires. It revived European imaginaries of Lebanon as a “surrounded, and to some
extent contaminated, by and Oriental decadence” (Makdisi 2000, p. 16). Bassil’s alliance
with Hezbollah stood in opposition to the constructions of modern nationhood that were
enacted at the WEF, in large part due to geopolitical considerations. These geopolitical

6. Within mostly Christian Maronite discourse, there were debates about whether the Lebanese
were a distinct people to be protected from Muslim domination of the region or rather a
Mediterranean people who must work with other Arab countries (Traboulsi 2007, p. 98).
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tensions involve the polarity7 between Saudi Arabia and Iran which inform the split in
political alliances within Lebanon. Hezbollah, the FPM, and others under the banner of
“March 8” forming a coalition which have the backing of Syria and Iran ‘against8’ the
“March 14” coalition which is led by former prime minister Saad Hariri, son of
assassinated Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and which has the backing of Saudi Arabia.
While some have framed it as a Shi’a-Sunni clash, it is due to contingent rather than
essential reasons—“partially because those are the lines of division in relation to other
geopolitical and local economic and political issues in this particular historical moment”
(Nucho 2018, p. 37). For these reasons, Bassil’s place in the “March 8” coalition presents
as an impediment to economic prosperity in spaces like the WEF, more friendly to Saudi
Arabia’s modernization path than that of Iran.
Indeed, the WEF was the location which enacted decisions impacting the future of
these countries, building on deeper regional anxieties and tensions between competing
visions of Lebanese sovereignty. In these ways, Lebanon “was to be periodically
reproduced by means of a compromise between the dominant regional and international
powers” (Traboulsi 2007, p. 108). Fadi Bardawil (2020) has described these conflicting
imaginaries, writing:
“Lebanon, founded on a compromise between different infranational sectarian
communities and their supranational (Arab and Western) imaginaries and
loyalties, would continually fail to produce a hegemonic unifying narrative for
what it means to be a Lebanese national” (p. 33)
7

Joanne Nucho (2018) describes these as relatively recent and contingent in nature.
This has been framed as a rivalry, but in these groups shift allegiances depending on the
geopolitical landscape.
8
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The anxieties around this failure run through both the interview and the commentary that
ensued, intensified by the country’s economic collapse and its relationship to
supranational forces. In the years leading up to Lebanon’s mass mobilizations, regional
shifts helped exacerbate an economic collapse as deposits decreased and neighboring
economies fluctuated. Lebanon’s sovereignty has been tied to not only geopolitically to
neighboring Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine, but to streams of foreign capital by
expatriates across the world. Lebanon has been a place where foreign capital was
welcome and sought out, with attractive interest rates for investors and banking secrecy
laws helping it become a haven for the wealthy. Since its inception, the country has relied
on diaspora remittances, or what has jokingly been called Lebanon’s “natural resource”
(Azzi 2021). In this way, the steady inflow of and dependency on US dollars has
intensified older questions of sovereignty.
These deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in the country in the lead-up to the
2019 revolution offered a renewed glimpse into the policies which accelerated inequality
and tied its sovereignty to streams of foreign capital and benefited the ruling elite.
Policies of “financial engineering” have exacerbated the increasing divide between the
elite and the masses. Through policies which promised high interest to depositors and
required the steady influx of fresh US dollars to keep the Lira-USD currency peg afloat,
the banking sector helped prop up what has been called a “Ponzi scheme”
(“Deconstructing the Lebanese” 2020). This, combined with austerity and privatization
measures, have led some to call it the “the experiment that shows neoliberalism’s failure”
(Chehayeb 2020). The recession of state functions in the last few decades has occurred
with the approval of international aid which helps power this system (Bazzi & Hassan
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2020, Chehayeb 2020, Daher 2020). In a piece focusing on the impact of these policies
on the health care sector during the COVID pandemic, Kareem Chehayeb (2020) wrote,
“If Lebanon’s public health care system is a patient on life support, then international
donors are the ventilator.” Such donors include international institutions like the World
Bank and the IMF which have introduced structural adjustments to many countries in the
Global South. As the collapse raged on, an IMF loan became one of the points of note in
public discourse around the collapse, with debates around whether the loan would further
entrench the local regime (Daher 2020, Malik & Haidar 2020, Schellen 2020). This
discourse has intensified after the port explosion of August 4, 2020, when the capital was
decimated by ammonium nitrate which had been stored in port warehouses, plunging the
country into deeper economic turmoil (Bazzi & Hassan 2020).
This history shows the entanglement between Lebanon and its international
community of institutional donors offering conditional aid, tourists attracted to its
romanticized cosmopolitanism, diaspora sending back money in the form of remittances,
and wealthy investors who have aided in the privatization of the country. This
international community was invoked through the WEF Forum and prompted a petition
contesting Bassil’s presence. What was being contested was his ability to present
Lebanon to this international community, “on the world stage” (Khalife 2020). This is
part of the reason that the controversy made a mediatized spectacle out of an event which
does not usually figure as scandalous or popular viewing content for national publics. In
the context of the collapse, with headlines suggesting and questioning whether Lebanon
was a “failed state,” the public had renewed interest in their politicians performing on
“international” stages.
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However, beneath the spectacle lies the reality that the WEF is an annual
performative space, rife with stages, audiences, and events. It features the global elite,
like Bassil and Gamble, who are enmeshed in networks of transnational capital and
engage in discussions about the flow of such capital through moralistic rhetoric. In recent
years, several English-language news and think-tank pieces have called attention to the
exclusivity of the event, questioning its elitism (Burke-White 2020, Lu 2020, Thomas
2020). With keywords like “sustainability,” “innovation,” and “skill,” operating as
buzzwords in panel titles and op-eds about the forum, private sector lingo is awash.
Critics suggest that the WEF has promoted neoliberal discourses and policies which do
not address structural issues of wealth distribution (Child 2018). WEF leadership has
responded to criticisms by promoting initiatives around “more sustainable capitalism,”
(Stiglitz 2020) opting toward a market-based approach to which advocates the need to
involve corporate leadership in questions of global concern (Burke-White 2020). In the
same year as the Bassil spectacle, WEF advocate and economist Joseph Stiglitz (2020)
suggested that “[w]e need to see corporations taking ownership of their actions and
leading by example.” A moralizing element underlies WEF discourse, suggesting a kind
of “trickle-down” approach to rising inequalities.
We may think of it as a pedagogical space where failure and success are
performed. Moralizing discourses pulsated through the panel in question, where he was
charged for his failure and responsibility to provide a sustainable socioeconomic
foundation for the country. This mirrored WEF discourse around the actions of
individuals and companies in delving out more just solutions to inequity, violence, and
climate change, reflecting a neoliberal discourse which personalizes and narrativizes the
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structural determinants of such issues. In an example of this, just two days before the
Bassil interview, when WEF Chairman Klaus Schwab held a panel on “stakeholder
capitalism,” a concept which has gained critique for being more of a PR campaign than
structural change (Denning 2020). Here, the questions of a more moral capitalism were
discussed.9 The framing was one of immoral and corrupt leadership which had failed at
securing Lebanese sovereignty.
This is how the stage is set for the bahdala, or the moment of humiliation or
ridicule. As I have noted, bahdala is a colloquial Arabic term which describes a
performance which aims to ground a person in the eyes of others. It is connected to
fadiha, or the Arabic word meaning the event of exposure (El-Ariss 2019), as well as
traditions of public embarrassment meant to bring disgrace (Fakhry 2014), pointing to its
pedagogical function. In this way, both the WEF and Twitter as a platform are at the
intersection of where bahdala finds its natural home. Both project an ethos of worldliness
which make conferrals of national failure a highlight circulatable discourse within each.
In the context of the WEF as an international forum, bahdala operated as a quasitrial for concerned spectators. It is a site where “affective justice” (Clarke 2019) is carried
out, bringing to the fore the performative dimension of justice-making. Such trials have
been linked to contestations around modernity which come from transnational contact
zones of postcolonial contexts. In a related example, Marwan Kraidy (2009) has
examined the scandal-trials that unfolded as reality television was introduced to the
MENA region, tracing them to the proliferation of new media formats and development.

9. Panel members like Bryan Moynihan, Chief Executive of Bank of America, have often
described a “virtuous circle” which can be measured through metrics to demonstrate the power of
stakeholder capitalism (Woellart 2022).
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They figure as “modernity’s ‘endless trial’ in which various segments of the Arab public
– or more accurately, various Arab publics and counterpublics – play the roles of
defendant, plaintiff, prosecutor, defender, and judge” (p. 202). In the process, they reflect
desires to be read as legible in particular ways.
It is largely these trials and their conferrals of failure that I am interested in. In the
context of its digital mediation, bahdala invites audiences who are invested and standing
to lose the most to watch and witness the conferral of failure to an individual positioned
as deserving it. Bahdala does not only move into a digital space, but it is at home on
platforms like Twitter and the WEF, two institutions which cultivate imaginaries of a
world which is much less representative than they claim it to be. Indeed, just 10% of the
Lebanese population is reported to use Twitter (Dennis et al 2019), reflecting a small
segment of the population. Likewise, the WEF—high-powered corporate leaders, former
and current politicians, academics from private universities and research centers,
celebrity journalists—invokes an audience who invest in its imaginary. In this way,
bahdala sits at the intersection between the nation’s technological and economic
imaginaries.
While much work in the last decade has investigated the role of social media in
the uprisings, as noted in my introduction, I am interested in the audience that is attuned
to this scandal. I next turn to the trial before discussing how it was digitally mediated.
The affective trial of Lebanon
The bahdala finds its perfect home on Twitter as event, due to the imaginary it proffers
and the audience that it interpellates. These are the globally-focused—journalists,
politicians, academics, activists—that the bahdala is oriented toward. Twitter has been
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described as a “‘nervous system for the planet’ and a ‘global newsroom,’” becoming a
central site for the proliferation of news and culture (Burgess & Baym 2020, p. 3-4). As a
corporation, Twitter espoused neutrality and decentralization in its inception, promising
in its early days to be “a platform that empowers citizens to voice opinions and emotions,
that helps stage public dialogues, and supports groups or ideas to garner attention” (van
Dijck 2013, p. 73).
It is this imaginary of debate and dialogue may be evidenced in the home that
Twitter content has found in traditional media outlets. In this case, the WEF as bahdala
was largely recognized by several international outlets. While some press gestured to a
split in audience reactions (Chehayeb 2020), its embarrassing aspect was identified across
the board. Many articles alluded to heat and fire in relation to the panel, noting that Bassil
was “grilled,” (Hilton 2020) came “under fire,” (Ahmad 2020) and was “roasted,”
(Chehayeb 2020). These narratives are largely evidenced by Tweets from the event
embedded in the articles. Numbers of digital signatures—12,000 signatories here, 6,000
signatories there (“Public uproar” 2020)—and Twitter polls—76% voting against
Bassil’s presence (Ahmad 2020)—were cited to represent the dissent of Lebanese
worldwide. Through this discourse, clicks and electronic signatures were presented as
legitimate indicators of a nation’s public sentiment.
It was these online petitions, social media posts, and press outlets who contributed
to the making of the trial. Several posts and petitions noted that Bassil was a corrupt and
incompetent member of the ruling order and would thus be unfit to represent Lebanon
with other dignitaries, while others came to his defense, unleashing petitions to defend
Bassil as a dignified representative with the nation’s interest at heart. Several US-based
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and regional outlets featured Tweets criticizing his place in Davos as well as the petition
that circulated contesting his ability to represent Lebanon. The Change.org petition called
Bassil “a failed, corrupt and especially an ousted minister” and contested his ability to
represent Lebanon on the “world stage” (Khalife 2020).
While the event became a scandalous grilling of Bassil, it was meant to be a panel
entitled “The Return of Arab Unrest” with Dutch Foreign Trade Minister Sigrid Kaag,
and Damac Properties Chairman Hussain Sajwani, and Hadley Gamble, the CNBCI
financial news journalist and moderator. The panel quickly turned into an interview with
Bassil, focusing mostly on the party leader with occasional input from the other panelists.
It became a kind of trial, with Bassil as defendant, Gamble playing the prosecuting
lawyer, and Kaag playing the calm and reasoned judge handing down her sentence:
guilty. With these actors, the stage was set to reprimand and shame the ruling regime of
Lebanon for its failure with Bassil as proxy.
The failure was fiscal and moral. Lebanon, once a pathway to the Orient, a
Christian haven for French colonial powers (Traboulsi 2007), a model of religious coexistence, and more recently, a country with lax banking secrecy laws, was now on the
chopping block for its economic failure. On a panel focused on magnifying and
examining “Arab Unrest,” a colonial dynamic was activated, with a knowing West
exposing inferior governance structures. Their questions described superior economic and
political structures in the allied US, Europe, and Gulf states but a failure to instill the
same values in the rest of the MENA region. In one instance, Gamble asked,
incredulously, what Bassil thought he could possibly teach Boris Johnson and Donald
Trump about running a country. Gamble and Kaag took alternative roles in admonishing
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the former official for his part in state failure, demanding that Bassil take responsibility
for what was unfolding. Gamble asked, “Are you taking responsibility for the fact that
this is a very bad situation?” Through questions about personal responsibility and moral
failure, failure was individualized and placed upon a bad actor.
In this way, Lebanon was ultimately portrayed as a good investment gone bad.
Kaag noted that the stakes of this economic failure were the loss of Lebanon as a
“mosaic” and a “public/regional good.” She described the country through a familiar
hegemonic discourse of pluralism and coexistence, gesturing to Lebanon’s secular model
of rule, pointing to the fact that the president must be a Maronite Christian to illustrate
this point.
The bahdala here as trial then revives familiar legacies of postcolonial contexts
that are positioned as failing in comparison to successful national models—here the US
and the UK. Positioned as a conversation about “Arab Unrest,” it ushered in histories of
intervention and structural adjustment in the region only to minimize them as outside of
the here and now. Sajwani gave reasons for instability in the region, identifying civil war,
proxy war, 9/11, Israel and Palestine, and other events in history, only to have Gamble
briefly recognize that these happened, but they happened a long time ago. In this way, the
nation was imagined as an autonomous, sovereign container.
However, the bahdala is shaped by histories of colonialism and imperialism
which persist into the present day. Kaag’s reference to Lebanon as a “mosaic” parallels
colonial discourses about civilizational others who have defined Lebanon’s success
through its governance structures which include Christian representation. Ussama
Makdisi (2000) writes of the way that the ‘mosaic’ metaphor was also part of European
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views on Christian “minorities” in the Ottoman Empire, representing them as a
suppressed people while also helping to produce categories of people that “existed as
separate and autonomous cultural and physical units” (p. 10). Of course, these minorities
were still viewed as civilizational others for their place in the Ottoman Empire, but they
became useful rhetorical devices in empire-building (Makdisi 2000). This echoes the
colonial histories of Asia and Africa by Europe, who “spoke of the value of the regions”
once they had them under their control” (Prashad 2008, p. 9). In a related vein, Bassil’s
alliance with Hezbollah also brought to bear legacies of European anxiety about the
Ottoman Empire and Muslim encroachment. In these ways, the characters in the WEF
setting reflect longer colonial histories coming into contact.
While the speakers disagreed on whether the role of the Western intervention,
wars with Israel, religion, or sect posed more threatening influence on the country and
region, there was a recognition that people in the region were unable to make sound,
rational electoral decisions due to a particular lack of sovereignty. By invoking a secular
Lebanon, these speakers made religion and emotion problem-objects to be dealt with by
the state10. All panelists then agreed on a kind of secular discourse of the separation of
emotion and rationality, one that proposes the removal of emotion and religion from the
public sphere, where voting happens. Much like Clarke (2019) has noted of liberal
legality and international justice frameworks, such affective trials disavow their
emotionality, denying their own place in affective economies while operating as

10. Sajwani, a successful businessman in the Gulf, supported Bassil’s point about foreign
intervention, citing the several wars, the consolidation of Arab states, the creation of Israel, and
the coups in Iraq and Egypt as some of the reasons for recourse to emotion, religion, or sect in
making electoral decisions.
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channelers of emotion. Clarke writes that “those engaged in the instrumentalization and
dissemination of this discourse do not necessarily recognize how their speech acts depend
on affect” (p. 52). As such, while discursively, they denied the ways they were pulled,
affectively, they were enmeshed in affective economies.
While Bassil’s geopolitical alliances were oppositional, this agreement
highlighted the investments the panelists shared. While the explicit goal of the panel was
to discuss “Arab unrest,” the affects that pulsated through the interview said otherwise. It
was a site of pedagogy, performance, and play for both Gamble and Bassil. While the
influence of emotion on politics was presented as regressive, they worked to reach and
capture their audiences. If we are to think of them as alternate channelers of emotion for
such publics, Gamble and Bassil reflected less opposing ideologies and more sparring
partners seeking to capture the audience. Gamble presented herself as the advocate for
victims of Lebanon’s corrupt state, pinning a video to her Twitter profile previewing the
interview and promising not to go easy on Bassil to ensure its visibility to her social
media followers. Bassil interrupted Kaag throughout the interview, saying “let me
finish,” and “let me continue,” various times. At one point, Gamble turned to the live
audience behind them and said, “He says that to me all the time.”
Her comment to the crowd, as well as viewers at home, elicited laughter and
highlighted the presence of audiences. Rather than appearing as neutral, she recognized
and took part in the making of the scandal by joining in the social media posting about
the event. Twitter users, including Gamble who herself made the joke, referred to the
interview as pornographic, with the connotation being that Gamble penetrated Bassil.

59

Figure 1: Appendix A1:29

Bassil also gestured to this audience, referencing the fact that the interview was trending
online. He said, “Me representing Lebanon has trended on social media and as long as I
still have this, I have to abide by this.” His legitimacy was linked to a Twitter hashtag,
placing power in the digital circulation of discourse. Gamble recognized the same digital
economy. Acknowledging that Bassil had watched some of her segments, she feigned
flattery, saying “You watch me on CNBC?” He responded that he had, adding,
“Especially when you declared your intentions in this debate,” to murmurs and laughs in
the crowd. Gamble chuckled, saying, “Our numbers definitely went up!” Ideology
becomes a secondary lens through which to understand these playful jabs between these
sparring partners legitimated through online petitions and hashtag campaigns. Their
sparring dynamic was not of two fundamentally opposed worldviews coming into
contact. Rather, each sought to capture an audience of viewers and followers tuned into
the trial.
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Figure 2: Appendix A1:31

Indeed, bahdala as national failure becomes consumable social media content for those
who are invested in the way that the country is represented amongst the ‘international’
community so important to Lebanon’s imaginary as a tolerant and cosmopolitan place in
an otherwise volatile region. For this reason, it is important to identify the affects and
emotions powering such nodes of power. Turning to the audience in the background
behind the trial-stage reveals the affective economies that undergirded the bahdala. Of
particular interest is the way that spectators online used segments of this interview to
express their joy, humiliation, or ambivalence. Some shared images of Gamble’s playful
facial expressions counterposed with Bassil’s stoic face as she asked pointed questions
and posed, waiting for his responses. The screenshots of her expressions juxtaposed
Bassil’s blank looks in Internet memes, memes which Gamble ultimately shared herself.
Here, the expressions of each character became fodder for claims to justice online. In
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sharing these screenshots, clips, and quotes from the interview, Internet users took part in
the recoding of these scenes as humiliating, pleasurable, or dignified.
Indeed, for Twitter users who expressed their feelings about the interview, the
panel was less about finding answers to enduring questions and more about the media
event that CNBC, the WEF, Gamble, and Bassil helped engineer around national failure.
One of the most popular clips to circulate online was of a segment where Gamble asked a
confused Bassil how we got to Davos, inferring that he was. When he answered that he
was invited by a friend, Kaag said, “We’re not allowed to have friends like those in
government.” The clip was shared with Twitter users expressing pleasure with seeing
Bassil taken to task for what was framed as corruption.
The commentary and circulation of it across international news platforms suggests
that the Twitter bahdala invokes an audience which is concerned with national standing
and stands to lose the most from Lebanon’s bad showing. It is not only this professional
class of national representatives, such as politicians and journalists, that stands to gain
from engaging in digital bahdala. It is also that it speaks to an audience that stands to lose
from the country’s fall from grace. We see in the commentary that audiences perform
jokes and insults toward Bassil, the one who fell from grace. In the next section, I discuss
what such media moments offer to national publics who are contending with the
aftermath of revolution and economic collapse. In this case, this audience engages in
performances of shame, humiliation, joy in ways that position themselves toward the
nation.
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The pleasure in the roast
There were two broad trends in responses to the interview which are inherently related.
There were 1) those who accepted the bahdala as a moment of humiliation, and 2) those
who refuted that it was humiliating. While the former was mainly English-speaking
supporters of Gamble who identified Bassil as the source of the country’s failure, the
latter were mostly Arabic speakers who were supporters of Bassil. While the former
identified aligned with and affirmed an aspirational cosmopolitanism that would be at
home in spaces like the WEF, the latter aligned with a brand of nationalism that saw the
panel as an attack on Lebanese sovereignty. They show how bahdala connects us to
others in the same stroke through the relational nature of emotion.
By turning to Twitter commentary, I offer that the bahdala as trial figures as a site
of affective modulation, where emotions appear to be channeled, transformed, and
quelled. To do so, I draw especially on two theorists of affect and communication: Sara
Ahmed’s (2004) theory of affective economies and Silvan Tomkins’ (1963) taxonomy of
affects. I do this to understand the way that affects or emotions operate in a kind of
social, relational, and interconnected feedback system. Tomkins (1981) writes that his
model was developed through an understanding of early cybernetics theory which
conceptualized “multiple assemblies of varying degrees of independence, dependence,
interdependence, and control and transformation of one by another” (p. 309). In a
collection edited by Evelyn Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995), Tomkins’ work is
recognized for its structure but also non-determinism, allowing for a multiplicity of
possibilities for the way that affects—conceptualized along an analogic continuum of
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intensities—and drives—conceptualized as a digital on/off switch— trigger one another
and bring about different orientations toward the world.
As noted in the introduction, Ahmed (2004) intervenes to offer that we must
consider the way that feelings about objects and subjects are learned, applying not only
an understanding of systems but of economies. Taken together, these theories emphasize
a relational understanding of the work of emotions, recognizing the ways that the shame
or humiliation of one can be read on the body in different ways and have a reverberative
effect on the pleasure of another.
I will focus in this section on the English-speaking audience, especially those who
joined in on the pleasure of watching Bassil be ‘roasted.’ This is because they illustrate
the way that bahdala works to cohere an audience that joins in on the bahdala. Many
comments referred to the event as a grilling, a roasting, a dragging, and murder:
“I am so happy GB @gebran_bassil is in Davos. Some interesting grilling
session.🥳🥳🥳 #GbinDavos #GBGrilled” (Appendix A1:2)
“The roast of Gebran Bassil #GbinDavos (Appendix A1:4)
“Gebran being dragged to mud is so fun to watch #GbinDavos I’m so glad he
attended (Appendix A1:11)
“How...HOW did I miss Gebran Bassil basically getting hela hela helo’d by
@_HadleyGamble at Davos? Has anyone reported this murder and
dismemberment to Interpol yet? 😂” (Appendix A1:26)
This desire to render the elite, wealthy, and corrupt touchable was on full display in
regional and national mobilizations. The posts around the interview thus channeled in the
chants, symbolism, and play of the protests to illustrate the humiliating display on the
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WEF stage. They ushered in the joy of the street, where chants against the ruling order
included memes, songs, and swears at individual representatives and the regime. In
Lebanon, Bassil’s was one of several names chanted. A particularly popular chant went:
“Hela hela hela hela hela ho, Gebran Bassil kes emmo,” (translating to “Fuck Gebran
Bassil”), which was referenced in various Tweets. Countless emojis, jokes, and
descriptive commentary reflected a jouissance in the spectacle.
Much of the digital commentary pointed to a joyful exuberance around Bassil’s
performance, and in particular, his humiliation. What these make evident is the element
of desire and pleasure that undergirds the humiliation or shaming of another through
exposure. Scholarship on the mobilizations across the region have called attention to the
expressions and performances of the body in response to repressive states and
socioeconomic conditions (El-Ariss 2019, Kraidy 2016, Mourad 2014). In his work on
digital scandals and leaks in the Arab world, El-Ariss (2019) complicates positivist and
Enlightenment era models of deliberation and communication by offering fadiha, or
exposure, as an affective framework. In the Arabic-speaking world, fadiha is a form of
exposure which causes a scandal and makes a scene (El-Ariss 2019). It is not simply a
transfer of information or message, but an entire apparatus of power which involves the
body, stage, and audience. Tracing such exposure across place and time to Greek scandal
and adultery, he suggests that there is something powerful to consider in the transgressive
act of uncovering. El-Ariss (2020) writes, “Scandal is thus about the desire for revelation,
the desire for political exposure, but also the desire to render the famous and powerful
touchable, shaming and humiliating them” (p. 6). If the spectacle is a machine of desire,
then it is a desire to witness the usually unreachable to be put on the spot.
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Writing of such practices in the region, Marwan Kraidy (2016) shows how
different forms of “creative insurgency” in the mobilizations were not signs to be
translated but affect-laden performances. For example, images of Egyptian leader Hosni
Mubarak as a cow or of Tunisia’s Ben Ali as trapped in an airplane were part of turning
classical bodies into grotesque bodies, debasing and grounding those who have ruled
through a cult of personality. Similarly, in the context of the WEF interview, Bassil was
compared to dogs, mops, and criminals, evidenced in the above screenshots.

Figure 3: Appendix A1:32, 33, 34

If Bassil’s image was leveled, Gamble’s was raised to the level of royalty. There were
several posts which praised Gamble’s performance. These included images of bouquets
and screenshots of her facial expression which linked to a joy in what took place on the
Davos stage. She was pictured as the famous Mona Lisa painting, featuring one of the
expressions she made during the interview and as a royal figure in the Bugs Bunny
cartoon, hitting the head of a subject with her scepter. Several Twitter accounts expressed
gratitude for her evisceration of Bassil.
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Figure 4: Appendix A1:34, 35, 36

“if Hadley Gamble came and did an interview with the president how fun would
that have been?” (_@ ﻟﻮ ﺑﺘﺠﻲHadleyGamble ﺑﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣﻊ رﺋﯿﺲ اﻟﺠﻤﮭﻮرﯾﺔ ﻗﺪّي ﻛﻨﺎ
 😀ﻣﻨﺘﺴﻠﻰ#GBinDavos) (Appendix A1:6)
"`@HadleyGamble Gebran bassil and his allies are our daily nightmare
Here s a gift for you our beautiful idomitable avenger !!! ❤❤❤❤
#GBinDavos #Davos #Davos2020 #داﻓﻮس# ( "ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞAppendix A1:8)
“I can never get enough of this interview” (Appendix A1:25)
The references to Gamble as professional, a superhero, and royalty must be understood
within the context of the Lebanese media landscape. They pointed to the difference
between local journalists and the US journalist. Many referenced local journalists like
Samar Bou Khalil and Jad Ghosn, contrasting Gamble as more critical and professional.
One Twitter user thanked Gamble on behalf of the Lebanese, calling her a national hero
and saying that Bassil was “not used to this.” There was an emphasis on the way that
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Bassil was forced to reckon with difficult questions due to Gamble’s superior
professionalism.
These Twitter users referenced a media landscape where each major news
network is majority owned by those affiliated with political parties. As a result, political
officials are rarely questioned by foes or rivals, preferring to be interviewed on their own
affiliated networks. Several Twitter users emphasized the desire for Bassil to be in the hot
seat, in contrast to interviews conducted locally. They suggested that Lebanese channels
colluded with him to portray him in a more positive light.
Indeed, we can compare this interview to one in the Lebanese context that several
social media comments referenced. This was an interview that took place just days prior
to the WEF interview, on January 8th, 2020, on the Lebanese Al Jadeed television
network by journalists Jad Ghosn and Samar Bou Khalil. The channel has been described
as airing “daring interviews with controversial personalities and political figures,”
launched in 2001 (Mellor et al 2011, p. 96). Its ownership by Sunni businessman and
rival to Saad Hariri, Tahsin Khayat, earned it a reputation for its “mildly leftist voices
critical of Hariri’s neoliberal postwar policies” (Salloukh et al 2019).
It was not the content of this interview, but the tone, comportment, and lateral
space Bassil was given that is of significance. For four hours and in Bassil’s home, Bassil
gave an account of his status as a minoritarian leader, even while his political history has
included posts in the telecommunication, energy, and foreign ministries, as well as
leadership of the FPM. During the interview, he accused her of cutting him off while he
indeed did the same, at one point asking her, “are you serious?” He told her to not mix up
issues and to not ask him the same question several times. He likewise interrupted Ghosn,
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saying, “he doesn’t want to hear what I have to say.” He sighed continuously, told them
their questions were taking too long, and exasperatedly demanded to move on to more
pressing matters. In contrast to the WEF grilling, he was given the time to control the
conversation—four hours of it—as a condition of access.
It serves as an example par excellence of the kind of interviews of officials to
which publics are accustomed and the frustration that publics, but particularly detractors
who joined in on the WEF grilling, expressed about Bassil’s escape from censure in the
local context. They suggested that other local journalists dodged important questions,
backed down, and even helped politicians to avoid exposure. One Tweet compared the
two interviews:
“You thought you were going on Jad Abu Ghosn or Samar Abou Khalil”
(Appendix A1:7)

Figure 5: Appendix A2:2
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The bahdala as quasi-trial, with its discursive intent to hold leadership accountable,
channels in desirable emotions, especially for postcolonial contexts. As Kraidy (2016)
notes of the trial spectacles of fallen dictators, “They show key characters in a national
drama participate in a catharsis as they reveal and contest once jealously guarded secrets”
(p. 88). While Bassil may be considered part of a dictatorial but pluralistic regime, and he
is all but fallen in the current political moment, catharsis is sought in a revelatory
moment. These practices are part of “an economy of exposure and confrontation that
vindicates, relieves, comforts, and gives pleasure” (El-Ariss 2019, p. 75). This catharsis
relies on the conferral of affects like humiliation to those who are felt to deserve it.
Digital bahdala appears to offer a way to reach or touch the source of failure, to
join in and help produce the humiliation. El-Ariss describes this opening created during
and after the uprisings as wai’i, or awareness/consciousness, or new modes of encounter
with centers of authority (El-Ariss 2019). Here, there was a desire to “cut through”
systems of signification (imperialist/anti-imperialist, progressive/conservative,
religious/secular) and to wield affects like shame at those in power. This becomes
attenuated for postcolonial contexts who turn to the international forum mediated through
the Internet to see the source of failure suffer and to orient themselves along proper
models of nationhood. Digital media appears to help bypass systems of signification
which encode meaning, allowing agency to individual users who can help reproduce the
nation as an ideal. The next section discusses the postcolonial desire to “cut through”
such systems by witnessing the humiliation of national representatives for their role in
national failure.
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The schadenfreude: “Cutting through” with bahdala
Even those who recognized Gamble’s own political agenda described a kind of catharsis
and pleasure in the scenes. In an article about the interview on the regionally focused,
English-language platform Middle East Eye, Lina Mounzer, a translator and writer, spoke
of the pleasures of watching a member of the ruling class, Bassil, “treated with the same
open disdain and contempt with which they treat us” (Chehayeb 2020). While she
recognized the differential treatment with which Gamble has interviewed members of
Bassil’s rival political factions, displaying US foreign policy interests, she emphasized
rather the feeling of watching the interview:
“All of the things he said about Syrians, the way he so shamelessly benefits from
the nepotism…[going] after people who say bad things to him on Facebook,” she
explained. “[The] schadenfreude was wonderful.” She continued: “I don’t need to
endorse Hadley Gamble as a person, embrace her politics, or agree with her,”
Mounzer said. “But let me take some pleasure [in this].”” (Chehayeb 2020)
Mounzer spoke of the pleasure of witnessing Bassil’s treatment, evidenced here
through the word, “schadenfreude.” This word refers to the desirable element of the
witnessing of misery, ill-fortune, or humiliation, and is line with the expressions of many
other spectators who expressed joy in the performance. What is of particular interest is
that she clarifies that even though she feels this way, she does not identify with Gamble’s
politics. Given the online discourse around the superiority of journalists like Gamble,
Mounzer’s comment echoes others who reject the premise, refusing to grant Gamble
privileged status. In this way, they reflect a desire to see Bassil, a Lebanese official,
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suffer without that pleasure crystallizing into evidence of a particular political
subjectivity, identity, or ideological complicity.
Several scholars of anthropology, literature, and religion highlight the way that
representative mechanisms like identity and ideology tell us part, but not the entire story
around political life (Clarke 2019, El-Ariss 2013, Pellegrini 2007, Schaefer 2015,
Sedgwick 2003). These representational quagmires have taken on new form as national
mobilizations are digitally mediated, but they also precede digital media technologies. ElAriss (2013) references these as the trials of Arab modernity, describing the affects and
expressions which complicate the rigid constructions of subjectivity in postcolonial sites.
By analyzing the cultural production of writers traveling through and residing in
European and Arab countries, he is attuned to the negotiations taking place between
different conceptions of modernity and civilization. He writes,
“the emphasis on the linearity of colonialism and its underlying binary opposition
and unilateral and teleological movement from North to South (West to East)
stifles theoretical frameworks by reducing debates to the politics of representation
and the binaries of tradition and modernity” (El-Ariss 2013, p. 86).
The WEF interview operates as one of these trials, triggering and activating these
epistemologies, but also revealing their affective mechanics. Sedgwick similarly turns to
the performative dimension of knowledge production to complicate rigid representational
structures. She writes, “Attending to psychology and materiality at the level of affect and
texture is also to enter a conceptual realm that is not shaped by lack nor by
commonsensical dualities of subject versus object or of means versus ends” (Sedgwick
2003, p. 21). Drawing on Tomkins, she offers that, in contrast to drives which are
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instrumentalized in particular ways, affects can be autotelic, meaning that their aim can
simply be the fulfillment or arousal of the affect itself. Different from drives which have
an instrumentality, positive affects are fulfilled when they achieve joy, interest, or
excitement. They can also be attached to other affects. Sedgwick writes, “one can be
excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy” (p. 19). Mounzer’s comment
reflects a desire to feel joy in humiliation.
This also points to the capacity of affect to soften and complicate rigid notions of
identity and ideology and tendencies toward essentializing their characteristics. Sedgwick
writes, “The object of affects such as anger, enjoyment, excitement, or shame is not
proper to the affects in the same way that air is the object proper to respiration” (p. 19). In
other words, there is no essential link between an affect and its supposed object. As such,
Mounzer’s comment references the desire to fulfill a particular affect, like a pleasurable
joy at a shaming, without it being swept up in postcolonial narratives of instrumentality
and motivation. This is familiar to questions of coloniality and the self-other binaries that
are enacted as “always-already” representational structures. Of the cultural production of
Arab writers responding but also opting out of these frameworks in a variety of languages
and across various metropoles, El-Ariss writes, “Through affects and embodiment, this
counterdiscourse bypasses the dialectical engagement with European models of cultural
difference to which many Arab intellectuals succumbed” (p. 73). They point to
something beneath the level of discourse that is not essentially linked to it and does not
reproduce it by countering it, but that undergirds and transforms it.
This becomes key in the discussion of digital media and its production of kinds of
evidence, whether in the form of discursive categories, motivations, or narratives. It
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points to the “affective transparency” (El-Ariss 2019) sought through digital media,
where evidence is sought through a performative uncovering. El-Ariss writes of such
practices during the mobilizations:
“Affective transparency becomes a new mode of showing and seeing the inside
(heart, chest), and of showing and seeing, as in “I will show you!” and “You wait
and see!,” which are threats of exposure, of scene-making, and of physical
violence.” (p. 75)
Kuntsman and Stein (2011) write of the need to investigate alternative interpretive
frameworks such as these to complicate Western and academic discourse around the
uprisings in the region as ushering in a kind of digital transparency. El-Ariss (2019)
describes the way that digital media and the regional uprisings have enabled the
experience of “‘concrete personal lives’ and a ‘directly felt present’” (p. 87). He calls this
wa’i, or a digital consciousness whereby bodily performances cut through the systems of
signification that Mounzer distances herself from. This is like Pellegrini’s (2007) account
of Evangelical Hell House conversion performances, where “[t]he appeal is to the heart,
not the head” (p. 914). Kraidy also describes the bodily performances of “creative
insurgents” who “cut through” the plethora of debates, videos, and reportages that
comprise the Syrian, Tunisian, and Egyptian public spheres in the time of revolution with
bodily performances and symbolism. In another kind of trial than the WEF, ousted
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak cried from a cage in the courtroom, “declar[ing]…that
this was a man unable to control his own body.” (Kraidy 2016, p. 89). These insurgents
help ground leaders through bahdala, signaling to others that they had lost their
sovereignty.
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However, while Kraidy writes of the revolutionaries worked to wrest the body
politic from the sovereign leader by debasing him, and El-Ariss writes of the activists and
authors who exposed bodily violence and hurl invectives at the state, these forms of
bahdala operate differently. The creative revolutionaries were motivated by their capture
of the body politic. The Tweets in this case, however, must be understood as belonging to
those invested in cosmopolitan imaginaries that orient attention outward, to the global
body politic.
In this way, audiences join in the bahdala through the Twitter post, the bahdala
helps reaffirm the models of nationhood which were established during the ‘grilling.’
Proper models, in this case and the next section of this case, are tied heavily to economic
health and openness to American and European markets. The bahdala activates
performances which turn away from embarrassing national practices and identities and
adopt aspirational versions. They appear to be able to touch or ground the elite leader, but
they affirm national ideals that are under threat of being lost—worldliness,
cosmopolitanism, belonging.
In the next section, I show how the maintenance of national exceptionalism is a
comparative, border-making which establishes a hierarchy of belonging through
expressions of shame and humiliation. Unlike shaming or humiliation, which can be done
‘from below,’ bahdala relies on and affirms an authority and establishes a hierarchical
relationship. To illustrate this, I examine transnational connections to this case which
featured similar discourse around Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan at the WEF,
who is presented as lost to the wrong kind of Islam. In doing so, I analyze the conferral of
shame, embarrassment, and humiliation at the international forum and find that it cannot
75

be isolated to the body that it singles out. Rather, it permeates through publics who are
attuned to the bahdala and shows the kinds of loss of access that publics fear.
Transnational affinities: The lost cosmopolitan and its discontents
Turning to a similar case shows us the transnational resonances and therefore, how this
case connects to broader anxieties around an aspirational cosmopolitanism that is
channeled on the WEF stage. In a connected case, national publics took to Twitter to
make similar disavowals of a political leader. These Tweets made intertextual references
between Lebanon and Pakistan, and of Bassil and Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Twitter users connected one of the most highly circulated clips from the interview where
Gamble asks Bassil how he got to Davos.
Khan has been both a revered and reviled leader in and of Pakistan, shooting to
popularity in the 1970s and 80s as a cricket player and then the captain of the country’s
national cricket team. He was a popular face in international tabloids for his dallying with
the famous, including Princess Diana, and dating actresses and models. He became a
figure of cosmopolitanism, but also a popular local figure through his philanthropy. Later
in life, Khan veered into politics, forming a political party, Pakistan Tehreek e Insaf
(PTI), and rose to popularity, becoming prime minister in 2018. As a populist figure,
Khan has also had to contend with the alternative visions for Pakistan’s future that clash
under the banner of nationalism.
Criticism of Khan’s “playboy to puritan U-turn” (“Imran Kan” 2006) has risen
around his politicization and what has been narrativized as a turn to Islam. The global
circulation of this figure strikes familiar hegemonic anxieties around an encroaching
Islam, connecting both Pakistan and Lebanon as nations which contend with (lost)
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cosmopolitan potential (Ahmad et al 2020, Shehadi 2021). This tension is reflected in
discourse between India and Pakistan, where Khan’s rule is seen as a dangerous turn to
fundamentalism. It resonates with anxieties around Bassil’s alliance with Hezbollah in
this case.
In this way, each official’s presence at the international forum was connected
through a failure to produce proper models of nationhood. This is evidenced through
intertextual references and similar expressions used by spectating publics. Like the Bassil
interview, which featured a pointed question about the financing of Bassil’s trip to
Davos, several posts questioned Khan’s sponsorship. Several accounts reshared the clip
of Kaag telling Bassil “we’re not allowed to have friends like that when you’re in
government,” tagging the Pakistan’s Khan, the PTI, and Gamble.
Several accounts noted that Khan had himself financed his trip to the WEF
through what was positioned as shady business dealings. Beyond the interaction with
shared digital content, similar expressions were used to confer shame to public officials
like Khan and Bassil who were in the hot seat. Twitter users gestured to the
“shamelessness” and lack of “dignity” of the politicians, with one Tweet calling them
“shame-proof people” and “#shamelesscreatures” (Appendix A1:26). Others called them
“corrupt,” likening them to “looters” and “plunderers.11” Others simply wrote the word
“shame” at the end of their comments.
In these narratives, only some wealth is seen was theft and only some
mechanizations and hierarchies of power were seen as corrupt. Similarly to the Bassil
interview, several users suggested that local reporters in Pakistan should learn from
11. The Tweet has since been deleted.
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Gamble and Kaag’s questioning of Bassil. One Tweet which reflected this read, “Sadly in
our part of the world we proudly tell everyone that we have “friends like this when in
government” (Appendix A1:28). Several posts cited this as an embarrassment and
reasons for the country’s third world status.
Like the hashtag #Gebran_Bassil_was_humiliated, the hashtag #PakHumiliated
was also used in relation to Khan’s performances at international forums. Twitter users
referenced the United Nationals Security Council (UNSC) in June of 2020, especially in
relation to its dispute with India over Kashmir, when Pakistan did not vote for India in
the election to the council. Tweets using this hashtag referenced Pakistan’s continued
failure at these forums. Additionally, news clips of both Khan and Bassil speaking to US
press on programs like PBS News Hour and CNN Connect the World featured
commentary about these officials being cornered by incisive news anchors.
Both cases about Pakistan and Lebanon feature public expressions of humiliation
and shame, pointing to feeling publics that are signaling a disavowal of national failure.
Ahmed writes, “our shame means that we mean well, and can work to reproduce the
nation as an ideal” (Ahmed 2004, p. 109). Declarations of shamelessness point to desires
to be recognized like others who mean well and who can spot the shameful; here,
Western nations which come to constitute the “international” community. However, in
their declarations of shame— "A man in @wef saying such is shame !” (Appendix
A1:12); “Shame on you” (Appendix A1:23). “It's a shame that leaders of rogue nations
like Pakistan @ImranKhanPTI @SMQureshiPTI are given space on this platform”
(Appendix A1:13).
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These articulations also admit a vulnerability. If shame is not privately contained
but relational and social, then social media users articulate a founding tenet of shame—
the failure to be recognized by the other (Sedgwick 2003). Indeed, these expressions,
rather than showing that Pakistani or Lebanese publics are full of shame, render visible
an investment in a kind of imaginary which is at risk of being lost. Khan and Bassil share
a dalliance with political groups and governance which has been labeled Islamist or
terroristic in Euro-American contexts. In this way, shame is not an orientalist descriptor
of a culture, but it is a relationship activated at a contact zone.
In examples of this around Bassil’s interview, one user wrote that Lebanon just
“needs one more push to be lower than a razor on the ground,” posting a screenshot of
Lebanon’s ranking of 177 on the “passport index” (Appendix A1:38). Another posted a
photo of a person standing on a torn flyer with Bassil’s face on it, a performance of
disrespect toward the political figure (Appendix A1:39). Posts like these are
performances, cultivating an ethos of shame as they work to rechannel it and confer it
elsewhere.
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Figure 6: Appendix A1:37, 38

These posts align toward international others who comprise the forum. This also means
that other national others were invoked as inferior and shame-worthy, aligning the
commenters away from them. There are several examples of this. Many Tweets made
jokes about Bassil’s use of the English language:
“I'm not okay with the fact that I had to improve my English language, grammar
and accent in order to represent my school at an MUN conference, while
@Gebran_Bassil represented the entire country using grammar rules of his own
creation. # ﻟﺒﻨﺎن_ﯾﻨﺘﻔﺾ#GBinDavos” (Appendix A1:10)
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"Are we going to ignore the fact that Gebran Bassil said ""we are independerst""
instead of independent TWICE? #Gebran_Bassil_doesn’t_represent_Lebanon
(Appendix A1:14)
“you feel like the people praising Bassil have either not seen the interview… Or
they dont know eng...or sorry they maybe french edu. 😂 Rolling on the floor
laughing😂😂 #ﺛﻮره# ﻛﻠﻦ_ﯾﻌﻨﻲ_ﻛﻠﻦ# ﻟﺒﻨﺎن_ﯾﺜﻮر#  ﻟﺒﻨﺎن_ﯾﻨﺘﻔﺾ#Davos2020
#GBinDavos #( "ﻣﺎ_ﻓﻲ_ﻓﺮﺻﮫAppendix A1:3)
“Zer iz itizz another version 🤣🤣🤣” (Appendix A1:24)
These accompanied Tweets with images of figures facing Western press in Turkey and
the US judiciary-as-entertainment. In one post, there is a screenshot is of Bassil’s face
from the interview next to a screenshot of a man being interviewed by a reporter in
Turkey. The latter screenshot came from a viral video where a reporter asks a Turkish
man how to get to Taksim Square, in English. In the video, the man appears to either not
understand the woman or chooses to ignore her and responds with words that are
undecipherable to her. In the meme with Bassil’s photo, the user (Appendix A1:5).
writes, “Close enough,” indicating a similarity between the Turkish man and Bassil’s
own mistakes speaking in English during the interview with Gamble. The meme was
premised on the relative inferiority of the Turkish man and Bassil in the face of the EuroAmerican press. Additionally, one Twitter user shared a photo of a black woman in a
televised court appearance on the US program “Couples Court.” The Tweet quoted the
woman speaking with a drawl, saying “lemme contiyu” (Appendix A1:9).
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Figure 7: Appendix A1:5, 9

While Bassil was a contentious figure in Lebanon for his own nationalist statements
around refugees, labor, and citizenship, through these Tweets he was painted as inferior,
backwards, and dumb in relation to his peers on the WEF stage. These Tweets work to
reroute attributions of inferiority to classed and racialized subjects across contexts. As
such, by virtue of their digital nature, these expressions of shamelessness did not confer
shame only to Bassil, but to racialized, classed others across national contexts. This
dynamic can be read into a strand of responses which described a feeling of shame in the
body, absorbed through the screen. One Facebook user expressed feelings of shame and
ridicule through the screen, indicating a level of identification or entanglement with
Bassil’s positionality. He wrote,
“Am I the only one who HATED every minute of the Bassil Davos interview?
I honestly felt shame, not exoneration nor joy, every time she pissed on him and
he took it like a dog, because he was there with his tail between his legs begging
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for money and pissing on every ounce of self-respect we never had but always
wished we had as a nation.
… -and I did not enjoy that she ended up doing the job that our own journalists
should have done, with much more legitimacy. He may be a thug but he is our
thug and the neoliberal hacks get no browning points for taking him out.
…. Finally, I could not cheer for his ridicule because I felt the ridicule myself…In
the eyes of the world his humiliation is really our humiliation because he is very
much a product of our own shit and our own politics. Whether with our fear or
zeal or apathy or whatever he is a monster we created and one we should solely be
responsible for ending.” (Zeidan 2020)
This comment and others like it depict an inability to do what Mounzer desired; to confer
shame to the postcolonial leader without being read as imperial or colonial. Rather, there
is an identification with the one in the hot seat and the humiliation is felt as one’s own.
Scholarship on digital media has suggested that affects like shame are easily
transferrable and have become essential characteristics and conditions of contemporary
media (Chun 2016). As Paasonen & Sunden (2021) note of scandals around male ‘dick
pics,’ “the circuits of shame also operate in expansive and immersive vein encompassing
their audiences,” highlighting the way that it permeates various bodies as a relational
experience. Also calling attention to the relational capacity of shame, Schaefer (2020)
draws on Tomkins to explore how shame operates in the body as a “sort of master switch
responsible for suppressing other affective responses, like joy or excitement” (p. 5).
Sedgwick and Frank (1995) conceptualize this as performing a kind of double move.
They indicate shame’s capacity to create new kinds of relationships and examinations of
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oneself within and apart from a group. Citing Wilden, they write that the affect of shame
“is activated by the drawing of a boundary line or barrier, the ‘introduc[tion] of a
particular boundary or frame into an analog continuum,” (p. 520). This is not to say that
shame will determine a particular identity, but that it does cultivate individuating
markers. Sedgwick (2003) develops Tomkins’ work, offering that shame “floods into
being as a moment, a disruptive moment, in a circuit of identity-constituting
identificatory communication” (p. 36). The double move is then “toward painful
individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality” (Sedgwick 2003, p. 37), indicating
both insider and outsider status in the same movement.
The transnational stage produces these moments of “uncontrollable relationality”
(Sedgwick, p. 37), where figures like Bassil become “our thug,” and where “his
humiliation is really our humiliation” (Zeidan 2020). Viewing publics are themselves part
of affective economies of shame and humiliation activated by the international forum, not
shielded from them through a sovereign desire to confer them elsewhere. If affects cannot
be contained within the private, individual body and rather operate to modulate other
affects and drives (Tomkins 1981), understood as social processes which produce bodies
and boundaries (Ahmed 2004), then we must next examine the responses which worked
to recode these humiliating scenes into scenes of dignity and pride.
I have examined the commentary of those who expressed joy and humiliation at
the way Lebanon was presented to the world. In what follows, I will examine expressions
of pride and dignity which came in response to the interview and discuss the implications
for such performances. I argue that these constitute moments of recoding, whereby
spectators rechannel and resignify texts and symbols to make them mean and feel
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differently. Spectators engage in the recoding of censure, ridicule, and humiliation,
transforming these as the grounds from which feelings of dignity and pride can be
mobilized. While publics engage in performances which work to confer bad feeling over
digital media platforms, they are also inseparable from them. They also resonate with
other feeling publics, opening possibilities to be channeled towards nationalist ends.
Recoding from humiliation to dignity
In this section, I discuss the responses of pride and dignity that came in response to the
interview. While they articulate as nationalist through the invocation of politicians and
sectarian groupings, examining the affective dimension shows us why this is not
essentially the case. Rather, if affects are autotelic, resistant to teleological logics, we can
learn something about what undergirds and transforms discursive constructions like sect,
religion, and race. By turning to the performances of those who expressed their support
for Bassil online, I offer that they seek to cultivate new feelings out of humiliation by
refusing it. They turn the bahdala into the grounds for dignity and pride. In this way, the
bahdala informs broader political subjectivities.
In response to the discourses of humiliation and bahdala which pervaded across
social media and news platforms, many social media posts refuted such claims, offering
Bassil as a symbol of pride. Several posts used the hashtags in support of Gebran, such as
“#Gebran_Bassil_represents_me” and #Gebran_Bassil_represents_Lebanon”
[Translated]. and expressing pride—“You make us proud of you” (Appendix A1:15),
“Proud of you 🧡🧡🧡,“How much we are proud of you” (Appendix A1:16). Some
referred to him with deferential language and using the orange heart emoji to represent
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the official color of the FPM party. Most common were posts that referred to him as
royalty, trustworthy, and brave:
“#gbindavos [ ”🧡 اﻟﻤﻠﻚtranslation: “King”] (Appendix A1:17).
“"ﺟﺒﺮان ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ.....  ﻣﻠﻚ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﯿﺔ#GBinDavos" [Translation: “Gebran Bassil…King of
diplomacy”] (Appendix A1:18)
“We trust him and we are proud of him😍😏 #GBinDavos” (Appendix A1:30)
“proud of you president” (Appendix A1:19)
These posts asserted that, in contrast to accounts of the interview by regional press, it was
a point of pride for national publics. Many of these posts were accompanied by images of
Bassil. They featured portrait-style photographs of Bassil smiling during and pointing to
crowds or giving interviews to Lebanese media networks. Several bytes featured Bassil
making forceful claims about Lebanon’s sovereignty, challenging local television hosts
and journalists.

Figure 8: Appendix A1:39, 40, 41
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While this will be discussed further in the second case study, I argue that these figure as
recoding performances. They perform a conversion of bad feeling to good, though
recoding can also do the opposite. I draw on both Stuart Hall’s work on encoding and
decoding as media processes and Ann Pellegrini’s (2007) notion of recoding to explore
these processes. Both identify the ways that discourse is both an outcome and a tool in
the production of feeling. Hall’s (1973) work recognizes the ways that meaning is
produced using existing codes and conventions to capture something ‘more,’ like a story
or an experience. This recognizes the relationship between what is structurally capturable
and what is left out. In her work on the Hell House, or the evangelical church’s version of
the secular haunted house, Pellegrini recognizes codes as both tool and outcome by
turning to performance. In Pellegrini’s (2007) account, church members guide audiences
through scenes of sin in the hopes of (re)investing “a deeper structure of religious feeling
that can tie together disparate, even contradictory, experiences, bodily sensations,
feelings, and thoughts” (p. 918). Pellegrini notes that these performances still invoke the
scenes and ideas they are trying to make feel and mean differently. They “draw upon
even as they move to recode experiences of ‘safety’ and ‘fear,’ ‘reality’ and ‘unreality,’
in the service of a fundamental spiritual transformation” (p. 915). In other words,
recoding is a way of cultivating different feeling around already encoded ideas and
symbols.
These posts about a resistant and strong Bassil indeed drew upon moments from
the WEF interview, reframing them as moments of pride. We see this in the way that the
WEF posts reframed and recoded moments of scenes which were otherwise coded as
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humiliating to spectating publics through references to animals, mops, and racialized and
classed bodies. Bassil the King is a recoding of Gamble as Queen wielding her scepter. In
a more intensified line of commentary, users expressed a kind of assertion of dignity and
defiance in the face of attack:
“Because you are loyal, honest and brave, they fear you! #"ﺟﺒﺮان_ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ_ﯾﻤﺜﻞ_ﻟﺒﻨﺎن
(Appendix A1:1)
“Every time they falsely attack you, you are big and become bigger in our eyes,
and they shrink and are shrinking more and more” [translated] (Appendix A1:20)
Pellegrini notes that the performance associated with conversion practice is more than
simple missionizing work. It is “an aggressive theater of transformation” (p. 925), doing
the work of recoding through an “emphasis on the culture and cultivation of feeling” (p.
914). As such, recoding makes evident that the move to assert feeling states of pride or
dignity may stem from the grounds of less desirable ones.
On the “international” stage, the very scene of humiliation becomes narrativized
as resistance to attack by global, foreign others. This rhetoric re-entrenches and advances
sectarian and nationalist narratives, crystallizing into geopolitical tensions. Of the WEF
interview, one Twitter user wrote, “Imagine if it was Saad in his place or Jumblatt or
Berri or Sami…12This man is strong and bold and smart and cultured and despite blow
after blow he stands up and doesn’t give up and strikes back with more force. We are
proud of you and we trust you” [translated] (Appendix A1:21). Another user wrote of the
alliance of Bassil’s FPM with Hezbollah, writing, “Thats what happened when GB talks

12. These are in reference to Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri, and Sami Gemayel,
political leaders of rival factions in Lebanon.
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about #hizbollah and thats why they try to humiliate him #GBinDavos” (Appendix
A1:22). Various users channeled charges of shame and humiliation and deflected them,
rerouting and recoding them through their commentary.
Such recoding has often been found in anticolonial discourse in postcolonial sites.
Clarke (2019) points to discourses of humiliation around the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and Kenya in the speech of President Uhuru Kenyatta, whose father was a famous
anticolonial figure during one of the most violent periods of settler colonialism by the
British troops. In his speech he says, “Our forefathers waged a struggle of conviction and
principle, supported with no resources except the burning fire of humiliation and the
indefeasible yearning for independence and respect,” before going on to describe the
victories of the anticolonial struggle against colonial forces (p. 93).
We can see this in the way that the image of Lebanon and the Lebanese was
revived during transnational controversies in the months and years following the
revolution. Several media controversies have been described as “humiliating” and
“embarrassing” after the economic collapse and revolution. On August 4, 2020,
Lebanon’s port city of Beirut experienced a deadly blast that killed anywhere from 190 to
251 people and destroyed much of the surrounding areas (The Public Source, n.d.). In the
wake of the revolution which began the year prior, it became another transnational
spectacle, with images and videos circulating rapidly across social media. The explosion
and destruction of the capital’s historic restaurant, bar, and cultural center was read as the
final nail in the coffin by many. The economic collapse and pandemic accelerated after
the blast, plunging the country into more intensified discourses of shame and humiliation.
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This has often been channeled through the upwardly mobile class of the
Lebanese. In one example, a public relations specialist named Mariana Wehbe shared an
Instagram video of herself denouncing Lebanese minister of foreign affairs, Charbel
Wehbe, after he made insulting remarks about a Saudi Arabian representative on
Lebanese television (“Saudi furious over” 2021). On live television, the now former
minister blamed the Gulf country for the rise of ISIS, referring to the representative as a
“nomad” or “bedou.’” The PR specialist took to Instagram to describe her embarrassment
at the scene, emphasizing that the minister was not representative of her or Lebanon
(“Mariana Wehbe Public” 2021). Referencing the ignorance of the country’s warlords in
contrast to the Gulf countries for their hospitality and progress as nations, she said, “I’m
so embarrassed to be Lebanese,” as she apologized on behalf of the country. To these
countries, she said, “I know that you know, that this is definitely not the way we think,”
invoking a national “we” that means well (Ahmed 2004). The moment of national
embarrassment became a catalyzing call for national dignity.
These sentiments have also been mobilized by state officials and members of the
political class. As Lebanon’s economic collapse has deepened and fuel shortages have
rocked the country, long lines of cars waiting for a rationed amount of subsidized car fuel
became regular daily sights and images circulating through social media platforms.
Hezbollah chief commander Hassan Nasrallah drew attention to these images, saying in
an address to the nation, “we can no longer tolerate these scenes of humiliation” (MEE
2021). The phrase “scenes of humiliation” was also used in popular regional press, full of
images of people waiting in long lines for gas (Choucair 2021). His speech included
plans to import fuel from allied Iran, challenging the state to stop him. Nasrallah’s “we”
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was also a national “we,” cohering a collectivity which included the faction. It also
produces a narrative whereby Nasrallah stands outside the state, with the broader public,
when in fact he and his party are inextricable from state practice. Most significantly, he
mobilizes an urgency in cohering away, but also through, humiliation.
These examples highlight the need to understand the affective motivations which
drive calls for justice. From a PR agent to a party official, national figures channel
feelings of embarrassment, shame, and humiliation to save face and dignity. What is
more, they ensure that this dignity takes on national character. While they turn to
opposing geopolitical alliances—Wehbe toward the Gulf and Nasrallah toward Iran—
they both channel in an awareness of how Lebanon is represented outwardly and how that
may be altered. In this way, they operate not as omnipotent figures controlling the
feelings of constituents, but through bodily performance and rhetorical technique to
engage with listening and watching publics.
In a similar affective dynamic which parallels conversion performances of the
Hell House, Donovan Schaefer (2020) turns to former US President Donald Trump’s
speeches and followers’ commentary which “converted shame into a felt sense of
dignity” (p. 3). He draws a line of continuity with what Sedgwick (2003) has called “a
highly politicized chain reaction of shame dynamics” around political correctness in the
US (p. 64) and those who refuse to embrace shame and alter their language, viewpoints,
and dominance in public space. Schaefer argues that through his rhetorical techniques
and bodily comportment, Trump commandeers a “mastery of a circuit of shame and
dignity” (p. 2) that emerges by those who have felt ashamed as they contend with losing
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their dominance over space. It is therefore “the thrust and counterthrust of shame and
humiliation” (p. 7) that powers and mobilizes supporters.
With this in mind, we can reread the still-images of Bassil during the interview
that were circulated online as evidence of his stupidity, as detractors suggested, and
instead see how the images are recoded into evidence of resilience. For these social
media users, Bassil was not merely the victim of a grilling, but a channeler of affects of
pride and dignity. These parallel portraits of Trump which feature what Schaefer (2020)
calls “a face that obliterates shame” (p. 13). Trump’s vocal refusal to feel shame
resonated with supporters and fueled, among other things, performances of dignity which
cohered into nationalist sentiment and racializing rhetoric. In the US context, these
performances cohere into “the identitarian logic of whiteness” (p. 15), one which to
refuses to accept the cultivation of white shame.
However, in this case, the performances of pride and dignity come in response to
colonial logics themselves, even while Bassil acts as a channeler of such discourse within
Lebanon. Schaefer (2020) asks if there is a difference in the shame of the marginalized or
those who are contending with demands to concede privilege and dominance over space.
As I show in the next two case studies in this dissertation, questions of feeling and the
way that they compare across differently situated groups is itself evidence of the renewed
value of feeling in contemporary debates around power and identity. Rather than
answering the question of whether these bodies feel shame the same way, I will show in
the rest of this dissertation that the very question of fellow-feeling is indicative of a
political juncture, where feeling is sought as an ends rather than as a means to an end.
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Conclusion: Feeling good about feeling bad
What can we make of the rerouting of such affects to others who are felt to deserve it? Or
the public declarations of emotion that characterize our digital media landscape, cohering
different publics together? These questions were previewed by Lauren Berlant in 1999
when they asked, “What does it mean for the theory and practice of social transformation
when feeling good becomes evidence of justice’s triumph? (p. 58). This, they wrote, was
the fetish of “true” feeling and its beckoning in contemporary US national justice
frameworks. Similarly to Berlant, Ahmed (2004) asks, “What is the relation between the
desire to feel better and the recognition of injustice?” (p. 102), while Clarke (2019) writes
that “affective justice of the contemporary period is as much about publicizing one’s
emotional alliances as it is about demanding action” (p. 128). In these instances, it is the
publicness of the emotions of those supporting the cause which are recentered.
This chapter has introduced the digital bahdala in “post”-revolutionary media. At
the WEF, a Lebanese public contending with “loss” and “failure” in hegemonic
imaginaries of its national standing turned to the international forum as a space to convert
bad feelings into more desirable ones. The trial of a nepotistic and populist local leader,
allowed for a cathartic release for some of this public, outsourcing felt justice to Western
officials who acted as prosecutor and judge. Through the online commentary, audiences
channeled in the performative dimension of the event and the national protests, aligning
pointing fingers at the local leader who, in the local context, showed no shame.
At the same time, while the exuberant reactions to the bahdala, schadenfreude, or
humiliation appear as the most emotional and apparent displays of feeling, other affects
were channeled through this site, inseparable from the joy that many took in wielding
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shame. While some found Bassil’s reactions to be stoic and evidence of stupidity,
provoking racializing comparisons to other classed and raced others, he too channeled in
affects that were inseparable from the “global” bahdala. Expressions of pride and dignity
came, recoding his performance as evidence of victory. These crystallized into sectarian
and nationalist discourses, emphasizing the ways that these sites, through the modulation
of affects, can intensify, transform, and entrench discursive constructions of race, sect,
gender, and other forms of identity.
This site shows us the way that “affect systems emerge…as the preferred method
for bodies navigating the ambiguity of information-rich environments” (Schaefer 2015, p.
46). As publics experiencing such wide-scale transformation turn to media to contend
with these changes, they must also contend with changing global relationalities, In this
context, we find that the national grilling or bahdala becomes the grounds for relational
affects to be generated. Examining the contact zones which generate this affective work
means contending with the fact that there are “more chances to be shamed” (Schaefer
2020), and therefore, more opportunities to recognize different kinds of relationalities.
The Lebanese nation, constituted through often conflicting infranational and
supranational imaginaries, provides an interesting site to display the different kinds of
affective work taking place. This opens connections to transnational others, from the US,
to Pakistan, to Kenya, and Egypt, where, across ideological and identarian lines, national
publics convert bad feeling to good. More broadly, it comes in the context of calls for
more humane and feeling states to respond to rising inequities across the world.
Following the reverberative and relational nature of bahdala, I turn to the
Egyptian context to another media trial which featured Lebanese tourist to Egypt, Mona
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Mazbouh. Mazbouh made international headlines after she posting a video lambasting the
Egyptian people and Islam due to her experience of sexual harassment while visiting the
country. In what follows, members of the Egyptian public responded to her video with
forceful and vociferous performances of dignity and honor. In doing so, they recoded
Egypt into the beating heart of Arab culture and identity, refusing her admonishments and
her labeling of Egypt as the “land of the dancers.” In this context, the responses parallel
the Lebanese responses to the WEF grilling, but with a more intensified and unified
force. By examining a variety of YouTube videos which feature long, edited, and even
playful reactions to Mazbouh, I find that Internet users draw on a rich history of cultural
production and performance in the staunch defense of the nation, returning the bahdala
and revealing its value to not only content creators but state institutions.
The third chapter will examine the paranoid media environment cultivated in the
mobilization of the bahdala. In that chapter, I return to the claims by Gamble and Bassil
on the WEF stage, where they debated Bassil’s genuine feelings— “you look happy,
you’re smiling!”—and social media posts by audiences that contested the ulterior motives
of Gamble and Bassil, with claims that she was a pro-Zionist journalist and that he was a
terrorist-sympathetic local official. I also return to claims raised in the second chapter
around the medicalized behavior of Mazbouh, In each case, the body’s tells are sought to
come to conclusions.
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RECODING THE BAHDALA: EGYPT, YOUTUBE, AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
OF ATONEMENT
“I am constantly on a daily basis working on getting rid of the programming my mother
put into me. Every fucking day. That you’re ugly like your daddy, you’re not good en—
you’re stupid you’re dumb, you’re never going to be shit like your daddy. It’s so many
things. What are you an idiot? You can’t make…just do the simple—pay attention! All
these things. And so I get in the mirror—and I talk to my therapist every week—but I get
in the mirror every day, and I imagine that every cell in my body is a little computer,
right? And you program that cell with the words that you say and the thoughts that you
have and the feelings that you feel. And as a human, you can change your mood, you can
change it really quick. I learned that from Instagram. Cuz one second I’m looking at a
picture and I’m like ‘Aw this is cool!” Next second I’m laughing, next second I’m
watching somebody die and I’m like, “Oh my god what the fuck?” So your emotions can
change pretty quick. And you can decide because you are control of this machine, this
human machine, so I get in the mirror and I look at myself in the eyeballs and I don’t
look at anything else. I look at the darkest part of my eyes, and I go “Tiffany Haddish, I
love and approve of you. Tiffany Haddish, I love and approve of you.” And sometimes I
cry so hard because I’m not in a loving approving mode, I’m not feeling that way.”
-

Tiffany Haddish on Conan O’Brien Needs A Friend podcast)

“Like I can be ashamed in my house by myself. You know what I’m saying? I can be
iiinnn shaaame, like a boiling pot of shame. But embarrassment to me is much more
traumatic. I feel like if you ask me stories about embarrassment, they’re all going to be
stories about how somebody saw me.”
- Kiese Laymon discussing writing his book “Heavy,” on This American Life
podcast, “My Bad”

Introduction
This chapter turns to a scandal which broke out in June of 2018 between Egypt and
Lebanon when a Lebanese tourist, Mona Mazbouh, released a Facebook-live video where
she both recounted experiences of sexual harassment in Egypt and conferred failure upon
Egypt for its backwardness, inferiority, and poverty. When her video was reshared across
the Internet, she was arrested on charges of spreading false rumors and attacking religion
and public decency. Her case made national and international headlines as a transnational
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media circuit was activated across Lebanese and Egyptian borders. Along this circuit,
Egyptian publics shared their own videos returning the bahdala, or moment of ridicule,
back upon Mazbouh and her country of Lebanon.
Following the first chapter’s advancement of bahdala as a didactic warning of a
failure to belong to a cosmopolitan world, this chapter is a repudiation of the charge. It
presents the (re)production of an alternative cosmopolitanism, one which is forged
through its Arab and Islamic history. While the first chapter showed how Lebanese
publics reached toward the country’s colonial and European continuities, in this chapter,
Egyptian publics reject such continuities. Instead, they engage in processes of recoding,
or the cultivation of alternative feeling states. Recoding in this dissertation takes place as
national publics reject what is framed as colonial and claim alternative nationalist
sovereignties rooted in claims to antiquity and resistance.
State crackdowns like the kind discussed in this case are not new in the Egyptian
landscape as President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi extends and intensifies the security state
following his 2013 military coup. Several activists, journalists, artists, and general social
media users have been arrested, charged, tried, and jailed by the state for crimes related to
social media use. This follows along a longer history of state policing of both Islamist
and secular dissidents. However, this case turns away from the state and toward the
digital economy of media users who respond to what they consider insulting or offensive
attacks on Egypt. It turns to the way that Mazbouh’s video was cut up online,
republished, and reamplified by several Internet users who responded to the bahdala of
national proportions. While in the Lebanese context, the bahdala lamented Lebanon’s
cosmopolitan multiculturalism on charges of corruption, the bahdala targeting Egypt
97

took on a civilizational and racializing rhetoric, framing Egypt as backward, dirty, and
unmodern. While in the first case, many reacted by claiming a cosmopolitan modernity,
all videos that this bahdala activated highlight Egypt’s historical value to the region and
world.
Across the videos, a variety of embodied performances contrasted speech which
said Mazbouh was not worth speaking about. Many avoided using her name or did so by
mocking it and twisting it into other words. Reactions oscillated between anger,
incredulity, and mockery, with some speaking slowly and deliberately and others
speaking quickly, pointing their fingers into the camera to punctuate their points. Others
laughed and smirked as they mimicked her or made jokes. The performative function of
these videos also included poetic meters, memes, filters, and physical displays of
strength. The demographics and digital presence of these users ran the spectrum, most
visibly across age and gender. Striking across many of these YouTube videos is an
almost paradoxical suggestion that Mazbouh did not deserve a response, but they were
unable to not respond—many of the users indicated that they felt compelled. While they
articulated with words that Mazbouh was not worth naming or speaking about, many of
their videos lasted for over ten minutes as they went through her video point by point.
The existence of these videos on YouTube also indicates a desire, after recording, to
propel their responses outwards.
The vociferous reaction to the video was paired with a media circuit which forced
Mona Mazbouh’s mother onto Egyptian television network to apologize on behalf of her
daughter, offering her tears, along with medical notes which excused her daughter’s brash
behavior. If the previous chapter offered Gebran Bassil, the nepotistic politician who
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refused humiliation through stoic responses, Mazbouh’s mother absorbed the humiliation,
hanging her head down to diffuse the situation through her own pain and ashamedness.
While Egypt’s status as “mother of the world” was revived and repeated by social media
users responding to Mazbouh’s comments, this chapter makes clear the currency of
scenes of suffering mothers in the maintenance of national boundaries.
I also identify in this case a digital economy of male YouTubers who are building
a brand on the conferral of bahdala to those who they frame as insulting Egypt. This
comes at a time when Western media have both celebrated and admonished the country
for its revolution while at the same time conferring failure to it through the lens of its
own liberal movements. One campaigner for Amnesty International described the arrests
of activists, journalists, tourists, and others embroiled in national scandals as “a reverse
#MeToo” (Buchanan 2018). While this is a familiar Orientalist conferral of backwardness
to the Arab despot, what is of interest is the way that this narrative obscures. Namely, the
history activated between Lebanon and Egypt, whereby contrasting national
exceptionalisms came to a head in the aftermath in the aftermath of the Egyptian
revolution. As such, I offer that it is important to consider the role of national
exceptionalisms in generating digital scandals.
I continue to examine the tensions activated through the bahdala, or the act of
humiliation, discussing why it is that the bahdala works. The previous chapter described
the way that postcolonial affects hinge on desires to feel and witness those responsible
being taken to account, shrinking the felt distance between them and the masses, but the
inevitable effects that they can have on many bodies when they take place at the
international forum. This chapter settles deeper into the effects that such performances of
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justice can have in the way of humiliation and shame, especially as such subjects identify
with the one receiving the embarrassing call-out. I find that social media users, through
recoding process, seek to cultivate alternative feelings which mobilize performances of
conversion. This conversion can be linked to processes of conversion on YouTube, where
video-posters seek to capture audiences.
In this way, I carve out the need for understandings of digital practices as
enmeshed in older forms of performance and cultural production, as well as tied to
political economic structures which accelerate the wealth of the few at the expense of the
most. I situate the apology that was demanded within a genre of reaction videos which
runs on this desire to feel differently. It highlights the digital economy of shame and
atonement that this case is situated, connecting it to other cases of perceived insults to
national publics in inescapably transnational contexts. In this way, I offer that the forms
of empathetic viewing it generates help to produce the felt distance between nations,
reinforcing national forms of identification.
I first discuss relationship between Lebanon and Egypt, then situate this case
within Egypt’s history of media production and state crackdowns on dissent, before
considering the post-revolutionary landscape. Next, I discuss the case and the responses
that followed, identifying common themes across the video which point to resonant
symbols of dignity, like Mo Salah. I identify the bodies and symbols as “conversion
points” (Ahmed 2004) in which there is a narrative of switching one feeling to another. I
discuss the digital media economy in which these kinds of response videos circulate,
meditating on the kinds of pain and injury which circulate more freely than others. I end

100

by examining the gendered dimension of bahdala, requiring some to perform the right
kind of feeling for spectating publics.
Egypt and Lebanon background
This case study brings Egyptian-Lebanese relations into the frame due to its transnational
nature. To understand the current events, we must turn to Egypt’s relationship to Lebanon
and its state in the post-revolutionary landscape. This relates to Egypt’s changing role in
the region, its loss of cultural and economic capital following the revolution, and
contemporary moves to revive and capitalize on its exoticized relationship to antiquity.
As noted previously, Lebanon and Egypt share alternative regional and
international imaginaries as ‘exceptional’ nations, producing forms of cultural, economic,
and political capital. If Lebanon’s exceptional status has been a cosmopolitan mosaic of
identities, Egypt’s exceptional status has rested upon its status a model of antiquity and
civilization. Lebanon’s status lies in its history as something of a Western enclave, a
Catholic French experience in the Orient (Traboulsi 2007). This included competing
visions of what the country meant to the colonial order and to the region, with some
opting toward autonomous and majority Christian rule, and others opting toward a more
pan-Arab and/or Islamic vision. Its internal governance through a power-sharing
agreement has led to the institutionalization of sectarianism, making it susceptible to
demographic anxieties, in-fighting, and proxy-war.
While Lebanon was discussed in the previous chapters as a site where a lack of
unified vision for the country’s future—as a colonial outpost, as part of a broader panArab nation, as a site of Phoenician civilization—it can be contrasted here with Egypt’s
relationship to the Arab world. Unlike Lebanon’s fragmented and contested allegiances
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and futures, Egypt has a long history as a center of pan-Arab nationalism. This brand of
nationalism can be traced to nation-state formation, when first president of Egypt
Mohamed Naguib and second president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, overthrew the
British-deposed King Farouk. Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab vision13 and his status as a leader
in “Third World” politics brought revolutionary fervor to regional inhabitants (Prashad
2008), mobilizing an Arab nationalism that is “mostly remembered as a world saturated
with strong political emotions” (Bardawil 2020, p. 40). For these reasons, his speeches
have been described as some of the most emotional moments for regional publics and
intellectuals.
At the same time, Abdel Nasser’s legacy is contested due to his firm grip on
internal dissent, including his decimation of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s. Abdel
Nasser’s approach parallels current president Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s own army coup and
crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. After
their brief rise and fall in 2012, the military leader began wielding a heavy hand on
political and religious discourse by regulating media content and religious centers in the
name of national stability and counterterrorism. In this way, his actions have been a
continuation of Abdel Nasser’s own paternalistic approach, albeit without pan-Arab
visions that he has been remembered for. These visions of pan-Arab nationalism were
perceived as threatening to countries like Lebanon, who have feared since before
independence the possibility of Muslim unification throughout the region (Kalawoun
2000).

13. During Nasser’s time, Syria merged with Egypt, representing to some the possibility of a
wider trend of unification across the region (Strasser 2014). While this vision was never brought
to fruition, it represented a time that visions of unification were arguably most felt as possible.
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While contested, his persistence in the national imaginary and popular culture as a
figure who represented glory for an Egypt which could stand up to colonial nations and
realize pan-Arabism, reflects a nostalgia for a worldly conversant with cosmopolitan
others, one which is revived in this case. It was Abdel Nasser’s reign in 1956 which
nationalized Egypt’s industry as well as encouraged Arab socialism and a welfare state
while discouraging imports (Abu-Lughod 2004, p. 18). This period of Egypt was also
characterized by Nasser’s leadership amongst “Third World” countries, such as Cuba,
India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and Ghana (Khaled 2021, Prashad 2008). At the time, antiimperialist sentiment was channeled, as well as hopes for a pan-Arab future prompted by
the unification of Syria and Egypt for a time (Strasser 2014).
In this case study, he is invoked as a counter to conferrals of national failure, even
while Nasser’s censorship of press and paternalism have been critiqued (Abu Alghar
2021, El-Ariss 2019). Nostalgia around Abdel Nasser is paired with a nostalgia for the
“golden age” of Egyptian culture, when Egyptian language, culture, and history
permeated the region through its exportation of cultural production. From its early
adoption of radio, its prevalent film and television industry, and its plethora of artists and
entertainers, it has remained the major source of cultural production, “in terms of scale
and seniority” (Abu-Lughod 2004, p. 7). It was the first adopter of state television,
preceded by Abdel Nasser’s domestic communication reaching Egyptian audiences
through radios (Hammond 2007). In the 1950s until the 1970s, Egyptian drama
proliferated through the region as the center of cultural production (Kraidy and Khalil
2009).
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However, Egypt’s hegemonic nationalism was fading14 by the 1970s and into the
1990s, and this is reflected in its shifting media landscape. After Abdel Nasser’s death
and Anwar Sadat’s reign, Egypt adopted an economic “open-door” policy, changing the
terms of Nasser’s legacy. Under Sadat, Abdel Nasser’s nationalization projects were
overturned and government restrictions on economic growth were lifted (Cox 2015).
Television, for example, was centralized and state-controlled before turning in the 1980s
toward advertising. In the 1990s, it was further transformed through neoliberal reforms,
the advent of satellite television, and increased privatization (Abu-Lughod 2004, p, 10).
During this time, Egypt’s “traditional media hegemony” was challenged by satellite
television from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon15 (Hammond 2007, p. 208).
For countries across the region, satellite television brought new questions of
sovereignty, leading to new ministries for culture and information, media laws and
policies, and regulatory bodies tasked with controlling flows of media. These challenges
to sovereignty have also been articulated through several geopolitical and industry
clashes and controversies following the Arab uprisings. In the years since Egypt’s
revolution, geopolitical tensions have shifted and entrenched especially due to the role of
the regime in trying to quell the Muslim Brotherhood and simultaneously contending
with declining national media industries (Kraidy 2019). Following the 2011 revolution,
the Muslim Brotherhood’s leader Muhammad Morsi was elected president only to be
toppled by current president Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, former minister of defense, in a military

14. Discourses of Islamism and globalization were gaining ground (Abu-Lughod 2004, p. 14).
15. Syrian dramas became a major competitor due to Gulf demand and financing, making it more
of a regional export (Salamandra 2011) and Egyptian drama a more domestic product (Kraidy
2019).
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coup. Given the support of the Muslim Brotherhood by Turkey but also its dominance in
the transnational drama sector, the Egyptian media sector boycotted Turkish productions.
However, this was also due to industry concerns, "a humiliating role reversal from
regionally dominating the sector to being a nationally struggling industry,” indicating the
ways that geopolitics and industry concerns articulate (Kraidy 2019).
Such commentary directly relates to the relations between Lebanon and Egypt in
the last several years as the revolutions have activated geopolitical tensions. Popular
culture is rife with examples of rivalry between Lebanon and Egypt, with jokes and
insults by notable figures triggering media coverage and demands for apology. One
altercation between Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris and Lebanese singer Nicole Saba
took place in 2019 after he commented on the attractiveness of the women of the
Lebanese protests, likening the viewing of the protests as entertainment (Fawzi &
Mohammad 2019). Several commentators to this controversy posted about the
commodification of the Lebanese revolution, posting pictures of women posing for
photos at the protests to diminish the real ‘political’ nature of the movements (Taher
2019, Hend G 2019). Implicit is the comparison of the Lebanese revolution to the
Egyptian, painting the former a mouse in comparison to a lion—here, Lebanon’s national
movements are downgraded to ‘cute’ in comparison to a masculinist, hegemonic notion
of Egyptian nationalism, but also the reality of greater violence and turmoil that the
Egyptian context witnessed during its revolution.
This anecdote highlights their contrasting national imaginaries. As two
postcolonial countries, their ‘oppositional’ national exceptionalisms are then also
gendered and raced ones, often becoming most apparent during moments of controversy
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or scandal. Lebanon’s dalliance with Western powers confronts Egypt’s claims to
antiquity and civilizational legacies. This often leads to a racializing dynamic where, as
we will see in Mazbouh’s case, the ‘modernity’ of Lebanon’s relationship to Western
powers like France is contrasted against Egypt’s nationalist history, with significant
anticolonial mobilization against the British and Ottoman Empire. As such, there is a
colonial dynamic replicated, highlighting the relational nature of coloniality.
In a recent example of bahdala which activated these tensions in November 2018,
just months after the Mazbouh case, Lebanese Minister of Tourism Avedis Guidanian
spoke to the Lebanese daily newspaper The Daily Star about the status of Lebanon’s
tourism industry. Comparing the context to Egypt, he said:
“I mean look at Egypt is there a place dirtier than it? People are louder than us,
there is more traffic than here – people live in graves, OK? But there is tourism,
because they know how to sell that country.”
Anger erupted across social media in Egypt and Lebanon, leading bloggers to apologize
on the Lebanese minister’s behalf (El 3ama 2018) and the minister to issue an apology
(“Lebanon minister apologizes” 2018). This is a dynamic which is replicated in this case,
where nationals are pulled into transnational dramas to make public apologies online.
What this highlights is the purchase of such scandals across borders, where the bahdala
activates these historical tensions.
Indeed, the efforts of the Egyptian regime have been to return to the past as a
mode of nation branding, recalling its claims to an originary civilization. President el-Sisi
is working to build an Egyptian brand of culture and civilization in state spectacles of
modernity which recall its arts and culture. We can think of the state’s 2021 sarcophagus
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parade as one way in which its antiquity is spectacularly mobilized (Gubash & Cahill
2021). There have also been art exhibitions at the pyramids in a bid to fuse this sense of
historicity with the present. As the head of an art consultancy that launched an art
exhibition at the pyramids with this intention said, "The world knows Egypt’s artistic and
cultural past. However, they are not aware of the present, the contemporary” (Barber
2021). This comment reflects a branding of continuity with the past and present. This
extends to state and transnational media companies who work together to bring this sense
of antiquity but also cosmopolitanism to life. For example, the former minister of state
for antiquities Zahi Hawass, is leading the excavation of remains and working with
Netflix to produce a piece on Tutankhamun (Barber 2021). This has been called Egypt’s
‘renaissance,’ where private and public sector work to restore and reproduce hegemonic
narratives of Egyptian heritage.
This has also led to an uneasy relationship with media companies, as the arbiters
of Egypt’s national image. In the last several years, crackdowns on activists and
journalists, secular and Islamist alike, have increased, pointing to a longer history of
media development and anxieties around national sovereignty. While all vocal dissidents
are under threat from these crackdowns, what is gained most international attention is the
arrests of women, reflecting the purchase of such stories in this media landscape. In this
way, crackdowns in the security state point to old local anxieties which manifest in new
ways with the shifting digital landscape. I next turn to the case of Mazbouh and contrast
it with other similar cases to draw out its transnational dimension.
The case of Mazbouh
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The Mona Mazbouh controversy broke on May 31, 2018, when online news platforms
began announcing that the state was looking for the tourist due to a Facebook video she
had posted. This came after she posted a video describing her experience of sexual
harassment and general unhappiness with her trip to Egypt. While the video has since
been deleted from her personal page, it remains on YouTube and various other platforms.
In the selfie-style video, Mazbouh describes trying to have a meal in an Egyptian
restaurant during Ramadan, the Islamic month-long fasting holiday, but being told that,
because it was Ramadan, they could not serve her until it was time for Muslims to break
their fasting in the evening. She also criticized her Uber driver, who told her that he had
to get home in time to break his fast. To this, Mazbouh said that she was a heretic—“ana
kafra!”—and that she should be able to eat when she wanted to eat, criticizing the wider
Egyptian public. She spat, “Tfeh on Ramadan in Egypt and the Egyptians in Ramadan.”
Of the instance of sexual harassment, Mazbouh said that two men on the street
commented on her body, saying that they wanted to “eat this white meat.” She said that
she responded angrily, swearing at the men to the surprise of passerby. She suggested that
there were no “effendi,” or gentlemen to be found in Egypt, calling them “sons of
whores.” She also commented on the bodies and dress of Egyptian women, as well as the
sensibility of Egyptian men toward them. She called Egypt “the nation of the dancers,”
and said that Egyptians were prostitutes and dirty people, saying “you’re the dirtiest
people God gave birth to.” She criticized the “kirsh,” or belly fat, of Egyptian women,
contrasted theirs with her own appearance. She explained that the way she dressed was
due to French influence on Lebanon, implying a more modern, Western sensibility than
Egyptians. Finally, Mazbouh told Egyptians that they deserved what they were
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experiencing under the rule of President al-Sisi and that she hoped there would come
someone even more oppressive after him.
As bahdala, her video can be placed along a longer continuum of performances
which make an event out of shaming. In this way, it can be related to fadiha, sharshaha,
zaff, and radh for its performative dimension of exposure (El-Ariss 2019, Fakhry 2014).
Mazbouh’s bahdala especially adopts characteristics of radh considered an entire
“Egyptian speech genre” (Stewart 1996, p. 45) which has been likened to “a verbal
mudslinging” (Marsot 1993). It describes the public hurling of insults, often by women,
toward an aggressor who has caused a perceived transgression (Marsot 1993, Stewart
1996). Devin Stewart (1996) describes the radh further:
“Radh often occurs in semi-public fora such as urban alleys, and takes place when
the performer, a woman, feels indignation, sensing that she has been mocked,
cheated, deceived, or exploited. The degree of indignation displayed varies
according to the occasion and the parties involved, ranging from playful anger to
murderous fury” (p. 45).
In the same family of performance as bahdala, radh identifies its gendered nature,
connecting it to the public/private divide. As a mode of exposure that is for an audience,
this performance is a way of approaching social media practices and their relationship
with older cultural traditions. Digital bahdala, as an event to be consumed activated
responses of recoding, which also become events to be consumed. By approaching
bahdala as a digital economy, we can understand the kinds of values which it generates.
A critical response on social media followed, leading to ample news coverage on
primetime television and commentary across digital platforms by the wider public. Days
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after her first video was published, Mazbouh took it down and published a second
apology video. In it, she noted that the initial video was meant to be posted privately
amongst her friends on Facebook but had become public when someone shared it beyond
her page. Mazbouh was arrested at the airport, detained, and charged with spreading false
rumors and attacking religion and public decency, a common state tactic against those it
brands dissenters. She received eleven years in prison, which was then reduced to eight
years, then time served before she was finally deported and sent back to Lebanon.
In this way, her arrest was like the arrests which have been intensifying on
activists, journalists, and marginalized groups under President al-Sisi. Unlike many of
these crackdowns, however, her pointed video sparked a widespread response by the
Egyptian social media sphere. This follows other cases of women who are arrested, some
of whom were referenced in the Mazbouh controversy. A month prior, an Egyptian
activist named Amal el-Fathy had shared her own Facebook-live video detailing her own
experience of sexual harassment but linking the violation of her body with the violation
of the state, focusing on issues of bureaucracy and corruption rather than its people.
Following her post, she was arrested, tried, and jailed under charges of spreading fake
news and public indecency, like Mazbouh. The case of Yasmine el-Narsh, an interior
designer in the tourist destination El Guna, in May of 2015 earned her the nickname
“Airport Lady” when she was filmed having an altercation with a police officer at the
airport (Abdel Hamid 2017, Al-Saeed 2018). In the video, she appears to be upset about
missing her flight and having her clothing commented upon by the airport employees.
She disrobes, squats on the ground, and eventually shoves the police officer. Eventually
she was arrested for a discovery of drugs that she was allegedly carrying. While el-Fathy
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and el-Narsh spoke as Egyptians addressing the security state, Mazbouh spoke as a
foreigner lambasting the entire nation for its lack of modern sensibility and hoping for the
continuation of oppression under President Fatah al-Sisi’s regime. While Mazbouh was
eventually deported back to Lebanon after her charges were greatly reduced and dropped,
the Egyptian women were sentenced to several years in prison.
While online commentary ran across news platforms, Facebook, and Twitter, I
focus on the YouTube videos for the kinds of performances they enacted. I am most
interested in the videos due to the length of time users spent recording, editing, and
publishing the videos, despite many of their admissions that Mazbouh did not deserve
their words. In focusing on these videos, I offer that Internet users engaged in such
performances like pointing into the camera, performing kicks on a punching bag, and
reciting poetry to affirm a sense of dignity. I examine both the rhetorical dimension—the
invocations of symbols, the uttering of phrases—along with the other performative
dynamics—gestures, punches, and recitals—that interlaced this constellation of videos in
order to understand the process of converting humiliation into dignity and mobilizing it in
the face of attack. I next turn to these responses.
Recoding with Mo Salah
These reactions involved a range of social media users, from those who had posted little
to no other videos, seemingly creating accounts from which to respond to Mazbouh, to
those who posted a variety of videos commentating on social issues. The videos included
women and men across a spectrum of ages, from children to older adults. Several
common themes emerged, with most taking issue with her rejection of Ramadan, her
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comments about Egyptian women, and her insults about Egyptians as dirty, poor, and
unmodern.
In particular, the reactions can be viewed as recoding of the bahdala, making it
the grounds for refusal and dignity. This section picks up on ideas introduced in the first
chapter around recoding to pinpoint its mechanics. Recoding, as introduced in the prior
chapter, is the process of cultivating alternative feeling states through rhetorical and
embodied performance. I argue that these performances seek to convert conferrals of
failure to the grounds for pride. This can be mined from the symbols and subjects that
they invoke to perform better feelings, like resilience, dignity, and strength. Further, they
represent a moment in time where some of the posters were building their entertainment
careers as digital content creators, leveraging scandals like this one to channel
indignation around the digital bahdala. These YouTubers will be discussed in relation to
the platform and the geopolitical context in the next section.
If Gebran Bassil’s bahdala at the World Economic Forum, channeled humiliation
through colonial rhetoric and racializing tropes, this controversy rejected such charges by
channeling performances of dignity and strength in the face of foreign attack. In contrast
to the previous case study at the WEF, where I focused on the trial as a moment of
national humiliation, this case highlights the rich cultural artifacts that are reached for in
postcolonial sites to contest conferrals of failure. This scandal is of interest for not only
the range of ordinary people and bloggers that recorded videos, but also their portrayal of
a desire to set the record straight in their commentary. What it also reveals is the
relational nature of affect by showing how Lebanon can both receive and dole out
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colonial bahdala in much the same way that Egypt has been both a colonizer to Sudan
and colonized by countries like England.
What comes across in several of the videos is a rhetorical construction of
Mazbouh as unworthy of commentary with performances that, affectively, say otherwise.
Video posters said things like “all I want to say is two things…” (Appendix B1:6), going
on to record and post a video which is 18 minutes long. They said, “I did this video to
answer you even though you’re smaller than me,” (since deleted video). They said, “Your
actions were too cheap for me to respond in words,” and “sometimes you get riled up and
by replying to her people have degraded themselves,” but recited it within a severalminute long poetic verse staged in front of a television screen playing Mazbouh’s video
in the background (Appendix B1:12). In a since-deleted video, a woman said, “I’m not
going to waste time because you are someone who’s not worth it, and I’m not going to
give you value” while posting an edited, 11-minute-long video.
They make the case for why it is important to turn to the performative component
of media processes rather than simply the discursive constructions they engender.
Throughout the videos, the performances suggest what is denied discursively—that
Mazbouh’s comments and video were inconsequential and that they were unaffected.
However, they ran the spectrum from quick selfie-style videos which lasted a few
minutes to heavily edited videos lasting several minutes and featuring the video of
Mazbouh herself, filters, and memes. Several of the videos feature Mazbouh’s own video
within their compilation, emphasizing their points by referencing hers. Some included
icons censoring Mazbouh’s cleavage or bleeps censoring her curses. In this way, they
channel the very power of Mazbouh’s bahdala, rerouting it back to her.
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Of particular interest to this project is the way that such practices are not simply a
feature of digital media technologies, but performances that span place and time.
Examples of such performances of recoding include US rhetoric in the aftermath of 9/11
and the so-called “War on Terror,” (Anker 2014) the dealings of judicial bodies like the
International Criminal Courts (ICC) and the Pan-Africanist pushback (Clarke 2019), and
conversion practices of the US Evangelical community (Pellegrini 2007). In Elizabeth
Anker’s (2014) work on the melodramatic nature of US rhetoric after 9/11, she illustrates
the ways that genre conventions of victimhood and suffering in official speeches helped
mobilize the US public to support the “War on Terror.” In Kamari Clarke’s (2019)’s
work on the ICC, she examines impassioned anticolonial speeches in African states about
past humiliation and future victory. At these sites, images and rhetoric are used to change
from one feeling state to another.
This does not only happen with nationalist rhetoric, but other kinds of rhetoric
which coheres belonging. Ann Pellegrini’s (2007) work shows that religious communities
like the US Evangelical church perform and channel melodramatic rhetoric around
victimhood and righteousness through televangelism but also the Hell House, or the
church’s version of the secular haunted house. Here, community members perform
affective work to change incompatible feeling states. Pellegrini (2007) shows that they
put on productions of the Hell House to recode conventionally pleasurable and sinful
experiences into experiences of fear in order to lead people to salvation. What is more,
other examples of utilizing a “pedagogy of fear” include secular practices like driver’s
education, where new drivers and students are shown frightening videos of potential
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accidents, scaring new drivers into safe behavior. Recoding affirms that something needs
changing due to a greater purpose.
Closer to home is the way that recoding was done in Egyptian popular culture as a
means of cohering Egyptian nationalism in the pre-independence era. Examples of this
took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries around the influx of migrants from
Southern Europe. As Ziad Fahmy (2011) notes, “The perceived differences between a
native Egyptian (ibn al-balad, or literally “son of the country”) and the foreign
(khawaga) “other” were often strengthened by the deliberate portrayals of this dynamic in
colloquial culture” (p. 28). Theater, colloquial jokes, and music helped to recode a sense
of ‘Egyptianness’ with Cairene Egyptian Arabic and positive qualities, like “patience,
goodness, perseverance, and intelligence” in contrast to the nonfluent who were imbued
with “exploitative greed, laziness, disloyalty, and naïveté” (p. 29). In this way, a sense of
Egyptian identity was affirmed at transcultural contact zones by drawing on and
cultivating more positive qualities in the production of nationalist identity. More recently,
in his work on digital media scandals, Tarek El-Ariss (2019) shows how recoding
practices like the online “leak” trace back to older understandings of the leak that span
mediums. Cyber-practices like the leak recode centers of authority and operate not as
adaptations of Western tools, but as embodied communication.
The video posters engaged in these performances by harkening to Egypt’s dignity
and what the Arab world owed it. Several accounts expressed their superiority to the
Lebanese Mazbouh. One since-deleted video featured a man saying, “you don’t even
know the things that happened to us, we Egyptians fight in every direction, we cheat life
to make a living, and still we have dignity” (since deleted). Another said, “Egyptians are
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cleaner and more honorable than you” (Appendix B1:13). In another since-deleted video,
a woman responds to Mazbouh’s comment about the bellies and weight of Egyptian
women, saying, “of course the Egyptian women has a kirsh (belly fat), this kirsh brought
many people that you can’t ever achieve what they have achieved” (since deleted). Bellyfat here is resignified from Mazbouh’s original video. Rather than unsightly excess, it is
the proof of hard work and resilience. In another video, a woman dressed in red, black,
and white clothing, including a scarf and her chair, the color of the Egyptian flag sat
upright at a desk and emphatically pointed her fingers into the air to emphasize her
points. She called Mazbouh an insect and said, “you think you’re beautiful. But that kind
of beauty we throw in the trash. Our beauty is dignity.” While forceful in tone, she took
moments to pause and smile slightly.
In these videos this takes place with filters, memes, jokes, editing, and embodied
performances. One vlogger cut Mazbouh’s video into sections, interjecting to provide
commentary through memes and sound effects. In response to Mazbouh’s comment about
wishing to eat during Ramadan, he inserted a clip of the popular Egyptian poet Gamal
Bakheet reciting a famous line from one his poems from the 2011 revolution. The line,
which translates to: “Their fathers’ religion, what is its name?” became popularized
during the protests by referring to the hypocrisy of the Muslim Brotherhood’s claim to
Islam. In this video, it is meant to draw parallels between Mazbouh’s own lack of a
respectable, pious upbringing and the Muslim Brotherhood’s own inauthentic claims to
Islam. Another vlogger used a filter of an older man’s face, performing as an older figure
speaking with authority over the younger Mazbouh.
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Figure 9: Appendix B1:10, Translation: “The 3 most dangerous pieces of information about the case of Mona
Mazbouh the Lebanese woman”

Figure 10: Appendix B1:19, Clip from since-deleted video of featuring Egyptian poet Gamal Bakheet

These accompanied assertions of Egypt as cultured, tolerant (Appendix B1:3), and ‘the
original,’ (Appendix B1:14), harkening back to constructions of Egypt as a center of
civilization, a locus of anthropological encounters, and a site for strategic military
interventions. Across the videos, they also used a common phrase: ‘Masr umm al-dunya’
(“Egypt is the mother of the world”). This has been a popular proverb in Egypt, drawing
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on its rich history of cultural production and the permeation of its colloquial language
throughout the region. Others adapted the phrasing by saying, “Egypt is your
grandmother, Egypt is the original” (Appendix B1:14), drawing on tropes of Egypt as the
birthplace of Arab culture and identity.
Given the performative and rhetorical techniques utilized in response to
Mazbouh’s bahdala, I delve deeper into the mechanics of recoding by offering that the
YouTube videos utilize “conversion points” or what Sara Ahmed (2004) describes as the
turning of bad feeling into good feeling. Donovan Schaefer (2015) has described this
process as “capturing an affective intensity but redirecting its force,” (p. 142)
highlighting the mechanics which underly these media artifacts and performances.
Conversion points, in these formulations, can do the work of switching the direction of
feeling from wider structural forms of violence and inequity to more specific bodies and
ideas. Ahmed writes of the feminist “killjoys” who are made to be the source of negative
feeling, moving away from recognition of more structural origins.
“When a feeling becomes an instrument or a technique it is not that some- thing is
created from nothing. But something is being created from some- thing: a
wavering impression of nervousness can strengthen its hold when we are given a
face to be nervous about. To track how feelings cohere as or in bodies, we need to
pay attention to the conversion points between good and bad feelings” (p. 227).
I find that these videos drew on tropes of the Egyptian “golden age,” global sports stars,
and virtuous mothers to redirect feelings activated by Mazbouh’s bahdala. The recoding
of bahdala uses a variety of conversion points, from Egyptian mothers, to belly dancers,
to flags, making it the grounds for refusal and pride. To be effective, these conversion
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points must make use of shared systems of meaning. As such, they require symbols
which are encoded and invested with meaning, available in the cultural arsenal.
Of interest were the figures that several videos mentioned, revealing insight into
how recoding works through already encoded meaning. In response to Mazbouh’s
labeling of the country as “balad al ra‘asat” (“the country of dancers”), video posters
named figures like classical singer Umm Kulthum and former president Gamal Abdel
Nasser. Figures like Abdel Nasser and Umm Kulthum16 are often paired together to
harken back to what some perceive as the “golden age” of Egyptian history. The pair had
a major role in projecting a unified vision of pan-Arabism to the rest of the world
beginning in the 1950s and into the 1970s, encoding them as Egyptian and Arab symbols.
They gestured to them as beacons of modernity when Egyptian cultural production was
dominant in the entire Arab world.
The coding of these figures as nationalist symbols was done through state
mediums which are inseparable from the icons themselves. Their encoded nature is
inseparable from the media practices of the time, which helped establish Nasser as a
commanding figure and Umm Kulthum as a pan-Arab icon. El-Ariss (2019) notes the
descriptions of the post-Nasser period, where some scholarship has noted an “awakening”
of national publics who were described as almost cast under a spell of a paternalistic
Nasserism. The instruments were TV and radio, encoding the leader with a larger-thanlife quality. As such, as well-worn tropes of Egyptian and Arab culture, their examples

16 For example, Hammond (2007) describes the way that state leaders like Nasser took part in the
recoding of cultural symbols as he established his order. For example, Nasser helped to transform
Umm Kalthum into a symbol of the military’s new order rather than a symbol of the old royalty.
Through performances on state radio, she became and still is “intimately linked in the minds of
people all over the Arab world with Nasserist pan-Arabism” (p. 206).
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drew upon a rich tapestry of popular culture and history, one that has been reinforced
through state branding in entertainment, tourism, and real estate. In these ways, Egypt’s
golden era is recalled to affirm its contemporary offering to the world.
However, encoded symbols can also be more contemporary. One contemporary
figure that several mentioned was Mohamed Salah, a Premier League club Liverpool
player and captain of the Egyptian national team. He shot to fame after scoring one of the
winning goals for Liverpool in the Champion’s League final and for helping get Egypt to
the FIFA World Cup. He has become a national and international celebrity gaining the
label, “the ‘pride of the Arabs’ from Casablanca to Baghdad (Ali 2021, p. 97). Describing
the role of international media events like the soccer/football match in 1990s Egyptian
television, Lila Abu-Lughod (2004) writes that they are “vivid spectacles of local and
national identity” where the masses were meant to be “made aware of the larger world”
(p. 11). Like Nasser, footballer Salah provided Egyptian publics with points of contact
with the extra-national, fulfilling what Amro Ali (2021) has called “the strong desire for
international recognition” (p. 93).
He serves as a central conversion point in this case. One woman whose video
referenced Salah related him to modernity, pride, and strength:
“If you don’t know who Egypt is, ask the people. Ask the whole world, ask about
how Egypt is the country of hadara [modernity], the country that brought Ahmad
Zweil, that brought…Mohamed Salah…that brought all the people that people
take pride in…There are very strong names, but I swear to God I won’t waste my
time because you aren’t worth it, so I won’t give you value.” (Appendix B1: 14)
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As shown in this quote, Salah’s value is not only related to his athletic ability, but
to his visibility as Muslim in global circuits of entertainment. Salah has become a symbol
of modesty, piety, and dignity for his humble beginnings and his visible Islamic practice
during games. Images of him performing the sujood after scoring a goal circulate in
international press. In fact, this visibility has even been offered as a reason for the
decrease in anti-Muslim sentiment in the UK.17 Whether or not Salah’s presence can be
confidently said to have caused the reduction of racist sentiment, what is important here
is the vested interest in the possibility of such a thing. A popular chant that accompanies
Salah in the UK goes: “If he’s good enough for you he’s good enough for me, If he
scores another few, then I’ll be Muslim too.” In this humorous chant there is also a
conditional proposition. Him being good enough, a good immigrant, a good Muslim, for
them depends on his performance. It highlights the stakes for success and good
performance of immigrants in places like the UK, where he resides.
It is this “visibly Muslim” quality, but cosmopolitan circulation through the
world, where he appears to evade representational traps, that gives him this allure to
Egyptians and wider Muslim publics. Amro Ali (2018) quotes a barber in Egypt’s
Alexandra who said of Salah, “I respect him as he is not embarrassed, nor does he try to
hide his veiled wife after all that success.” In this statement, there is an assumption that
one would be expected to possibly want to hide his veiled wife, ashamed or embarrassed

17. Research has been done to measure the possible effects of Salah’s presence in the
international arena, suggesting that the visibility of Muslim figures has the potential to reduce
anti-Muslim attitudes in the UK context (Alrababah et al., 2019). The finding was that greater
exposure to Salah as “a visibly Muslim soccer player” reduced anti-Muslim sentiment online.
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of her visible Muslimness. In a piece for The New Yorker about Salah’s allure, Yasmine
Al-Sayyad (2018) similarly writes:
“What stands out to me most about Salah, who is far more conspicuously Arab
and Muslim than I am, is that he doesn’t seem concerned with trying to blend into
anything. He is simply himself. That, more than anything else he has done on the
field, is what I admire most.”
These comments point to the potentially embarrassing feeling of being ‘visibly Muslim’
in a ‘global’ context like the international sporting event.
As such, he is a conversion point, converting bad feeling to better feeling. To
draw a contrast from the first case at the WEF and show how some figures, once full of
cosmopolitical and ‘transnational’ appeal, lose that status, we can compare Salah to
Pakistan’s Prime Minster, Imran Khan. Not only has his brand of populism have been
touted as embarrassing and shameful, but, in contrast to Salah’s wife as a symbol of pride
for Egyptians, Khan’s wife has been referenced as evidence of his nonmodern status due
to the niqab, or the veil that some Muslim women wear. As we see here, Salah retains the
cosmopolitan that Khan lost. From Salah as a figure of pride and Khan as a figure of
disappointment, we see how the circulation of symbols becomes invested with
cosmopolitical hope.
They also show how the loss of cosmopolitical hope is tied to racialization. One
response which came from Egyptian-German rapper and social media personality Khalid
Gad, expressed this. In his selfie style video, he says:
“And regardless of my fervor (hamawaya) and my boiling blood, I don’t know
how long we’ll give chances to these kinds of things to offend and wound us like
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this. Why don’t we take legal action against any one of those and make an
example of her for anyone who tries to touch on Egypt, even from afar, not from
within? But this one is IN our country and is cursing us? I need you to forget the
original topic and to forget everything and to grasp my screaming and the tone of
my voice.” (Appendix B1:3)
The man asks viewers to ignore the words and to focus on the conviction with which he
is speaking. In a since-deleted video, a woman looks at her camera and references “we,
the ones in pain.” She speaks for several minutes about the rift created between Lebanon
and Egypt, a rift of aggressiveness and pain. She says that the country is tired, saying,
“Live our situation, live the sincerity/authenticity of our pain, to understand how much
pain we are in. Live it.” She ends her video with a deep breath before saying, “Live what
we are feeling/experiencing. I’m not going to say it more than that.” Many of the videos
expressed a similar desire for others to feel for the Egyptian people through social media
platforms.
These kinds of comments also point to the way that across place and time, bodies
are compelled to restage and recode scripts of power—whether the performance is done
in the service of vulnerable identity or to leak abuses of power. The performance of
recoding, Pellegrini (2007) writes, “sutures gaps, soothes contradictions, and produces
resonance amid discord” (p. 915). The various remarks by YouTubers are examples of
this soothing and suturing work, admitting what is desired in the process. Pellegrini
writes that Hell House performers, “draw upon even as they move to recode experiences
of "safety" and "fear," "reality" and "unreality," in the service of a fundamental spiritual
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transformation” (p. 915). In other words, recoding the bahdala is a way of affirming that
there is a link between discourse and affects that needs altering.
In these videos, he appears to evade being trapped in dualistic systems of national
signification. Here, we can draw a connection to the first case study, where publics
expressed desires to ‘cut through’ rather than be ‘stuck within” systems of signification
which inform public discourse. For example, Amro Ali (2021) writes that during the
revolution especially, Egyptians were trapped between rigid binaries of "revolutionary
versus counter-revolutionary, secular versus Islamist, civilian versus military, liberal
versus hyper-nationalist, pro and anti-Brotherhood, among others” (p. 93) which
pervaded national public discourse. Considering the history with the state and Islamist
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Salah appears able to conjoin Islam and
cosmopolitanism. More broadly, Salah’s mobility in the ‘world stage’ helped him evade
such trappings conferred by national systems, becoming signified as a national among
others. This is how “[i[ntertextuality, decontextualization, irreverence and subversion
recode the iconic online” (Ibrahim 2021, p. 2).
However, this very visibility is not neutral. It is part of the affective and visibility
economies which undergird social media platforms. Salah becomes visible in ways which
are gendered. We can see this when these performances work to realign oppositional
hegemonic brands of Egyptian and Lebanese nationalism. For example, across the
response videos, men and women remarked about the virility of Egyptian men,
suggesting that Mazbouh was more accustomed to effeminate Lebanese men. Nasser,
Umm Kulthum, and Salah were contrasted with women like Mia Khalifa, a well-known
former adult film star with Lebanese heritage, and Haifa Wehbe, a popular Lebanese
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singer in the region. As a conversion point, Salah aligns viewers with the right kind of
nationhood and Mia Khalifa and Haifa Wehbe with the wrong kind. Some referenced
Lebanon’s plastic surgery industry, saying that Mazbouh came from the country of Mia
Khalife while they were the land of Mohamed Salah. Additionally, several of the videos,
some of which were deleted after posting, were of men expressing violent remarks about
Mazbouh. Some featured physical displays of strength. In the next section, I will discuss
the gendered dimension of the digital bahdala, describing the digital content creators on
YouTube who have a built a following out of scandals like this.
The YouTube response video
This requires a discussion of the wider media landscape through which these videos
travel and the kinds of geopolitical and corporate discourse they align with. Some of the
videos analyzed included those who appear to have created accounts just to reply to
Mazbouh, either deleting or leaving the videos as their only uploaded videos on their
channels. However, there were also several who have since gained followings through
their production of social commentary. This alerts us to a much wider YouTube economy
of reaction videos which feature moral policing of especially women and gender nonconforming people. What unfolds is a digital economy of atonement, where those called
out as threatening national respectability and exceptionalism are demanded to apologize
and perform suffering.
The Mazbouh controversy alerts us to this group of YouTube creators and their
connections with the state. Karim Alaa, one of the vloggers who responded to Mazbouh,
shot to influencer status over the last few years since I began studying this case in 2018.
In one of his earlier videos, related to the Mazbouh case, he stands in front of a boxing
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bag hanging from the ceiling of what appears to be a gym (Appendix B1:13). In the
since-deleted video, he positions the camera and begins to describe the Egyptian men as
strong. Referring to Mazbouh’s apprehension by the state, he says, “They went and got
her two days after her video came out, she didn’t know we were strong” (Appendix
B1:13). He pauses from his speech to walk over to the punching bag and kick and punch
it, a display of brute force and physical strength. He manifests the strength that his words
gesture toward. His performance of physical strength is precautionary.
He, among others, reacts to what is framed as embarrassing, generating a
YouTube following that comes to expect more. He regularly posts reactions to YouTube
and TikTok videos which feature what he frames as disrespectful and offensive. Today,
Alaa’s videos feature YouTube plaques in the background, received for his rising
subscriber count, which at the time of this writing was 1.06 million (“Karim Alaa” n.d.).
Many of these videos featured YouTube plaques in the background, received by content
producers for milestone metrics. Through the years, Alaa’s plaques have changed from
silver to gold, reflecting greater rewards for his improving metrics on the platform.
Alaa is only one of several YouTubers who feature this kind of content on their
channels. While blogs have been cited as an important platform preceding the revolution
(Pepe 2020), YouTube is one place where national exceptionalism have been channeled
by Egyptian digital content creators in the last few years since the revolution. Of interest
here are the male vloggers who have found followings by posting reaction and response
videos to others, especially women, across social media platforms, policing their
behavior. These videos feature men looking into the camera and providing commentary
about the videos, interlacing them with clips and sound effects from Egyptian popular
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culture. Several YouTubers have found success with this format, with popular YouTube
channels having one million or more subscribers. YouTubers like Mahmoud Eldeeb
(825,000 subscribers), Younes Mohamed (1,000,000 subscribers), Amr Eltmraya
(211,000 subscribers), and Abdullah AlZabet (61,000 subscribers), post reaction,
response, and commentary videos, often projecting their brands which cohere through a
common theme of reacting to the Egyptian bahdala.
Their videos may be viewed through the rise of YouTube in 2005 as a videohosting site. Since then, it has been considered as participatory culture (Miller 2012), a
space of community (Gauntlett 2011), and a site to produce performance genres (Burgess
& Green 2018, McDaniel 2020). Prior to its professionalization, which these vloggers
take part in, its reliance on user-generated content was marketed as a way of creating and
broadcasting the “self.” Eventually, its interface began to reflect a more consumerist
agenda, moving away from community features to those resembling network television
(Burgess & Green 2018, van Dijck 2013). This professionalization of YouTube was
evidenced by the rise of projects like YouTube Creators and multichannel networks
(MCN’s), the latter of which has become an intermediary between advertisers and
content creators (Bucher 2018, Burgess and Green 2018, 2018; van Dijck 2013). This has
led to a kind of entrepreneurialism in content production, where these intermediaries are
favorable for the platform by making it “a more appealing space for advertisers” (Lobato
2016, p. 350–1). Several of the accounts are likely part of MCNs due to their similar
background templates and the actual logos of the MCNs on their channels, likely
reflecting different terms of agreement with the intermediaries.
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One thing that has coevolved with these intermediaries is the rise of video genres.
Vlog videos, as well as those uploaded by non-established companies, of which these are
an example, have made up most popular user-generated videos on the platform (Burgess
& Green 2018). User-generated videos are also the most discussed and responded to on
the platform, while those by traditional outlets are the most viewed (Burgess & Green
2018), lending insight into the function that YouTubers may have to advertisers or other
interested parties, such as the state or state-aligned groups, as well as the kinds of
interactions publics have with traditional and new media personalities. In their overall
content structure, they are like the genres of “reaction” and “response” videos which have
become popular on YouTube but also spread to other platforms like TikTok, where they
have become a feature built into the application (Lewis et al 2021). Reaction videos, for
example, grew out of an awareness that creators could gain subscribers who were
watching the original content (McDaniel 2021, p. 1629). Additionally, the response video
“interpellates the target as if they were already defending themselves against response
video’s creator and gives the respondent the last word” (Lewis et al 2021, p. 737).
Indeed, these vloggers are positioned as having the last word, stopping the bahdala and
returning it tenfold to where it came from.
The videos I analyze feature elements of both, serve as one way that these capture
audiences and power of the bahdala. In this way, these YouTubers are working to craft a
brand based on bahdala. These videos were sometimes comedic in nature, if the
channel’s goal was to highlight the comedic skill of the host, or investigative videos
about scandals or mysteries to be uncovered, or videos where the host offers musical
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performances and plays different characters—from older men, to street sweepers, to army
generals—as entertainment, mimicking theater performance.
On this subject, scholarship of digital media has explored the economies which
undergird these kinds of content. Through their visual focus, platforms like YouTube
generate value linked to the visibility of bodies and performances (Banet-Weiser 2018).
In this way, it is linked to emerging as well as persisting centers of power, like
technology companies and state-affiliated or -friendly news networks. Relevant to this
case, Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012, 2018) has written of digital economies of popular
feminism and misogyny, describing the forms of visibility and legitimacy they generate
for social media figures. In particular, she notes that popular misogyny and popular
feminism are connected through economies of visibility, where each drives the other,
linked through their reactions to one another.
We see this relationality in the way that these YouTubers use the content of
Egyptian TikTokers, often women, remixing them with pieces of popular culture. Many
of the reaction videos often use as thumbnails screenshots of the women’s videos in their
own videos to attract viewers. They also feature clips from these videos, blurring out
what they consider to be inappropriate, such as parts of women’s bodies. These
YouTubers respond to content on Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube, channeling
audiences through the content of these women.
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Figure 11: Appendix B3:13, 8, 14, Translations in Appendix
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What is also important is these videos’ production of Egyptian exceptionalism through
their aesthetics and rhetoric. They recall motifs and characters from Egyptian theater
during the pre-independence era who were conjured to imbue positive or negative
qualities with national others (Fahmy 2011). They also draw on the “golden era” of
Egyptian film and entertainment, using clips of actors who appear as if they are reacting
to scandalous TikTok videos. They engage in recoding by drawing on cultural traditions
from Egyptian popular culture, as well as broader performance traditions.
One YouTuber who exemplifies this is Abdullah Al-Zabet. He interlaces clips of
TikToks with his own commentary, jokes, songs, and clips from film and television to
cultivate a sense of outrage or disgust about impropriety. He performs as various
characters in order to make his case, drawing on histories of theater and vaudeville, the
latter which Henry Jenkins (2006) has compared with YouTube itself. Using
‘embarrassing’ TikTok content, he makes this content the basis for his own brand of
humor, producing skits as several characters in between the clips. One of these characters
is an army general who wears a military cap with the YouTube logo on it. He is a
YouTube general.
This recoding relies on a variety of conversion points which are encoded in the
popular imaginary. Examples include depictions of Egyptian actors slapping one another,
making incredulous exclamations of disbelief, or one-liners which answer Al-Zabet’s
rhetorical questions. Offering an alternative, at the end of many of his videos, Al-Zabet
features a counter to these various forms of bahdala in the form of more proper and
respectable content. These are often TikTok videos of young women and men singing or
speaking about religion. He zeroes in on the account names of these TikToks, providing a
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form of advertising for what is deemed more wholesome and appropriate content.
Through these features, he contrasts what is bad and good, sometimes ending his videos
with a performative admonishment of TikTok itself, punching the logo out of screen
view.
This parallels other performances of masculinity, like Alaa’s mentioned earlier,
not only part of a masculinist showing of dominance, but a cultivation of strength in
response to bahdala, the threat of unbelonging. In this way they emphasize the
performative and productive nature of “reaction” videos. By recoding the original
content, they invest it with meaning even as they are also consumers of this content. As
McDaniel (2021) notes, “reaction videos become a way to stage their power as
consumers, turning the affective dimensions of listening into a performance that they can
package and circulate for others to witness” (p. 1626). As such, they depend on bahdala,
taking what they frame as humiliating affronts on national reputation and using it to
propel their careers forward. Through their performative dimension and their utilization
of conversion points, they are both a pedagogy of masculinist postcolonial nationhood
and a method of branding which uses the bahdala to channel latent and more systemized
feelings of bahdala.
In some ways, these scandals are not new. Other scandals have coevolved through
the role of media corporations and state bodies. In recoding what is perceived as national
failure or embarrassment, this economy of videos aligns with state crackdowns on
women and gender-nonconforming people that have taken place far before the advent of
social media platforms. For example, the state has operated through televisual media
through the exposés and raids of public and private places (Amar 2013) as well as social
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media and dating applications like Grindr to entrap gay and queer people. Indeed,
“electronic entrapment” is by far the state’s most utilized method for arresting those who
are in the LGBTQ+ community (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2017). We can
see this in the connection between state practices and a digital economy of morality
policing.
Indeed, these YouTubers have also had explicit connection to the arrest and
persecution of women who have boasted TikTok followings. They have gained
legitimacy and aligned with state and legal institutions, helping to lead persecutions of
not only women like Mazbouh, but many Egyptian women (and likely other Egyptians)
on platforms like YouTube and TikTok. One YouTuber has referenced the way that the
state uses social media to aid in its policing:
“The work of morality police officers has developed. Now, they sit on the
internet, they watch YouTube, TikTok, all the live broadcasts. They follow, they
watch who publishes things that aren't right." (Hajjaji 2022)
These vloggers have also been directly connected to state campaigns of moral policing.
One such example is a campaign called “Purify Society” which was linked to Karim Alaa
through his relationship to the lawyer leading it. The lawyer noted that the goal of the
campaign was “the balance between freedom of expression and silencing the pollutive
audiovisual voices" online (Hajjaji 2022). While he “denied his initiative is swayed by
YouTubers, saying that his complaints are based only on evidence that a crime was
committed under Egyptian law” (Hajjaji 2022), he noted that Alaa alerts him to potential
cases of interest. However, Alaa, according to Hajjaji (2022), has gone on to create his
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own campaign called “Bel Mersaad,” which refers to practices of surveillance and
watching.
On digital media, the role of these video is not only to police within the nation,
but to bolster nationalist affect through digital media’s transnational reach. Alaa is
instructive for his origin story, which began with a video reacting to Mazbouh. It was one
of several others which began to respond to those who insulted Egypt online. In one of
his first response videos which generated almost two million views, one of his most
popular videos of all time, he called it, “A reply to everyone who insulted Egypt and her
people in this latest period” (Appendix B3:1). While his first videos were relatively
unedited simple comedic skits and vlogs using a selfie camera, they have become
increasingly edited as he exclusively reacted to scandals and affronts to Egypt. Across his
most popular videos reacting to insults by other MENA nationals about Egypt, he
generates expressions of transnational support.
This case study’s transnational perspective lends insight into purchase of bahdala
across national borders. In the next section, I show how traditional centers of power like
media institutions utilize this platform to benefit from the affective economy of bahdala
and its appeal across national borders. I show this in the next case by turning to YouTube
videos by Egyptian and Lebanese media networks around this case. These videos reflect
the way that these outlets mobilize the power of digital bahdala to capture not only
Egyptian audiences but transnational audiences who may sympathize. It is to this
landscape that I turn next.
Performing atonement on television and YouTube
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If we turn to the wider media landscape, toward Egyptian and Lebanese television,
particular kinds of scenes are associated with bahdala. From the first case study at the
WEF event to sociopolitical talk-shows in this case study and the next, there are
conferrals of responsibility to those who are expected to absorb it. Traditional networks
have picked up on the appeal and value of digital bahdala.
Several channels featured segments with Mazbouh’s parents as they apologized
on behalf of their daughter and implored the Egyptian state to return her safely to her
home country. The program which featured the most significant coverage of the event
was the popular Egyptian al-‘asher Masa’an (10pm) on Dream TV. On this channel and
network, Mazbouh’s parents appealed to the regime and the public to forgive their
daughter in the days after her arrest.
The coverage on Dream TV is significant because of its relationship to the
Egyptian media landscape. It is one of Egypt’s first two private television networks,
initiated in 2001, relatively late in comparison to other countries in the MENA region
(Kraidy & Khalil 2009, Sakr 2007). While the Egyptian state has had more control of
terrestrial networks, Dream TV became one of the first private networks, owned by
businessman Ahmad Bahgat, who was close to the regime. It was launched, as Naomi
Sakr (2007) notes, as quintessentially a ‘business project’ – a vehicle for advertising
goods produced by the business empire of Ahmad Bahgat” (p. 7). For Dream TV, this
eventually led to “public-service-style talk shows,” where they asked public figures
questions on behalf of the public (Sakr 2007, p. 7). The network led the way to more
political analysis and social commentary within Egypt, however at the same time, toed
the line between censorship and economic survival. Sakr (2007) writes of this time:
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“Repeated warnings issued to Egypt’s Dream TV about its political content
demonstrate the fine line between, on the one hand, attracting audiences by
showing programmes that are relevant and different from other channels and, on
the other, abiding by vaguely worded prohibitions on criticizing people in power”
(p. 37).
This programming on this station originally featured call-in confessional programming
(Sakr 2013) of which elements have been retained, including the call-in by audiences of
al-‘asher Masa’an in this case. Hosted by Wael El-Ebrashy, it featured guests to
comment on social affairs and controversies, sitting them down to speak on these issues
and to allow call-in viewers to ask questions and make comments. It was also known for
hosting public figures and asking them about contemporary issues (Sakr 2010).
Reflecting a theme around gendered scandal in this case study, the program was
originally hosted by Hala Sirhan before she left due to restrictions on content and
tensions arising from what was framed as risqué programming (Kraidy & Khalil 2009,
Sakr 2007)
The program was especially notable in this case for its focus on Mazbouh’s
mother. In the segments, her mother and lawyer spoke about the case to El-Ebrashy. They
apologized and explained Mazbouh’s work history, her countless visits to Egypt, and her
medical history. El-Ebrashy asked questions about the law, her medical history, and
possible outcomes. In one segment, however, the Egyptian public was invited to call in to
air their grievances against the Mazbouh family. In the most-watched video from the
case, Mazbouh’s mother sits silently as several Egyptian women call in to admonish her
daughter (Appendix C2:6). Viewers are invited to watch as she quietly sits and absorbs
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the words, at one point covering her face. This video is the most watched of the segment
and the one which has the most comments.
As a transnational scandal, this case also highlights the purchase of these scenes
for Lebanese audiences, especially those who watch from outside of the nation. Diasporatargeted satellite channels like the Lebanese Diaspora Channel (LDC), capitalize on such
scandals. In this case, Mazbouh’s parents were invited to speak about it on Joe Maalouf’s
program “Hawwa el-Horriya” (Appendix B2:14). Maalouf has a history in television
programming around scandal, having led one of the most infamous Lebanese media raids
in the last two decades of an abandoned theater which was known as a cruising venue for
gay men (Awadalla 2012). In a clip of the interview on YouTube, Mazbouh’s original
video plays while the camera focuses on the parents’ reactions. As Mazbouh refers to the
Egyptian people as dirty, the camera focuses on her mother biting her lip quickly and
taking an intake of breath.
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Figure 12: Appendix B2:6, 14, 15, Translations in Appendix

We also see this in the case of Yasmine El-Narsh, the woman who was invoked by
several Egyptians on social media as a predecessor to Mazbouh. On the YouTube account
of Youm7, an Egyptian daily newspaper owned by pro-government businessman Ahmed
Abou Hashima (Bahgat 2017), one video about El-Narsh’s case focuses on her mother
reacting to her conviction trial. The video is entitled, “In the video…The collapse of
Yasmine el Narsh’s mother during the trial of the ‘airport incident,’” dramatizing her
reaction (Appendix B2:15). The video features El-Narsh in court and pans to her parents
in the audience. Her mother, dressed in pearls, a scarf covering her shoulders, and a wellcoiffed updo, looks around and put her hands to cover her mouth.
This digital economy is part of the pedagogical work that the bahdala does,
performing the links between ideas and affects. For example, in the conversion work of
Evangelical performers leading audiences to salvation, there is a reliance on both
pedagogy and performance to alter feeling states. Pellegrini (2009) suggests that US
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secularism relies particularly on pedagogies of fear to cultivate its ethos. Like the Hell
House, she offers public school videos like drivers’ education videos of drunk driving
accidents as a parallel example of the kind of pedagogical tool that utilizes fear to train
the body to feel afraid of certain objects and subjects. These media “solicit and bind” (p.
213) feelings and concerns and attach them to structures of lived experience. They can be
thought of as a “retraining and a reteaching of bodies” (Schaefer 2020, p. 6), where there
is a habitual,18 repetitive, embodied aspect to conversion pedagogies like recoding.
Like these driver’s education videos or the salvation whose goal is conversion,
this identifies the source of bahdala in women who have experienced their own form of
bahdala through harassment, policing, and other modes of systemic violence and
exploitation. Along the way, rhetoric, symbolism, and performance aid in cultivating
different ways of feeling about the source of bahdala. In the Hell House, the conversion
points are the non-monogamous, homosexual, or drug-using characters, becoming the
means through which to achieve salvation. They aim to both affirm an identity or way of
belonging while also seeking to transmit those affects to audiences.
One YouTube video of Mazbouh’s mother in the interview reflects the didactic
nature of bahdala and the affordances which make it possible. While most of the videos
from this programming feature judgment of Mazbouh and her family, these are markedly
different. In the video which features Egyptian women calling in to admonish Mazbouh’s
mother for her daughter’s actions, more comments are compassionate than they are
judgmental. To Mazbouh’s mother facing the callers on television, they wrote:

18. We can think of Wendy Chun’s (2016) work which engages with habit as a framework for
understanding new media.
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“Poor mother, that’s enough forgive her and return her daughter to her, God will
be able to help her. I’m from Algeria, greetings to the Egyptian people
💞💝💝💝💞💞💟💓💜”
“We are Egyptians have high morals and good hearts. I say to the Lebanese
mother you are respectable and are welcome to Egypt.”
“There is no power or strength but in God, the tears of a mother are very precious,
people”
“Egyptians, you are good people. The mother has no guilt, nor her father”
“People, the creature made the mistake, why did you hurt her mother?
“Poor mother, she cut/broke my heart” (Appendix B2:6)
This sample of sympathetic comments is a stark contrast to the other videos, reflecting a
different kind of reaction to the content. In the video, as women call and berate
Mazbouh’s mother, publics are invited to witness the bahdala being returned. On
YouTube, they can judge and are invited to share their stance.
The comments beneath this video in particular highlight the way that gendered
labor is part of digital bahdala, where there is a demand for the performances of women
as proper victims of it. In the process, they show how these national exceptionalisms are
themselves gendered, relying on the labor of women to change bad feeling to good. This
is not limited to the triggering scandal, but to the bahdala that is more systemic,
activating the very actions that these women turn to social media to expose. As I have
mentioned, because of its digital nature, the bahdala is an entire reverberative event
which generates reactions, and as noted in this section, lead to an anticipatory production
of bahdala. This production requires the content of other content creators, but also,
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evidence of suffering for their transgressions. In the next chapter, I will examine this
anticipatory quality of the bahdala, and the paranoia that it generates.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the way that publics, the state, and media institutions engage
and facilitate this recoding of events to change meta narratives of the nation. By turning
to the recoding of the bahdala, I have identified the way that publics reach for a variety
of artifacts and symbols to convert humiliation into pride. Attention to such artifacts and
ideas can help us understand the kinds of affective value that symbols of modernity,
cosmopolitanism, and national exceptionalism offer to postcolonial contexts grappling
with structural rupture. They are symbols of a sense of ‘global’ belonging that is under
threat due to not specifically the bahdala, but the failures of national projects to deliver
the imaginaries they promise to most people.
I have also shown how national exceptionalisms are gendered. Egypt, as the
“mother of the world,” demands the affective labor of mothers who have failed to
produce docile subjects. This reveals a reliance on the policing of women to maintain
national projects. In this way, this case study considers an additional dimension to the
notion of networked misogyny, showing how national projects inform such scandals and
the way that digital genres are created. Ultimately, it shows how relations of dependency
are illuminated and attenuated during national crisis, highlighting the labor required to
produce cosmopolitan imaginaries.
I next turn to the paranoid media environments which emerge as social media
users confront media environments where they are individually working to cultivate
different ways of feeling. We see this in the Mazbouh case, where several commenters
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asked where she was from and whether her video was conspiracy. Like the other cases in
this project, elements of paranoia also abound in news coverage of her and other women
who have crossed the state. Across national television on political talk shows, news hosts
question her motivations and her origins. On one channel, the host asked a litany of
questions:
“Our brothers in Lebanon, if she’s from Lebanon (this creature), if she’s
Lebanese, disown her. If she’s really Lebanese, and I doubt it, because I know a
lot of Lebanese. This is not like you, it’s not possible. Maybe she has a
nationality, or she got the nationality. But her roots and her origins can’t be
Lebanese. You have to find the truth and find out her story. What’s her truth?
Who is she?”
In the next chapter, I examine this push to read for truth in the case of Lensa Tufa, an
Ethiopian migrant domestic worker who became the subject of a global scandal after
jumped from the two-story balcony of her employers and claimed that her employers, an
elite Lebanese family, were abusing her. In what followed, international and national
media covered the event, leading to paranoid posturing, recantation, and conspiratorial
questioning on national stages. I focus especially on “This Is Lebanon” (TIL), a digital
activist group that harnesses the power of bahdala to free women from imminently
violent conditions.
In doing so, I continue to highlight a digital economy which comes to anticipate,
and even rely on the bahdala. I examine this anticipation and its production of paranoia
around the bodies of migrant domestic workers and their capacity to tell the truth about
their experiences. In this case and the next, bahdala alerts us to the fact that reading the
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body for evidence of a feeling or quality—incapacity, suffering, pain, pleasure, shame—
is not a power-neutral task.
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ENGINEERING THE BAHDALA: THIS IS LEBANON AND THE DIGITAL
PRESSURE GROUP
“If consumers want to be entertained, and the images shown us as entertaining are
images of violent dehumanization, it makes sense that these acts become more acceptable
in our daily lives and that we become less likely to respond to them with moral outrage or
concern. ”
— bell hooks. “All About Love.”

Introduction
On April 2, 2018, Lensa Tufa was wheeled on a hospital bed onto the stage of the
Lebanese television program, “Lil Nasher” (For Publication) to share her side of what
had become a national news story in the weeks prior (Chamoun 2018). Tufa, an Ethiopian
domestic worker employed by a wealthy Lebanese family who owned a couture fashion
line, had recorded what became a viral video recounting her experience of abuse at the
hands of her employers. The original video was shot by her aunt from Tufa’s hospital
room, where she had been recovering after allegedly jumping from her employers’
balcony to escape. The Lil Nasher television episode invited Tufa, the daughter of the
family employer, and the family’s lawyer to uncover the truth of what had become a
heavily mediated event across Lebanon and had even reached the international press
(“Lensa’s hospital bed” 2018). During the televised episode, Tufa recanted her story,
offering that she had lied in order to return home to Ethiopia, while the family lawyer
suggested that these kinds of spectacles were orchestrated by international organizations
working to misconstrue the facts of many cases of alleged abuse, exploitation, and
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violence against domestic workers. Here, Tufa was linked to international actors seeking
to blackmail Lebanese families and destabilize the nation. It is to this paranoid posturing,
where international shadow actors are posited to be behind local developments, that I turn
in this chapter.
While stories of abuse of domestic workers by employers are common in a
country where two migrant domestic workers die per week (“Lebanon’s new domestic”
2020), Tufa’s case with Eleanore Ajami’s family became not only a national but an
international news story following the circulation of her video across social media. These
stories highlighted the role of This Is Lebanon (TIL), a group which works to expose
abuses of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, in publicizing Tufa’s story. The group,
comprised of nine relatively anonymous members who reside outside of Lebanon, works
to expose employers who are abusing or withholding pay from the migrant domestic
workers that they employ. At times, this results in screenshots of Whatsapp conversations
with and personal information—phone numbers, emails, screenshots of GPS work
locations— about employers being shared on their social media platforms and website
(www.thisislebanon.work) to prompt action. In these cases, it also involves extended
campaigns to pressure authorities to act.
I offer that TIL works as a “digital pressure group,” a version of the pressure or
lobby group which works to influence policy or government decisions using the
imaginary of global reach on social media platforms. They wield the cosmopolitan
imaginary of Lebanon that has been an aspirational mode of belonging and a method of
nation branding, and they expose it as a lie, pressuring employers to meet their demands.
This produces not only the actual exposure of some employers, but an anticipatory threat
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to those who are invested in the imaginaries that both kafala and social media platforms
proffer. Using an anticipatory humiliation and the paranoia it cultivates, the digital
pressure group tactically wields the spectacle of social media platforms like Facebook to
meet their demands.
However, I also argue that as a digital pressure group relying on the bahdala,
there is labor required by the migrant domestic workers to perform the right kind of
suffering. In wielding the power of the bahdala, they wield these affective scenes as
“pressure points,” invested with the power to guide audiences toward other ends.
Drawing on affect theory which complicates universalist theories of feeling, I show how
wielding and even reading for affects is not a power-neutral task, as there is a demand for
legibility so that others may find evidence. The relationality of emotions shows that when
we rely on narratives of national failure, it makes demands on others to perform the right
kind of victimhood. As such, this last case study comes full circle to describe the kinds of
readings and judgments that transnational publics engage in. These affective trials are the
sites where different forms of evidence are produced and judged by spectators.
In the following pages, I provide background on the kafala system and its
relationship to upholding a cosmopolitan imaginary of Lebanon. I next discuss TIL’s
work in the landscape of kafala activism in Lebanon and in relation to the Tufa case. I
offer that TIL utilizes the cosmopolitan imaginary of both Lebanon and of platforms to
channel paranoia, or the potential for shame, around impending exposure to a global body
politic. I lastly discuss the way that this places the impetus on women in the system to
perform the right kind of suffering.
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Kafala system and This Is Lebanon
This Is Lebanon gives us an opportunity to consider the kafala system’s role in propping
up an imagined cosmopolitanism which has been one of Lebanon’s greatest exports and
which gives the bahdala its power. The kafala system as it stands is a migrant
sponsorship system which exists in some form in the Gulf and the larger Middle East. In
its contemporary form, migrant workers can enter countries under the sponsorship of a
kafeel (sponsor) to whom they are dependent for mobility and employability. Within this
system, much has been written about the abuses and exploitation19 it engenders
(Kassamali 2017, Dagher et al 2020, Fernandez 2021), but what differs especially in
countries like Lebanon is the relative lack of role of the state in regulating workers’ rights
and protections (Kassamali 2017). This gives private citizens and companies jurisdiction
over the treatment of migrant workers while the state recedes into the background
(Motaparthy 2015). Through this privatization, a particular class of consumption and
mobility is maintained. This has occurred partially through nation-state formation in the
region. Some have traced the system to the indentured labor contracts of the Gulf states,
where British colonial powers regulated labor and policing the population of migrant
workers working as pearl divers and in the oil industry (Longva 1997, AlShehabi 2019,
Fernandez 2021). In the Lebanese context, it has also been connected to the rural-tourban migration of Lebanese women to upper-class homes or regional migration to be
under sponsorship contracts in exchange for domestic chore work (Zein 2020). At the
same time, after the Gulf oil boom in the 1950s, migrant domestic workers especially

19. The amount of money made from the industry in the private and public sectors has been
estimated at $105.6 million in 2019, with an unknown amount making it to migrant domestic
workers themselves (Dagher et al 2020).
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from South Asia traveled to not only the relatively wealthy Gulf countries, but to
Lebanon as a new node in the kafala system (Zein 2020).
In this way, an already gendered and classed labor practice became a racialized
system as migrant workers from South Asia and East Africa began migrating to Lebanon
in the 1970s (Fernandez 2021, Zein 2020). This has given way to a demographic anxiety,
one which is baked not only into the kafala system, but Lebanon’s sectarian order. In
Lebanon, colonial and post-independence era laws have regulated the maintenance of
sectarian groupings in national governance, reflecting population anxieties around
Muslim and pan-Arab majorities. An 18-sect political system which requires powersharing and sects to achieve consensus means that gridlocks block legislative reform
often (Dagher et al 2020). Shifts in demographics signal sifts in sectarian representation,
provoking fears around refugees and migrant workers on paths to citizenship. Kafala is
another example of this kind of anxiety, leading to a transnational industry where
migrants are differentially treated according to hegemonic hierarchies of race and
ethnicity. Migrant domestic workers are graded on a pay-scale which largely correlates
with skin color (Dagher et al 2020).
Population anxieties also relate to the informal nature of the kafala system across
national contexts, and therefore the relatively informal nature of kafala in Lebanon. In the
Gulf, where non-nationals outnumber nationals, the system is more formal and there are
relatively stricter laws. Foreign workers born outside of the region often outnumber local
citizens, and informal systems became formal “through the diffuse assemblage of these
practices with regulations and laws” (Fernandez 2021, p. 4). In contrast, in Lebanon,
domestic work is not part of labor law, existing rather as a set of regulations. Here, where
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the ratio of “nationals” is greater than migrant domestic workers, the system remains
relatively informal, leaving work that happens inside of the household unaccounted for
under labor law (Dagher et al 2020). There exist some 250,000 foreign workers in the
kafala system (Barkawi 2020, “Lebanon to abolish” 2020) out of the almost 7 million
national inhabitants.
Given the connection between the oil boom, rural-to-urban migration, and other
labor patterns, kafala is inherently connected to the cosmopolitan imaginaries produced
about capital cities in the region. In the Gulf, migrant workers have built the fixtures of
capital cities like Dubai and Doha and are a necessary but not officially advertised
component of Saudi Arabia’s own “modernization drive” to diversify the economy off oil
(Black 2017). In Lebanon, kafala fills a gap left by a lack of state social services,
including caretaking for the elderly (Dagher et al 2020). Migrant domestic workers are
most often employed by families with dependents (Fakih & Marrouch 2014). In countries
like Hong Kong and Taiwan, where there are similar industries of labor, hiring a worker
makes it more likely that the female employer will also participate in the labor force
(Suen 1993). In Lebanon, distinct from the Gulf and Hong Kong, it is also the middle
class that employs migrant domestic workers rather than only the upper class (Fakih &
Marrouch 2014). Given the gap between their average pay and minimum wage—
estimates state that migrant domestic workers earn $230 in contrast to a national
minimum wage of $450—and the wider network of kafala workers working outside of
domestic spaces, Lebanese publics writ large benefit from this supply of cheap labor
(Dagher et al 2020).
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While there are several groups working on the issue of kafala, at the same time,
local laws and media ownership structures limit the kinds of coverage and organizing that
take place around the issue. This Is Lebanon is one among several groups working to
support migrant workers in Lebanon. In this landscape, several NGOs and civil society
organizations have campaigned for reform around and abolishment of the kafala system,
including groups like Kafa (“Enough”), Anti-Racism Movement (ARM), Caritas, Insan
(“Human”), and the Migrant Workers Task-Force. Another recent group which has had
overlap with ARM’s Migrant Community Center (MCC) is Enga Legna Besdet20, a
feminist group of Ethiopian women who run workshops, campaigns, and solidaritybuilding projects for other workers across Ethiopia and Lebanon. Therefore, forms of
extra-national labor that the transnational Enga Legna Besdet group utilizes are often
helpful because non-nationals face limitations or prohibitions in their ability to navigate
the legal landscape.
For these reasons, the turn to social media has become an effective way to bypass
local laws which limit the organizing potential of workers and regulations which control
the coverage of these issues in the wider media landscape. This Is Lebanon (TIL) is a
group which runs partially or mostly through extra-national labor but differs from Enga
Legna and predecessors in its tactics. According to their website, TIL in its form on
social media was founded on May 1, 2017, Lebanese Labor Day, by two former migrant
workers named Dipendra Uprety and Priya Subedi. While they now reside outside of the
country, Uprety has shared in interviews with international press his experience of
20

The group was founded in 2017 by Banchi Yimer, a former domestic worker in Lebanon who
now runs it from Canada (Sabaghi 2021). The group has helped repatriate hundreds of migrant
workers during Lebanon’s continuing socioeconomic collapse (Barkawi 2020).
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imprisonment and abuse as a migrant worker in Lebanon. After finding sponsorship with
a local church, he began helping abused migrant workers as an honorary representative of
the Nepali Consulate. On the website, Uprety notes that while he has witnessed dozens of
accounts of women dying in the kafala system, he has only once witnessed one person
responsible brought to justice for these kinds of crimes—that person was a non-Lebanese.
Uprety explained to Al Jazeera the reason behind his turn to social media, saying, "I had
dealt with over a thousand cases. I had a huge headache, we couldn't get them justice. But
when we went to social media, we started seeing results” (Azhari, 2019, par. 9).
Platform exposure and the manipulation of the cosmopolitan ideal
This turn to social media began with the exposure of a few Lebanese employers,
including a man posing as a police officer and a politician and women’s rights advocate.
On their website, they write that they are “the first organisation to expose and name the
abusers; it was thought that if the abusers were named and shamed, it would act as a
deterrent to others” (“About – This is Lebanon” n.d.). The posts on TIL’s Facebook page
include a steady stream of content which highlights the experiences of migrant domestic
workers who turn to the page for help receiving their salaries, exposing abuse, or finding
them a way back home. These posts connect to a website which features more extensive
stories and information about these women.
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Figure 13: A sample of TIL’s correspondence with an employer (Azhari 2019)

The stories often recount the events in narrative fashion, with titles such as “Serial
Abuser Ahlam Hamade Is the Monster in Your Bad Dreams: Caught Mistreating Her 5th
Worker,” “Abdallah and Maha Rafi: Lawyers & Slaveholders,” and “The Mighty Cesar
Gebara is a Violent Man.” Within these pages there are timelines recounting the events,
images of the migrant workers and employers from their personal social media pages, and
telephone phone numbers, social media profile URLs, and GPS locations of the
employers’ homes and places of work. Along with the employers, the page features the
contact information of agencies, journalists, and officials who This Is Lebanon has
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rendered complicit with the exploitation of migrant domestic workers. The Facebook
page serves to generate audience commentary around the stories.
Uprety has noted that they first try to deal with employers privately before
resorting to exposing them on social media. It is this exposure which has received its fair
share of attention, praise, and criticism by Lebanese and international press. Several
articles describe TIL’s tactics as “shaming” (Allouche 2020, Azhari 2019, Nashed 2019),
referencing the ways that TIL exposes the “personal” information of employers as a
pressure point for them to meet their demands to end exploitative behavior. In these
ways, they invert the gaze of surveillance toward those who have otherwise been able to
maintain their privacy. B. Fernandez (2021) notes that part of the power that employers
wield over workers is their sovereignty over the home space. This combines with the
state’s role in both receding in terms of protection and exerting itself in terms of
surveillance and spectacle trials, leaving the home which doubles as place of work at the
discretion of Lebanese employers.

Figure 14 Translation: “Blackmailing and talking about people in this way is shameful”

Through their ability to leverage the imagined power of social media platforms, TIL is a
new permutation of older groups which work to pressure political action. These have
included pressure groups that push citizens to vote by sending mail threatening to reveal
their voting status, AIDs activism, and advocacy around the plight of migrant workers
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(CBS 2010, Korte 2012, Gould 2009, Schouten 2014). Pressure groups have been
described as groups which work to influence or lobby for sociopolitical change in the
realm of policy or other efforts. These have included journalist lobby groups in the
MENA region (Sakir 2007), US groups working against media violence in the 1960s
(Carwile 2021), those on either side of the issue of abortion (Lovenduski et al 1986),
grassroots organizations working on activism around the AIDs epidemic (Gould 2009),
churches and labor unions (Watts 2007), and environmental issues (Carnwath 2016).
TIL is also an NGO, registered in Canada and the US, which can act as pressure
groups. They have been called “civic pressure groups” (Arts 2004), operating at the local,
national, and global level. They are considered non-governmental organizations which
work toward “the delivery of services to people in need, and the organization of policy
advocacy, and public campaigns in pursuit of social transformation” (Lewis 2009), first
introduced in 1945 by the UN Charter after World War II (Martens 2002) and
proliferating in the 1980s and 1990s development era. Further, their relationships to
states and government institutions vary, with some working closely with policymakers
and others focusing on public influence (Baggott 1995).
The very reliance on NGOs like TIL for activism and politics is related to both the
formation of nation states in the MENA region (and other postcolonial sites) and the
application of structural adjustment policies. In the 1980s and 1990s,with structural
adjustment policies came a lack of public investment by the state and decreased social
welfare. This began generating a gap for international aid money and civil society
organizations to take on these sectors and roles. There was a larger proliferation of NGOs
and civil society discourse across countries that have contended with proxy war, civil
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war, and foreign intervention like Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, and others (Jad
2007). Some have written of the way that this perpetuates asymmetrical power relations,
whereby “much activism within NGOs is creating an economy of victimhood that is
ultimately dependent on funding provided by states in the Global North” (Abu-Assab et
al 2020).
This points partially to the way social media functions in contexts where sociolegal protections are mainly provided by political parties or NGOs rather than the state. In
the MENA region, what has been called “NGO-ization” or “NGOism” by some has led to
a reliance on international donor aid and development models for issues of social
change21 (Armstrong & Prashad 2005, Jad 2007). This may be seen as part of a larger
proliferation of NGOs and civil society discourse which expanded exponentially in the
1980s and 1990s (Choudry 2010), when structural adjustment policies, a lack of public
investment by the state, and decreased social welfare has produced a gap for international
aid money and civil society organizations to take on these roles. The turn to social media
to fill the gap left by state functions then follows along such extra-state histories.
For issues like kafala, advocacy and reporting are often done outside of formal
systems of complaint and reporting. Farah Salkah of the Anti-Racism Movement in
Lebanon, has reflected on this, writing:
Critics should first look at the failures of Lebanon’s non-existent legal justice
system in relation to migrant domestic workers,’ she says. ‘Are all the cases on

21. Islah Jad (2007) has described the “NGO-ization” of social movements, whereby “issues of
collective concern are transformed into projects in isolation from the general context in which
they are applied and without taking due consideration of the economic, social and political factors
affecting them” (p. 177).
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This Is Lebanon’s site 100-per-cent accurate? I don’t know… But how does one
really get evidence of all the atrocities that are happening in the houses around us
in this country if the authorities don’t intervene? (De Stone and Suber, 2019)
She points to the way that social media activism is filling a gap left by formal
justice mechanisms. Formal groups working within Lebanon face obstacles in organizing
around kafala, including citizenship prohibitions for heads of NGOs, the threat of arrest,
and other legal regulations. This is why TIL turns to social media to expose issues of
exploitation. In doing so, they join other social media groups like ThawraMap who have
tracked and shamed politicians out of social establishments during the revolution (Collard
2020). In the absence of formal mechanisms, social media can be seen as filling a gap in
protections for migrant domestic workers.
The turn to social media for 157amingg and shaming” as a political tactic has
garnered much discussion in studies of digital media and communication (Banet-Weiser
2018, Burgess et al 2017, El-Ariss 2019, Chun 2016, O’Neill 2022, Paasonen & Sunden
2021). Wendy Chun (2016) has discussed the related “epistemology of outing,” a logic
which comes from the imaginary of networks that digital media has cultivated. These
logics prompt questions about the power of exposure and information leak online,
questions like, “what form of humanitarianism does not also rely on the assumption that,
if atrocities happen, it is because they are not known?” This recalls a point made over a
decade ago, when Evelyn Sedgwick (2003) referenced the paranoid mode of reading, one
which “acts as though its work would be accomplished if only it could finally, this time,
somehow get its story truly known” (p. 138). In other words, there may be other reasons
for exposure that have less to do with its outcomes and more to do with the way it is felt.
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This recognizes an affective dimension to exposure which is more than informationuncovering (El-Ariss 2019).
The paranoid mode that Sedgwick cites points to TIL’s ability to leverage
exposure and its associated affects. It is the threat of exposure that TIL weaponizes
through the digital bahdala, mobilizing not necessarily shame or embarrassment, but
generating paranoia about its potential. Paranoia, according to some affect theorists, can
be viewed as a response to waiting for potential shame or humiliation (Sedgwick 2004,
Tomkins 1963). It can come from the degree to which shame or humiliation appears to be
peeking around the corner, constituting a “strong theory” of a negative affect (Sedgwick
2004). This means that there is a temporal nature to the work of paranoia; it stays
effective by never bringing the thing to be feared to fruition (Ahmed 2004). Paranoia
saturates the world with the potential for negative affects like shame or humiliation,
working through temporal frames.
Paranoia is inherently connected to social media through visibility paradigms.
Erik Erikson (1965) describes shame as being “visible and not ready to be visible” (p.
244). This happens while new economies of visibility have emerged around the social
media and neoliberal landscape put more emphasis on visibility as “an end in itself”
(Banet-Weiser 2018, p. 67). On platforms like Facebook, where TIL mostly functions,
visibility operates as an organizing framework (Banet-Weiser 2018). These are what
Sarah Banet-Weiser (2018) has called economies of visibility, which rely on a
marketplace of consumption, labor, and production. She offers that “[t]hese are also the
spaces that enable visibility of the body, that ask users to evaluate and judge the body,
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that function as spaces for public shaming” and “where profit is in some ways contingent
on number of views” (p. 27).
These meditations on exposure recognize paranoia as baked into the logics that
networks rely upon, a paranoia which “stems from the attempt to solve political problems
technologically” (Chun 2005, p. viii). These modes of exposure are the logic of social
media platforms like Facebook, which TIL is very active on. They are part of this trend
toward publicizing what was previously considered private life (Thompson 1995, van
Dijck 2013). Platforms like Facebook were launched with visions of global imaginaries,
projecting notions of transparency and a distributed empathy that would be the solution to
social ills. Their leadership has referenced its goal of a more open, transparent, and
empathetic world (van Dijck 2013). These discourses of a global village have long
circulated in neoliberal imaginaries of networked communication. It is thus the
relationship between social media platforms and the generation of audiovisual evidence
and paranoia that make the digital pressure group different from the pressure group.
As such, digital bahdala, with its conferral of failure, brings out the paranoia of
exposure to an imagined cosmopolitan audience connected through the platform. In the
next section, I return to Tufa’s case, describing how TIL leverages these imaginaries in
the digital bahdala.
Engineering the digital bahdala: The digital as transnational
I focus on the case of Tufa as a particular manifestation of a wider phenomenon of the
engineering of the digital bahdala, or other practices of “naming and shaming.” Namely,
it is instructive for the way it activated an international media circuit, operating as a case
par excellence of the pressure applied through extra-national labor. In its commentary
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and reliance on narratives of national failure, it shows how the bahdala, as a repeated
tactic for the digital pressure group, relies on the desirability of a place in the global body
politic. It shows how this provokes a paranoid media landscape which contends with the
threat of being shamed toward a transnational audience, one that is invested in the way
the nation is represented to others, but also those who are interpellated by spectacles of
victimhood and violence.
Due to Tufa’s employer, Eleanore Ajami, the owner of the Lebanese fashion line,
Eleanore Couture, the case is a prime example of the way that TIL operates most
effectively, as they provided an example par excellence of a cosmopolitan imaginary to
be shattered. Tufa’s case gained visibility online nine months after she began working in
Lebanon. She reportedly came from Ethiopia in July of 2017 and began working for the
Ajami-Khalil family (“This Is Lebanon” 2019). In a documentary shot by TIL following
Tufa’s return to Ethiopia, she explains that the conditions that she experienced upon her
arrival did not match what she was promised. Her passport was taken upon arrival, she
worked from 6 AM to midnight without days off, sewed clothing for the company rather
than cleaning, and was forced to sleep in the shop rather than in a bedroom in a house. In
the documentary, she recounts the physical abuse she experienced by the family when she
made mistakes with the sewing or when the house was not clean to their satisfaction
(This Is Lebanon 2019). On March 11, 2018, she jumped from the second-story balcony
of the family’s house. When the video of her from her hospital bed circulated by TIL
across social media, international press began to pick up the story. As soon as it did, TIL
began to reshare on their own Facebook profile, urging others to share the coverage and
boosting their posts accordingly.
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Figure 15: Facebook post by TIL one month after her jump from the balcony (Appendix C1:14)

TIL’s use of bahdala here is illustrative, especially because it displays the role of
diaspora in contexts like Lebanon, where significant remittances are sent home by
nationals living abroad. As a digital pressure group, TIL uses the bahdala to trigger an
economy of desire to belong to a global body politic. They reshared news about the case
by Euro-American and Western publications and platforms like the UK’s The Sun and
The Daily Mail, Australia’s News.com.au, and Human Rights Watch. They launched a
campaign to inform international customers of the Eleanore Couture dresses that the
employer was embroiled in controversy. What is more, they invited page followers to
interact with celebrities who were spotted wearing their dresses, letting them know that
the dresses were made through “slave labor.” They also explained that they boosted posts
to reach these audiences, referencing this in comments underneath posts about the case.
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Figure 16: A comment on a post by TIL about Tufa’s case (Appendix C1)

In this way, they leverage the power of exposure to this imagined world to prompt
employers to meet their demands. Their very name—“This Is Lebanon”—conjures an
audience who will soon know the truth about Lebanon, rather than what is presented in
hegemonic discourse of the country as modern, cosmopolitan, and liberal in an otherwise
troublesome region. It resonates with content that has been used both as a tourism
campaign highlighting the wonders of Egypt’s heritage and history—Egypt’s tourism
campaign, “This is Egypt” (“This is Egypt” 2017)—as well as social commentary around
police brutality in the US—Childish Gambino’s “This is America” music video (Murai
2018). “This is Lebanon” merges both, suggesting that there is something that needs to be
seen. Common tropes around Lebanon as a tourist destination, including its ski slopes, its
beaches, and its nightlife, were, following this genre of video, meant to be shattered.
It echoes commentary around Capernaum, a film depicting the refugee crisis and
the kafala system in Lebanon, of which one journalist notes, “There is no sight of the
Mediterranean Sea or the glamour of the so-called Paris of the Middle East. This is
another side of the Lebanese capital” (Qureshi 2018). TIL conjures an audience who has
an idea of the tourism and luxury imaginary which must be busted with the reality of life
for those in the kafala system.
In other cases, they highlight gesture to this world through the news platforms that
are exposing Lebanon’s slave system— “Readers all around the world, including UK and
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USA, are finding out about slavery in Lebanon.” They regularly hashtag
“#BlackLivesMatter” and highlight comparisons to police brutality in the US, beckoning
toward US movements and political events. These include titles and comments like,
“America has Donald Trump and Harvey Weinstein. Lebanon has Michel Hayek,” or
comparisons made to the UK context. They invoke social media users to “SendUsHome”
and #ChooseToChallengeKafala, conjuring an audience with the power to make a choice.
They share news articles by sites like Vice as well as Dutch platforms and position them
as “the world.” In these ways, TIL leverages desires and investments in global belonging
that undergird the platform.

Figure 17: Appendix C2:15
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Figure 18: Screenshot of a TIL post sharing a Dutch news article link (Appendix C2:16)

In this way, TIL positions their page toward an audience that is concerned with
campaigns in the US around police violence, racial justice, and labor movements. They
are positioned as ‘the world’ by TIL as well as audiences, evidenced by audience
engagement with the page. In comments on posts which share information about other
cases of abuse, this discourse of the “world” was repeated: “so that [t]he whole world
would see it” (Appendix C2: 11), “a bad reputation around the world” (Appendix C2: 12)
and “so that the world can get to know about them” (Appendix C2: 10). In many
interactions with the page, commenters and TIL gestured to an outside world that would
soon know about Lebanon’s horrors.
Their commentary reflects the imaginary upon which platforms like Facebook
help cultivate. Social media platforms and especially Facebook have leveraged this sense
of connectivity, transparency, and openness to the world, reflecting a language of
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sociality rather than one of marketability and technological progress (van Dijck 2013, p.
50). While these platforms and their affordances boast concepts like “sharing,” these
social veneers align with hegemonic discourses of cosmopolitanism, branded as the
prized way of being in the world. As such, Facebook leverages the power of concepts like
“sharing” and “transparency” to create a more appealing and profitable service that
invites users to engage. If an imagined worldliness is desired, there is value to be
generated from this desire.
There are affordances that facilitate and are built upon this imaginary. Through
the integration of hyperlinks from external websites, they can create a narrative around
news items, commenting on the audience sizes of the publications and using the
imaginaries of platforms themselves to extend their imagined reach. Audiences are
invited to discuss this commentary. Facebook account holders can comment on every
post, as well as directly reply to other individuals. They can tag individuals to make a
pointed comment to them, personalizing questions. They also use the platform to boost
posts to the diaspora or to the local community in the area where the employers live.
Indeed, they remark about the reach of these posts, noting that their videos are embedded
in international news articles and sharing screenshots of the reach of these posts
(Appendix C2:3).
TIL then mobilizes an imaginary of ‘the world’ who is witnessing the bahdala by
utilizing the affordances of the platform. In this way, they channel the affects of diaspora
and those who are interpellated by the spectacle of national failure on the platform.
Underneath the posts, account holders are invited to respond to narratives of national
failure, articulating either a defense of Lebanon or an acceptance of its shame. In several
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posts, commenters explain that this is not ALL of Lebanon or the Lebanese. They contest
the exceptionalism of kafala, bringing up examples of exploitation in other contexts. In
one example, a commenter responds to a post that TIL posted comparing kafala to other
national labor systems. She notes that the UK also has its problems. The commenter, and
the others like her who point to other contexts where violence and exploitation take place,
suggests that the nation cannot be a failure because other countries, countries that might
not be thought of as failures, also have forms of exploitation.

Figure 19: Appendix C2:1

In other examples, commenters on the page take the opposite stance, but still reinforce
the same underlying logic of national failure by trafficking in the very shame that TIL
does. For example, in response to one case highlighted by TIL, commenters lamented
Lebanon’s third or perhaps fourth-world status. They position justice systems in the UK
as superior and describe Lebanon’s chaotic and backward nature. Some comments refer
to carceral logics as solutions for this kind of abuse, framing Lebanon as an uncivilized
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country. In these ways, particular subjects become part of the right kind of ‘we’ by being
on the right side of shame.

Figure 20: Appendix C2: 8

Figure 21: Appendix C2

As such, these examples show two ways of reacting to the bahdala which are
discursively different but rely on the same affective encounter. In generating and relying
on debates about global belonging, the digital bahdala generates collectivities who are
positioned differently in relation to shame. Several posts from Tufa’s case, as well as
cases that followed, expressed such sentiments of shame in response to posts about the
cases. As we saw in chapter two with the case at the WEF, these are those who either
accept the nation’s shame, trafficking it in, or reject it. Those that accept the shame—“we
should be ashamed” or “shame on them”—align toward cosmopolitan belonging and the
fear of losing access to global imaginaries, while those that reject the shame—“this
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doesn’t represent Lebanon”—align toward more nationalist ends, still concerned with the
global body politic but aligning toward a more autonomous mode of belonging.
These posts help cohere an audience which responds to narratives of national
failure, debating whether this is Lebanon. Comments are accentuated with emojis and
engaged with through ‘likes.’ These engagements, however, are not only an expression of
agreement or acceptance, but a valuable indicator for platforms and other corporations
(van Dijck 2013). These expressions of shame or its refusal generated through these
repeated exposures become the manner through which future activities are decided. It is
how TIL’s viability is secured; through the repeated engagement of those who consume
the national failure or bahdala as a genre of media. In this way, there is a temporal
dimension to digital bahdala, relying on the potential for humiliation which manifests in
paranoia.
Paranoia and economies of visibility
This question of futurity brings temporality to the forefront of what separates the digital
pressure group and the pressure group. While pressure groups have also historically
worked to influence the political landscape, digital pressure groups like TIL work by
producing the potential for exposure and humiliation as a mode of operation.
TIL’s viability is premised upon the belief that the platform connects to a wider
cosmopolitan world. This is not to say that they rely on the technical affordances of the
platform or the exposure of individuals, but rather on the imaginary of these affordances
as a spectacle of global access. We see this in the way that they remark about the ability
to use the platform to boost posts to the diaspora or to the local community in the area
where the employers live. These often look like screenshots of the reach of posts,
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sometimes showing how many people have been reached through their budget and how
many were reached through users’ engagement with the post. Their power then lies not in
the actual access that they have to global audiences, but in their conjuring of these
affordances of the platform. Much like Taina Bucher (2018) has noted about the way that
algorithms take on a kind of spectacular power through their materialization as cultural
artifacts which tell stories, the reach of posts becomes a spectacle of the power of the
platform and its capacity to reach imagined audiences.

Figure 22: Appendix C2:3

Access to this imaginary through the platform maintains their bargaining power with
employers. In one response to a commenter who asked the page to “name and shame” the
influencer that they were referencing, they note that they unfortunately could not expose
her. They replied, writing that “this would compromise our ability to negotiate with
employers in the future and would be detrimental to the cases of workers who presently
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have or will have cases with us” (Appendix C2:13). In the process, they admit that the
employer’s feeling about their potential for future exposure becomes their bargaining
chip. They operate on the assumption that employers will not be able to know whether
exposure and potential humiliation will take place, knowing rather that it could.
As evidenced in several posts about TIL’s cases, we see that they rely on the
potential for reach to this imagined audience as a powerful affective motivator. Their
screenshots which explain the ‘total’ and ‘organic’ numbers of people who are reached
indicate their willingness to sponsor posts and the potential for this to then reach an
audience that is larger than intended. Much like it is “the promise of potential stardom
and economic revenue” that urges digital content creators to produce on platforms
(Bucher 2018), it is the potential for access to cosmopolitan audiences that encourages
desired behavior on the platform. Viewers are enmeshed in a pedagogical space that
stages the habitual bahdala and its affective economies of shame. This shame is around
the possibility to expose what has been “personal” or “private” for those who have
previously been able to secure their privacy.
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Figure 23: TIL shares the phone number of an employer on their Facebook page (Appendix C2:8)

This also recognizes the way that paranoia, through questions of temporality, are baked
into the logics of platforms, drawing on an affective condition around leaks as digital
practices and embodied performance (El-Ariss 2019). Writing of the 1990s dot-com era
and the rise of cyberporn, Wendy Chun (2005) notes that the uncertainty around whether
information was being “seen”22 was part of the Internet’s technical specifications. In
other work (2016), she notes that new media are by definition leaky, writing that “a
networked personal computer is an oxymoron” (p. 12). In this way, “it is not that
someone could be looking but that—at any point in the future—someone could look”

22. Seeing, she notes, is not a straightforward concept, given the proliferation of fiber-optics
(Chun 2005, p. 86).
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(Chun 2005, p. 86). Paranoia, explains Chun, comes from the move toward “prevention”
as a political and policing tactic.
This logic can be found in the rise of fiber-optics, large-scale events like 9/11, and
policing practices, where control is sought through prevention, and where the idea of
freedom that is produced that is based on fear (Anker 2014, Chun 2005). For this reason,
we can think of the politics of the digital age in relation to the prevention of humiliation.
In a piece which recognizes the role of shame as a kind of digital switch which cuts off
good feeling or triggers bad feeling, Silvan Tomkins’ (1963) describes the body’s
preventative work to detect evidence of potential bad feeling:
“The entire cognitive apparatus is in a constant state of alert for possibilities,
imminent or remote, ambiguous or clear. Like any highly organized effort at
detection, as little as possible is left to chance. The radar antennae are placed
wherever it seems possible the enemy may attack. Intelligence officers may
monitor even unlikely conversations if there is an outside chance something
relevant may be detected or if there is a chance that two independent bits of
information taken together may give indication of the enemy’s intentions…But
above all there is a highly organized way of interpreting information so that what
is possibly relevant can be quickly abstracted and magnified, and the rest
discarded” (p. 433 as cited in Sedgwick 2003, p. 135).
In this formulation, the body is in a constant state of vigilance to prevent what Sedgwick
(2004) calls “bad surprises.” Paranoia here is a way of policing borders to prevent
‘external’ threats from coming ‘in.’ In this way it is an apt affect to describe the structure
of feeling which undergirds the kafala system itself. Systems like kafala which generate
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racialized others in processes of nation-building are inherently ‘paranoid’—they rely on
the difference between nationals and non-nationals. As Bina Fernandez (2021) notes, it is
not only an issue of ethnicity; there is a production of racial others to affirm national
citizenship.
Like these promises of networked communication as private and personal hubs of
information (Chun 2005), kafala produces the privacy of national citizens. It is not a
natural resource or quality one has, but a concept that is produced. Kafala, as a set of
regulations which stands outside of labor law through its place in the domestic sphere, is
a site of instability around the very divide of the private and the public. Both social media
and kafala straddle the public and private divide, imbued with the capacity to upend it at
a moment’s notice. Put together, bahdala alerts us to an uneasiness about the extranational quality of both, highlighting a crisis of national and bodily sovereignty.
TIL upends this imagined privacy through its status as not only a digital pressure
group, but an international NGO. As a digital pressure group, it can evade state capture
through anonymity and extra national labor. However, as noted, when Tufa’s case
became the subject of a media trial on the Al Jadeed channel, the Ajami-Khalil family
lawyer suggested that these kinds of cases were often orchestrated by international
organizations working to misconstrue the facts of cases of alleged abuse, exploitation,
and violence against migrant domestic workers. She said,
“There are many organizations funded from abroad whose apparent goal is to
support migrant workers…and to change the Lebanese laws…but in reality,
what’s happening is that there is competition between these organization to see
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who can get the media scoop by getting a case. Whether it’s true or not doesn’t
matter to make a scandal (fadiha) to show funders abroad.”
While her comments may appear to be the stuff of conspiracy theory, they also point to
legacies of intervention in the region, proxy war, coups, and the aforementioned “NGOization” of social services in the region (Jad 2007). While NGOs have provided these
social services, at the same time, they have been critiqued for their role in pushing
(neo)liberal and Orientalist discourses which resonate with imperial histories (Mahmood
2005, Massad 2008). For these reasons, paranoia around NGOs is baked into the structure
of the postcolonial state. John Jackson (2008) has pointed to the suspicion and paranoia
that has accompanied structural shifts in race relations in the US, writing that “subtler
forms of racism, forms more difficult to define or even see, have actually made it tougher
to operationalize the phenomenon today” (p. 8). In a similar way that the subtle racism of
the late 1990s and early 2000s in public US discourse was a remnant of blatantly racist
structural policies and regulations as they have crystallized as historical accounts and in
bodies, NGO-ization can be seen as a remnant of colonial histories, provoking paranoia
around intention and benevolence where it is made harder to visibly point out. While
Jackson writes of these dynamics within the nation, this case incorporates the
transnational, investigating what happens, recursively, when this paranoia is about
foreign others to the nation and its citizenship structures. In this way, TIL diagnoses the
paranoia of a postcolonial state which fears losing access its cosmopolitan imaginary. It
grapples with the reality of a national imaginary supported by extra-national labor and
capital in the form of kafala work and diaspora remittances. Introducing a transnational
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dimension to questions of digital activism shows the forms of value that come from the
production of national imaginaries online.
However, at the same time, leveraging this cosmopolitan imaginary through the
digital bahdala still requires particular kinds of labor on social media platforms. We may
think of TIL and other groups which work to ‘publicly shame’ through social media as
operating through economies which structure and frame informal justice in this
landscape. Drawing on scholarship around visibility structures and economies (Wiegman
1995, Gray 2013, Gambetti 2013) Sarah Banet-Weiser (2018) argues that across media
platforms in the neoliberal landscape, the politics of visibility are a profitable end in
themselves, rather than a means to an end (p. 23). This means that value is to be
generated through the visibility or representation of politics, making visual testimony
desirable for platforms and activist groups alike. We have seen that TIL relies on these
economies of visibility to leverage the threat of exposure, producing it as a form of
valuable content. That sites like Facebook operate through these economies means that
TIL must continue to provide content which generates engagement.
In this case, it is not only visibility, but affect, which becomes the end rather than
the means to the end. If shame, or rather paranoia, is the telos, or end-goal, what is
required to make people feel it? In the next section, I examine the labor required when a
feeling is sought as an end, rather than a means to one (in much the same way BanetWeiser argues that visibility becomes the end). In the next section, I examine the way that
the digital bahdala relies on national others who are invested with the capacity to align
publics toward cosmopolitan belonging, or away from it. The digital pressure group
applies pressure, but that pressure is not generated in a vacuum. These women must then
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embody the shameful practice so that others might feel shame or paranoia. As a group
which works to change the feeling of those with power, it requires the work of those who
are being exploited. By engineering the bahdala, digital pressure groups also pressure
victims of the kafala system to interiorize shame on behalf of others who look on.
This reframes our attention away from the employing families who are often cited
as losing out if the kafala system were to be dismantled. They draw attention away from
the lucrative industry which helps produce cosmopolitan belonging as a mode of being.
They instead locate the origin of their power in the performances of workers who are
vital to the maintenance of Lebanon’s hegemonic cosmopolitan imaginary. In the next
section, I discuss the emphasis placed on migrant domestic workers to be read in legible
ways, offering that the digital pressure group produces paranoia temporally, through the
future-oriented possibility of shame.
Pressure in the digital pressure group
While TIL and its capacity to trigger bad feeling in targeted audiences does work to free
some women from imminently violent conditions, we must examine the way that power
is structured in this dynamic. By relying on the desirability of cosmopolitan imaginaries,
they must generate evidence that these employers fail to live up to those ideals. This
means not only reemphasizing this cosmopolitan belonging as a desirable mode of being,
but requiring visual performances of suffering to be effective. It upholds a dynamic
where victims of exploitation must perform to generate paranoia in nationals. In this way,
this section has implications for questions of fellow-feeling, empathy, and other forms of
affect management that seek to make those with more power feel something. This can be
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evidenced in the kinds of public discourse about the visibility of kafala in popular media
as spectacular forms of violence.
In an instructive example of the kinds of visibility that kafala is achieving in
international media circuits, the 2019 Lebanese film Capernaum achieved international
recognition for its depiction of the refugee crisis and the kafala system in Lebanon. Some
have described it was ‘poverty porn’ for the depiction of refugees and migrant domestic
workers, as well as the decision to hire real people rather than actors to star in the film
(Nasr 2019, Saghaier 2018). Nonetheless, international audiences cohering around the
international festival marveled at the violent conditions it portrayed, with even Oprah
celebrating the “compelling” and “worthy” film (McFarlane 2019). It becomes Lebanon’s
second film to ever be nominated for an Oscar.
We see the political import of this in the local media context, where expressions
of shame and embarrassment about kafala circulate through official and popular
discourse. It has been called a “retrograde, immoral, and fundamentally embarrassing
system” by Triangle, a policy organization in Beirut which works with major
international NGOs (“Cleaning up” 2020). In an article about kafala in New/Lines
Magazine, an Amnesty International campaigner says, “This shameful pattern of abuses
has to end” (Di Ilio 2021). In 2007, an article by Nadim Houry on the Human Rights
Watch website entitled, “Lebanon’s slaves, Lebanon’s shame” discussed a French
documentary, "Liban, Pays des Esclaves,” (“Lebanon, Slave Country,”) and its criticism
of Lebanon’s kafala system. In this piece, Houry wrote that rather than being outraged by
Lebanon’s treatment of these workers, many Lebanese were outraged by their perceived
reputation in France. He noted that while attitudes may be starting to shift, there was still
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much work to be done: “Until then, we all share in the shame of the continuing abusive
practices committed against migrants who came to work for us” (Houry, 2007).
Discourses of shame have also been mobilized in rhetoric by officials, generating
their own forms of social capital. When labor minister Camille Abousleiman was
appointed to his post in January 2019, press and activists wrote of a renewed hope for
labor relations in the country, pointing to his international accolades from a UK-based
institution and his lack of political affiliation with the usual Lebanese sectarian structure.
They cited his attitude toward the kafala system as a welcomed change in state attitudes
toward the kafala system. In a Twitter post on February 16, 2019, he wrote, “Withholding
the passports of domestic workers in Lebanon is forbidden and illogical, and shame on us
for behaving in such an inhumane way.” This statement received a response from Farah
Salka, a co-founder of Anti-Racism Movement, one of the most active groups advocating
for migrant workers in Lebanon. In an article by the London-based online news outlet
Middle East Eye, she said, “I don’t expect anything to change, [but] the fact we have a
minister who is ashamed about the situation is something to be happy about” (Chehayeb
2019). Here, expressions of bad feeling about bahdala are evidence of political progress
and cosmopolitan belonging.
In this case study and others, the bahdala, as an event is experienced by more
than the individual target. Rather than autonomous affects generated by platforms, we can
think of those who must labor for it. Like any other affective economy, there is labor
involved. In this case, the paranoia leveraged at employers is not, as Ahmed (2004)
writes of the mobilization of emotions, something being made from nothing. To produce
the potential for exposure and shame, labor is required. In this case, it is the labor of
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those exploited in the kafala system that produces the potential for exposure by
embodying the nation’s shameful practices.
This is evident in the way that shame is not only expressed by those speaking on
behalf of or about the nation, but it is also read on the bodies of migrant domestic
workers. Shame is especially invested in the bodies of migrant domestic workers in
journalistic and academic discourse. A common description of laborers in the system is
that they are humiliated or ashamed. Bina Fernandez (2021), comparing kafala to the
Indian caste system, has called it a “system of racialized institutional humiliation” (p. 7).
Journalists writing about it have described kafala workers as having shame. For
News/Lines, the author describes a former worker remembering her experience “almost
with shame” and speaking in an “ashamed” way (Di Ilio 2021). This Is Lebanon
describes Tufa as being “humiliated” on television (“Lensa’s hospital bed” 2018). Across
media coverage and academic discourse, shame is located in the bodies of migrant
domestic workers, suggesting that those who stand apart from national violations can
read it on their bodies.
When shame becomes attributed to others that are read as having it, it reveals an
uneven but relational topography of feeling. Scholarship in feminist and queer studies
have recognized this topography, describing the systems which invest particular bodies
with feeling, making them legible in particular ways (Ahmed 2004, Chun 2016, Palmer
2017, Yao 2021). Interiorizing emotion in this way is to locate it as a personal feeling in
the body rather than to understand it as a set of relations, rendering it personal and
private, rather than structural. Such “inside-out” or “outside-in” models of emotion,
writes Ahmed (2004), take for granted that the subjects they talk about are pre-given and
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arrive to the table at neutral. They mirror notions of autonomous affect which ignore the
way that feeling becomes invested in bodies within existing systems of power. If the
happiness of some (Ahmed 2010), like the privacy of some (Chun 2016), is linked to
others who must labor to produce it, and the privacy of some was built on the captivity of
others (Chun 2016, Spillers 1987), then kafala conjoins both, helping to produce a
cosmopolitan belonging in which some work for the good feeling of others. Kafala makes
clear the need for a relational approach to affect, and beyond that, the economies that
mobilize them, supposedly depositing them ‘into’ other bodies.
This is because TIL, as a digital pressure group, relies on economies of visibility
which manage the way issues become represented in popular discourse. Writing of the
corporations and industries that structure the way that political categories are made
visible Banet-Weiser (2018) cites Zeynep Gambetti’s work on the Gezi protests to show
how representations were “pinn[ed]…to available structures without letting new
meanings emerge” (para. 1 as cited in Banet-Weiser 2018, p. 24). In an example of these
structures of visibility, Didier Fassin and Estelle D’halluin (2005) recognize the
development of immigration policies, medical expertise, and legal frameworks which
render the need for evidence of violence to be visible on the asylum seeker’s body.
Marking a shift toward more restrictive immigration policies, they note, “Although their
word is systematically doubted, it is their bodies that are questioned; however, quite often
these bodies speak little, for it is in the torturer’s interests to silence them” (p. 598). In
this case, migrant domestic workers whose exploited labor does not always involve
physical violence by employers have no recourse to action if their exploitation does not
adhere to these economies of visibility.
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Along these lines, I argue that what is made legible is not only bodies, but affect
to be read on the body. As I have shown in the previous case study about the Lebanese
tourist to Egypt, these bodies become bodies to be read and mined for the right kinds of
affects—here, expressions of pain and suffering. This is evident in the circulation of
Tufa’s place on the talk show stage, bandaged, in a hospital bed, recanting her statements
about the family’s abuse. The apparent pain of her body, rather than in her words,
achieved transnational circulation and triggered pronouncements of shame across
Facebook. It becomes the means through which publics can judge, express belief, and
name shameful ways of being. Several write that they were convinced of her account
after reading her body for clues.

Figure 24: Appendix C1

This economy demands that some become legible and visible, able to be read. As BanetWeiser (2018) notes of the gendered and gendering nature of these digital economies, the
body’s “value is constantly deliberated over, surveilled, evaluated, judged, and
scrutinized through media discourses, law, and policy” (p. 28). Such platform logics of
engagement invite this audience to take notice, read, and judge; indeed, they rely on it. In
Tufa’s case, after the talk show interview, TIL’s Facebook page was the site of
speculation about signs that she was being coerced to recant her statements by the family.
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Several screenshots from a TV interview of her were shared, with one commenter reading
for clues in her posture and clothing to gauge whether she was being truthful or coerced.

Figure 25: Appendix C1

Across other cases highlighted by TIL, commenters engage in others debates about how
to read the bodies of migrant domestic workers. In several posts, workers or former
workers are not only giving accounts of their experiences in verbal form but showing
corporeal evidence of violence to audiences. In one account, a migrant domestic worker
comments on the post herself, defending her claims by showing the ill-fitting slippers she
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was forced to work with. Commenters then pose doubt about her claims, suggesting that
the slippers aren’t that expensive in Lebanon.

Figure 26: Exchange between "Tina" and a Facebook account holder

This kind of comment exchange, where disbelief and suspicion take front stage, are not
only desirable, helping to sustain their negotiation power, but inevitable when the digital
bahdala, a tactic of the digital pressure group, depends on visual testimony. Writing of
the experience of black women who are labeled “killjoys” for pointing out racism in
hegemonic kinds of feminism, Sara Ahmed (2010) describes the way that gendered and
raced bodies become invested with different interiorities. She writes, “The exposure of
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violence becomes the origin of violence. The black woman must let go of her anger for
the white woman to move on” (p. 39). She shows how the problem seems to emanate
from the one pointing it out. In the example above, the friend of the employing family
says that she “can’t believe” what “Tina”23 is saying about the experiences she had with
her employers. Here, she becomes the origin of the problem for not simply asking —“you
can ask them sure they will bring you.” Not only is this name likely given to her so that
Lebanese employers would be able to more easily pronounce it (it does not match her
Facebook profile name), but the woman blames her for the state of her own conditions.
These ways of reading the body point to the uneven topography of believability in
such systems of exploitation. We see this in the comments which debate the truth-claims
of women, suggesting that they are excessive—“she is overdoing it with her
screaming”—or that their bodies are transparent—“If you look at that girl you can tell
that she’s being told on what to say.” Their bodies come to be invested with affects and
motivations, reflecting longer histories of associations between excessive emotionality
and people of color. As scholars of race and affect have suggested, forms of animatedness
are often associated with racialized others (Chen 2012, Ngai 2005, Palmer 2017, Yao
2021), and these ways of reading emotion help produce race as border-making (Ahmed
2004). In the very practice of reading others’ bodies, there is an expectation of “excessive
affects and demonstrative physicality,” showing the very boundaries of universalist
theories of the human and of affect (Yao 2021, p. 33).
By creating visual testimony that is open for debate, in fact meant to open debate
on platforms like Facebook, we can see that the pressure that impresses upon the
23. “Tina” is assumed to be the name that Nana Akua Adepa was given in Lebanon.
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employers being exposed is generated by kafala workers. It is a pressure which requires
workers to perform the right kind of suffering to be read as the proper victim. We can see
this in other online campaigns which construct the body to be saved to activate the right
kind of public feeling. In a social media campaign, which was started after Boko Haram’s
2014 kidnapping of schoolgirls in Nigeria, images of the girls veiled and stories of them
being prohibited from receiving schooling prompted international campaigns. One such
campaign was the #BringBackOurGirls campaign, where celebrities and officials
expressed support across social media by using the hashtag and circulating images of the
girls. Describing this campaign, Kamari Maxine Clarke (2019) writes:
“Not only are the images and the block-art posters used in ways that enhance
people’s engagement with it, they also represent contemporary democratic values
that tie the logic of freedom to the body to be protected. This body is increasingly
being seen as a site of global action” (p. 120).
The digital pressure group as requires this labor to generate alignments toward proper
nationhood. As a site of global action, there is an emphasis on the body’s capacity to
carry meaning for an imagined audience.
Often, it is visuals of women’s battered bodies which circulate, allowing
audiences to express their belief or disbelief. In a similar case to Tufa, an Indonesian
migrant domestic worker named Erwiana Sulistyaningsih became a poster child for the
horrors of migrant domestic work in Hong Kong after her story circulated across social
media. Like Tufa, Sulistyaningsih was interviewed from bed by press. A Google search
of her name bring up images of her in academic, journalistic, and NGO spaces,
contributing to the image of her as a victim-hero. She was even featured on the 100 Most
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Influential People list by Time in 2014 (Wahyudi & Allmark 2016, Mam 2014). Like
Tufa’s case, Facebook played a major role in activating the international news circuit,
with coverage by outlets like CNN, BBC, and Al Jazeera circulating images of her
bruised body.24 Like Tufa, she had similarly activated international press.
In this case, too, the body became framed as evidence of the shame of a nation.
Echoing NGO and journalist discourse around Lebanon’s kafala, Hong Kong’s migrant
domestic worker system was framed as its “hidden shame” (Kaufman 2014). The
suggestion that these are “hidden,” and that Sulistyaningsih was “the public face of an
invisible economy” (Chen 2015) points again to a global body politic as the imagined
audience. While these countries do not have a great deal in common according to
dominant characterizations of their economies or governance structures, they have both
had major mobilizations over the last several years which have been evaluated in
international media, and they both have sizable migrant domestic worker economies
which help to sustain their cosmopolitan imaginaries. Specifically, they have been framed
as sites which are “losing” freedom, liberal life, and hope after recent mobilizations and
contestations over power (Ghattas 2021), reflecting anxieties about countries “losing” a
cosmopolitan imaginary.
As bodies to be read, they become invested with the power to shock audiences,
shame them, or make them feel the threat of exposure by embodying those emotions, for
those audiences, themselves. Like VR technology or film festival cinema which promise

24. According to Wahyudi and Allmark (2016), when another Indonesian migrant worker at the
airport, Yanti, encountered Sulistyaningsih with her injuries, she did not believe that they were
from a skin condition, as Sulistyaningsih claimed. When she found that they were from abuse, she
took a photograph and it was shared to Facebook, where migrant activists posted it.
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empathy around social issues for audiences, the emphasis is on the audience means that
their changed feeling is the goal. We see this by returning to Capernaum, the
internationally acclaimed film which depicts the refugee crisis and kafala system. The
filmmaker, Nadine Labaki, explained her approach to the film and her decision to direct
it, saying:
"I used to make it a point at the end of the conversation to ask them: Are you
happy to be alive?" she said. "And most of the times the answer was no. They just
see themselves as insects, as parasites — some of them used those words. 'I'm just
an insect. I'm just a parasite. I don't exist. I'm invisible.' So I wanted to translate
this anger" (Qureshi 2018).
In the effort to translate anger into something useful for audiences, Labaki and the team
use real people rather than actors in the film, even filming prisoners of the country’s
infamous Roumieh prison behind bars. This was done as a means of getting as ‘close as
possible to the real’ story, an immersive one for audiences (Qureshi 2018). While these
kinds of films are not new, they become more attenuated in the digital age, where more
empathetic solutions to social ills are touted to shock audiences into action. However, in
doing so, they maintain the distance between audiences and the scenes they absorb,
investing some with the right kinds of feelings.
I would like to contrast this appeal to empathy with another piece of content that
TIL shared on their website and social media platforms. In one of the last pieces of media
that TIL posted about the Tufa case, a different kind of affective work is taking place.
The video is a documentary interview with Tufa upon her return to Ethiopia from
Lebanon. In the video, she recounts her story, taking back her recantation, and admitting
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that she was forced to work long hours and that she was made to sew dresses for Eleanore
Couture. She discusses being locked in the home of the Ajami-Khalil family and the
ways in which she was threatened. While the narrative elements of the video are
important, providing an explanation of the reason she jumped from the balcony to escape
the family, they are perhaps not the only important element of the video. Beyond its
revelatory capacity, the video includes aesthetic elements which do a different kind of
work than the TV interviews in the Ajami-Khalil house, in the hospital, or on the
television stage. These elements include greenery from the garden space outside of her
home, close-ups of her mother’s hands as she prepares food on a small stove, and shots of
homes lining a street in her village. They also include a still of her staring straight into the
camera from the center of the frame.

Figure 27: Appendix C1:24, Screenshot from documentary by TIL about Tufa's return to Ethiopia
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This documentary is not their most viewed video, and it did not reach the levels of
engagement that the others did. But that may be part of the reason why it is worth
dwelling on. While the video ultimately pivots around her status as a migrant domestic
laborer and her abuse and is thus discursively based on her experience in Lebanon,
affectively, through the imagery of her home, her mother, her environment, her voice in
her own language, there is another kind of work being done. It reveals that this video is
not intended for an audience that is invested in her suffering.
Conclusion
Since Lebanon’s 2019 revolution broke out and its socioeconomic collapse accelerated,
the terrain has been shifting for the kafala system. Dependent on US dollars, against
which the Lebanese pound has lost most of its value, an entire class of Lebanese people
are unable to afford to employ domestic workers. Following the Beirut port explosion in
which 2,400 tons of ammonium nitrate exploded and decimated much of the capital, this
became even more extreme. As migrant workers struggled to leave the country and most
of the country dropped below the poverty line, much remains to be seen when it comes to
digital activism around kafala and the new techniques which will prove viable. What it
does suggest is an even greater dissonance between global imaginaries of Lebanon and
the reality of life for those living in it.
This chapter has argued for a relational approach to questions of digital activism
and the targeting of emotion to bring about solutions to structural problems by
highlighting the affective labor that is required to make those in power feel something. It
has examined the kinds of pulleys and levers which must be pulled to cultivate the right
kinds of feelings. Weaponizing the imaginary that provides the country with exceptional
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status, TIL has managed to channel paranoia in targeted directions. At the same time, this
analysis has also examined the pressure placed on those who must labor for the paranoia
of others. It has shown that the investment of feelings, ‘our’ feelings, in others, is a
modality through which power is experienced and lived in the digital age. Reading the
bodies of some for evidence of truth is a power-laden act, and without paying attention to
the directionality and quality of affects or emotions, we don’t have a systematic way to
understand the unevenness of these demands.
The digital pressure group is a contribution which recognizes the temporality of
activism which works through the imaginary of social media platforms as global spaces
of transparency and connection. In leveraging the affordances of these platforms, they
produce the threat of future-oriented exposure, one which lags as a potentiality rather
than a current moment of uncovering. Producing paranoia, or leveraging the paranoia
which is baked into commercialized social media platforms, requires the labor of migrant
domestic workers as bodies to be read for potential shame and humiliation. Relying on
cosmopolitan imaginaries helps to uphold violent structures of belonging.
In the conclusion to this dissertation, I return to ideas from the introduction which
discuss affect theory’s relationship to digital media. In that section, we can see how the
“affective turn” and the proliferation of digital media are not coincidental. Rather, the
investment of bodies with networked feeling is part and parcel a digital phenomenon and
a way of making sense of the ways we are pulled in different directions.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation has elaborated digital bahdala as a framework for understanding the
desire for global belonging at a time when cosmopolitan belonging has become a
preferred way of being in the world. Across social media platforms, locales, and
performative traditions, people make sense of losing a place which was felt to be assured.
As such imaginaries waiver, publics’ investments in them are exposed. Turning to their
didactic expressions online then highlights the role of performance in maintaining
national structures. In these performances of bahdala and subsequent performances of
recoding, publics work to repair nationalisms which have been slighted or threatened.
From staged event, to a genre of response, to a future-oriented threat, bahdala
urges us to consider the embodied dimension of communication as a non-discursive but
integral aspect of meaning-making. It takes seriously the tight coupling of ideology,
rationality, and affect in order to explain publics’ investments in nationalist projects. In
this way, it develops recoding as an analytic which explains the way that dominant
encodings of national imaginaries—Egypt as a site of antiquity and Lebanon as a beacon
of multicultural tolerance—are enacted, but also how their contradictions are embodied.
The social media users in this dissertation employ a variety of performances, rhetorical
techniques, and symbols to repair what the revolutions set out to expose. Digital
platforms, through their imagined affordances of global exposure, lay bare the paranoia
around exposure integral to the maintenance of national projects in a neoliberal and
neocolonial economic order.
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To develop these concepts and explore the malleability of national imaginaries,
this dissertation draws on theories of affect, performance, and communication. It finds
inspiration in work which has examined the powerful politics of the popular in the region
(Abu-Lughod 2004, El-Ariss 2019, Mahmood 2005, Kraidy 2016) as well as work which
has given name to the often-nontangible qualities of that power (Ahmed 2004, Chun
2016, Pellegrini 2007, Schaefer 2015, Sedgwick 2004, Tomkins 1963). This literature
gives shape to phenomena which takes place not only in postcolonial contexts, but in
places where access to these imaginaries is rendered precarious.
Digital media appears to offer an efficient and cathartic way to access national
others who are responsible for what is framed as national failure. It appears to offer a way
of closing a distance and teaching something, wielding bad feeling at the target who
shows no shame for what they have done. However, this grounding says more about
digital publics than those who they are pointing to. The structure of bahdala alerts us to
the work it does for audiences and spectators rather than the bodies that they point
toward, alerting us to the way that social space is realigned. In this way, digital bahdala
and attendant practices of recoding complicate the notion that what moves us is a
disembodied Affect—rather than digital technologies as purveyors of Affect, they are a
means to examine the value systems which prop up national imaginaries.
This happens at a time when individual progress, entrepreneurialism, and
empowerment have become hegemonic models of being, investing in individual bodies
interiorities which stand in for the weight of the structural. This is how what is framed as
national failure—financial corruption, racism, sexual harassment—becomes invested as a
shame in the individual body rather than a diagnostic of national projects. By discussing
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events and frameworks like bahdala, this dissertation has resisted taking platform logics
at their word, placing them into a wider historical and material context in which national
projects are proving incapable of providing solutions to our most pressing concerns.
Given these systemic wounds, the bahdala does the work of turning some who
have been impacted by this violence and exploitation away from and toward nationalist
projects which promise them protection. This is because bahdala relies on and cultivates
a hierarchy of belonging, talking down to nationals who have risked the nation’s place in
cosmopolitan imaginaries. The recoding of bahdala is then a reaction to the feelings of
shame or humiliation which are generated through conferrals of failure. In cases like the
WEF publics who identified with Gebran Bassil’s brand of nationalism which relies on
claims to Lebanon’s civilizational past, or with Hezbollah’s brand of resistance to what it
identifies as imperial aggressors like Saudi Arabia and the US, turn away from the WEF
bahdala and toward more identifiable structures of belonging. This is how bahdala
intensifies sectarian and nationalist projects which promise the globally violated and
racialized a form of belonging.
This transnational dimension strengthens an argument about national imaginaries
by bringing their contradictions and paradoxes to bear. Egypt and Lebanon, with their
oppositional claims to national exceptionalism, provide a compelling way of studying
national imaginaries. In this analysis, their imaginaries are less oppositional and more
alternative offerings to those interested in their brands of cosmopolitanism—politicians,
artists, academics, diaspora. This draws similarities between national subjects who are
grappling with the viability of these imaginaries in a global marketplace.
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Further, this dissertation explores the labor dimension which upholds these
national imaginaries. It does this by showing that the mobilization of emotion does
political work and requires the labor of some figures who must work to remedy national
failings. It has offered a method of drawing out relationships between national subjects,
recognizing the distributions of power which make some performances expected and
demanded for the nation to move on from what is narrated as an attack. The gendered and
raced labor of national projects is embedded in the articulations of bahdala in this
dissertation, showing the tight coupling between the affective and the political.

Recapitulation
In chapter one, I discussed the bahdala by turning to the staging of it as a pedagogical
event. At the World Economic Forum, the performances of nations cohere collectivities
through what are framed as humiliating events. The framing here does not only reflect
but does something—it mobilizes people to align with the right kind of nationhood,
provoking performances of pride, shame, and dignity. These events, framed as tragedies
to wider audiences, also become entertaining trials for spectating publics who are
invested in stagings of modernity. They provide the very material needed as evidence—
of failure, embarrassment, strength, or resistance.
As an extension of the function of popular programming in postcolonial contexts,
these national trials enter the digital media sphere and introduce new ways of taking part
in the crafting of these narratives. This is especially resonant in places which have faced
the postponement and delay of more formal mechanisms to dole out what is felt as
justice. Lebanon is an especially relevant context to show this, as its political
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establishment is secured through ‘temporary’ power-sharing of sectarian leaders who
fought in the civil war, and political assassinations are rarely ‘officially’ attributed to
establishment figures. This chapter shows how the outsourcing of felt justice on Twitter
becomes an entertaining and cathartic trial for postcolonial contexts, allowing for the
feeling of justice taken into public hands. Through live digital commentary. At the same
time, it calls into question the very binaries of ‘formal/informal’ and ‘official/unofficial’
which come from hegemonic state narratives of justice.
The chapter also highlights the desire for states to feel at a time when inequities
are rising and, whether those inequities are not felt by some, we all face the realities of a
global pandemic and impending environmental disaster. In doing so, they reflect a desire
to ‘cut through’ systems of signification that trap discourse, turning to platforms like
Twitter to evade state structures which limit what is felt as national justice. In joining in
on the laughter of the media ‘roast’ in performances meant to ground the leader, national
collectivities cohere through modes of respectability enacted at the international forum.
In feeling better, the symbols they reach for show us how certain figures, like the girl
boss or the resistance leader, gain social capital through desires to belong to a global
body politic. It shows how we can learn something by tracing the objects and subjects
that publics turn to cultivate better feeling. This chapter then complicates the
epistemological move to turn to social media to “cut through” the traps of signification
systems. I rather offer that participants do not literally send autonomous affects like
shame through Twitter, but rather activate differently situated bodies through rhetoric,
images, and gestures. This approach shows that there is a need to recognize the histories
which shape national subjects, understanding online performances as contact zones which
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make and remake identities and subjectivities through the mobilization of affects like
shame or pride.
This is how the digitally mediated international forum acts as a site of affective
modulation, enabling relational affects amongst transnational publics. At these sites, the
same circulating image can have different but relational effects. For the grilling and
grounding to be funny on the ‘international’ stage, inferior others are beckoned to act as
pedagogical tools for the refashioning of the self. As chapter three will show,
cosmopolitanism, like privacy, is not a naturally found quality. It is produced through the
labor of national others. These are therefore pedagogical spaces in which expressions of
shame are a way of refashioning oneself in relation to shifting patterns of legibility. In
this chapter, I also introduce the concept of ‘recoding’ which takes place to make
narratives of failure feel differently. I develop this in chapter two, offering the bahdala as
embodied communication. I turn to the relationship between Lebanon and Egypt, where
Egyptian publics engaged in vociferous debate about a scandal around a Lebanese tourist
to Egypt. By turning to the way that they staged their own performances of strength and
dignity to refuse and reroute the bahdala, I show how the bahdala has reverberative
effects, requiring certain subjects to perform atonement.
If chapter one showed the way that narratives of national failure revive familiar
postcolonial power asymmetries, chapter two shows how these are relational matters by
turning to the tensions between two postcolonial national imaginaries. Just as Lebanese
subjects can feel shame from the bahdala, they can dole this shame to others by drawing
on tropes of secularism, civilization, and colonialism to make their case. This chapter
shows the way that national publics interpret and do things with the bahdala, making it
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into the grounds from which to affirm threatened identities. By drawing on socially
mobile and cosmopolitan figures in politics, science, and sports, they cultivate ways of
being legible and belonging. In this chapter, I offer that we must pay attention to these
“conversion points,” (Ahmed 2002) or the symbols and ideas that are able to mobilize
bad to better feeling. I offer that these conversion points are powerful indicators of
desires for a certain kind of acceptance in the world, as well as a diagnostic for
Islamophobia, racism, and sexism experienced by those contending with national ruptures
in the aftermath of the revolution. On YouTube, these performances are part of digital
genres of shame and atonement, reflecting a demand for genuine expressions of pain and
suffering. In this digital economy, there are rewards given to those who can effectively
mobilize conversion points around narratives of national failure. This case study reveals a
landscape of digital content creators who have been able to leverage narratives of
national exceptionalism, working to preserve it by calling out threats to the national
order. These are not only individuals who gain transnational subscribers and followers,
but older centers of power like state-affiliated television networks who use public
resources to tap into these affective economies. Such digital scandals then help provide
fodder for state imaginaries to be renewed and reaffirmed, highlighting the mechanics of
state and corporate interests in moments when national exceptionalism is threatened.
What this chapter also emphasized is the uneven topography of feeling that exists
for those who are implicated in bahdala, a point which I flesh out in the final case study.
The wave of response videos on YouTube demanding atonement is inseparable from the
stagings of quasi-trials on private television networks, where media hosts, as we see in all
case studies, play the role of judge and counsel. They also show how, similar in the first
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case study to the expressions of resistance to imperial attack on national figures, these
expressions can resonate with nationalist figures in the state, entertainment, and
journalism. I also introduced ideas about what this recoding relies on, which is an
admission of vulnerability as well as an affirmation of affectedness. As the YouTube
videos show, participants in the recoding of the bahdala do not only cultivate strength
and pride, but they also point to experiences of racism and Islamophobia. At the same
time, this chapter shows how the recoding of the bahdala through recourse to a superior
national exceptionalism is still a wholly inadequate mode of repair. As it is recoded and
rerouted, it takes on gendered and sexist dimensions which have effects beyond the
container of the nation.
In chapter three, I discussed how this this vulnerability is recognized and
mobilized by actors who tap into the power of digital bahdala to meet their demands.
Here, I discussed the structure of bahdala by turning to the kafala system and its role in
upholding imaginaries of cosmopolitanism across the region. In this chapter, I showed
how activists can tactically work to puncture Lebanon’s status as an exceptionally
cosmopolitan country in the MENA region. They do this by orienting their content
toward the diaspora and other international communities who are invested in the piercing
of this imaginary. I offered the notion of the ‘digital pressure group’ as a group which
tactically applies transnational pressure on national figures by virtue of its online tactics.
“This Is Lebanon” (TIL), the activist group working to expose cases of violence and
abuse in the kafala system, functions as one such digital pressure group through both
their extranational labor and their reliance on international audiences to make their
demands met. However rather than trafficking in shame, I offered that they rely on
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paranoia as a negotiation tactic, mobilizing the potential for humiliation as a motivating
force on employers. In doing so, digital pressure groups are part of longer histories of the
NGO-ization of postcolonial contexts, where extra-national funding creates forms of
paranoia in much the same way that the kafala system generates as an informal system of
labor.
I turned to Facebook and examined the affordances which allow audiences to take
part in the judgment about a variety of charges on Lebanese employers and accounts of
violence of migrant domestic workers, finding that the focus on the feelings of employers
maintains a power relationship which privileges their feeling at the expense of others.
What is more, channeling these feelings of paranoia alerts us to the way that affects are
sets of relations. This means that engineering the bahdala requires the labor of those who
have the capacity to produce those feelings. I discussed the way that migrant domestic
workers are tasked with providing this evidence in performances of suffering, requiring
their bodies to be legible in the right ways.
Here, the issue at hand is not the outcome of the activism, as it releases some
women from violent conditions. The issue of concern is the very desire that demands
their labor, unchallenged by narratives of Lebanon as failing to live up to its
cosmopolitan imaginary. Many activist groups in history have wielded shame, working to
ground figures of authority through creative and militant means. In this case, however,
this shame is dependent on the desirability of this brand of cosmopolitanism, at times
working to reify it as a preferred mode of being, even as it shatters the facade of
Lebanese exceptionalism. TIL highlights the way that kafala helps to produce this very
imaginary, and how inverting this imaginary is not the same as dissolving its foundation.
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Taken together, these chapters offer that bahdala is pedagogical because it
teaches a way of being and a means to prevent the exposure of not really belonging.
Returning to Tomkins’ offering of affect theory as well as the body’s dealing with affect
as a way of learning to navigate affect-rich environments (Schaefer 2015), bahdala as a
framework for and diagnostic of the contemporary moment of socioeconomic collapse,
proxy war, and environmental crisis. The performances and expressions I offered as
evidence show that these publics have awareness that this belonging is untenable. For if it
was not at risk, then these narratives of failure would not have so much purchase.
Implications and contributions
With these discussions in mind, what do bahdala and its attendant expressions of shame,
embarrassment, and humiliation about national failure tell us about communication?
For one, I have argued that the mobilization of affects like shame does a distancing work.
As Ahmed (2004) notes, expressions of shame protect national structures by preserving
the distance between the nation and its atrocities. It also coheres national collectivities by
making an “us” align on the right side of shame. Bahdala, as a pedagogical event, alerts
us to the sociality of emotion, requiring a relational approach from the outset.
With such a framework, the performative dimension of communication is
foregrounded. This emphasizes the material effects of discourse, paying less attention to
what a nation is and more on what the imaginary does for publics. Indeed, it emphasizes
the very way that such publics are constituted. This de-essentializes what it means to be
Lebanese or Egyptian, emphasizes what it is that provokes these articulations in the first
place, and draws a line of continuity between those who mobilize the discourse. In this
way, affects like shame, humiliation, or embarrassment are seen as not only provoking
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such articulations, but as concepts which lie underneath discursive categories like nation.
This attention to relationality emphasizes something that is shared beyond national
structures—here, anxieties around sovereignty which are linked to circuits of global
capital.
What can we learn from the performative dimension of these scandals, as their
mediation works to convert bad feelings into better ones? This dissertation offers not a
mode of agency which lies solely in the body of the individual subject or a deterministic
model of the structural, but the way in which structures are felt in the body and how they
can also shift through embodied performance. As Wendy Chun (2016) notes of neoliberal
precarity, “[n]eoliberal subjects are constantly encouraged to change their habits—rather
than society and institutions—in order to become happier, more productive people; to
recycle rather than regulate in order to save the world” (p. xi). In this dissertation, I have
turned to several publics who are invested in cultivating more desirable ways of being
legible to imagined, global audiences. This, writes Chun (2016), is one reason that
theories of affect have become popular ways of not only doing scholarly work, but
understanding the current political moment.
It is then no wonder that the “affective turn,” or the name for the intellectual
production around affect in the academy in the early 2000s, and the commercialization of
the Internet and the rise of social media as we know it, have coincided. To be on
commercially driven platforms today is to be in constant proximity to conversion points,
moving us in different directions. We identify bodies as the source of our bad feeling, but
they are providing material form to what is more systematized bahdala. It disguises the
wounds that systemic bahdala comes from—Islamophobia, racism and violence at
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national and transnational levels, systems of labor exploitation, and the hyper
accumulation of wealth. By turning to individuals and groups responsible for bad feeling
and unbelonging, there is an identifiable source of pain.
This mining of communication’s embodied dimension recognizes what Talal
Asad (2000) has called “our incomplete knowledge of and mastery over our bodies and
desires” (p. 30). As he notes, it serves a function in its attribution of responsibility. He
writes:
“Agency today serves primarily to define a completed personal action from within
an indefinite network of causality by attributing to an actor responsibility to
power. Typically, this means forcing a person to be accountable, to answer to a
judge in a court of law why things were done or left undone.” (p. 33-4).
This is one way in which the bahdala is a framework for the contemporary digital
moment, where demands for accountability look increasingly like expressions of
individual responsibility. Such expressions are mobilized while systemic bahdala is
harder to expose, complicating the idea of the digital platform as a networked public
sphere. Rather, platforms like those discussed in this dissertation help maintain systemic
bahdala by relying on relations of dependency between different kinds of national
subjects. In this way, post-revolutionary digital culture is not a break from revolutionary
digital culture. It is a dialectic which informs neoliberal nationhood in Global South
contexts.
In postcolonial contexts like Lebanon and Egypt, this is even more relevant when
there are states that sit on the deciding side of the table when it comes to structural
adjustment and loans and those who sit on the side of choosing the best of few options.
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One cannot understand the current conditions of the post revolutions in Egypt and
Lebanon without understanding the ways that these legacies continue to shape
distributions of state power. Digital bahdala and its recoding here are postcolonial
frameworks for considering national viability, though they may be conceptualized as
extra-national as well. They come to describe the anxieties of sovereignty in times of
economic crisis, but they are also a framework to consider anxieties of bodily sovereignty
in a time when environmental threats are increasingly part of our public discourse.
In these contexts, bahdala becomes a useful diagnostic as the value of these
nations fluctuate in transnational marketplaces. The 2020 port explosion of Beirut was a
pivotal moment for the shaping of Lebanon’s national imaginary. A population already
fatigued by a raging pandemic, socioeconomic collapse, and months of prolonged protest
suddenly found that news of the blast circulated across all international media networks
and social media platforms, becoming one of the worst explosions in history. While the
2019 protests witnessed the vibrant and resistant occupation of public space by citizens
across political affiliation and identity, a firm branding of national failure came not only
from those on the streets, but analysts and intellectuals consuming the spectacle. In
particular, the blast challenged hegemonic imaginaries of a cosmopolitan
exceptionalism—the Paris or Switzerland of the Middle East seemed to return to the
Middle East.
At the same time, the Egyptian state is renewing the country’s branding as a site
of antiquity, heritage, and civilizational glory, staking its place not only in the MENA
region, but the world. From archeological digs to spectacular parades of mummified
bodies, Egypt joins other countries like Saudi Arabia that are branding their offerings
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through the production of national imaginaries of modernity through history and
technology, fusing the future with the past. At sites like these, initiatives like Saudi
Arabia’s ‘Joy Awards’ attempt to recode the nation with new kinds of affects in the
popular imaginary. This happens while at the same time, activists, journalists, and
dissidents have remained in Egyptian and Saudi Arabian jails for years.
As such, one main contribution I offer is that the mobilization of feeling disguises
a labor dimension. The uneven topography of feeling around national failure is gendered
and racialized. Across Lebanon and Egypt, it is overlapping categories of women,
migrant domestic workers, and mothers who are tasked with answering to affronts on the
nation. However, there is also a labor to affects like empathy, where a distance between
nations is maintained during disaster. Performances of empathy can reveal uneven power
dynamics that structure political life. Expressions of empathy abounded in the countless
accounts by Western journalists about the violence unfolding in Ukraine. In one
exchange, the former deputy general prosecutor of Ukraine said, “it’s very emotional for
me because I see European people with blonde hair and blue eyes being killed” and the
BBC presenter who answered, saying, “I understand and of course respect the emotion”
(‘Double standards’ 2022). In such exchanges, feeling structures are legitimated,
maintaining racist modes of belonging. Empathy, and more specifically, the effort to
cultivate empathy, must be complicated for the power structures that it maintains,
especially in times of political uncertainty. These expressions of fellow feeling by those
who appear to empathize with the nation’s tragic turn can do the work of reifying the
right kind of nationhood.
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These remarks were nothing surprising to those in contexts like the MENA,
accustomed to a short supply of visible empathy in the form of coverage by media
networks. Empathy here became framed as a resource that is in short supply on social
media platforms structured by economies of visibility (Banet-Weiser 2018). Indeed, there
are material effects to such discourses, evident in the way that conflict is reported,
international aid is distributed, and investments are valuated. Resisting the idea that what
we need is more empathy may be one path forward. In these case studies, we have seen
how feeling, as a goal, means that some must labor to make it so.
This is more prescient at a time when conspiracy theory and a ‘post-truth’
moment are discursively linked to heightened emotionality. In this context, bahdala
offers a framework for considering the affective motivations of knowledge production.
Silvan Tomkins’ description of a person who is affectively engaged offers a meditation
on the way that we feel our way to knowledge:
The individual whose affect is engaged is inevitably thereby confronted with such
questions as: “What is happening?” “What is going to happen?” “How sure am I of
what seems to be happening and what will happen?” “What should I do?” (2:369,
as cited in Frank & Wilson 2020, p. 92)
Implicit here is the way that knowledge production—whether bodily or intellectual—is
generated through affect, making it important to turn to events to understand affective
motivations. Case studies, for example, provide a tangible way to understand the events
which orient publics away and toward particular kinds of narratives. In particular, the
kinds of figures and symbols that publics reach for in their commentary shed light on a
certain kind of mobility and legibility to imagined others. This mobility allows these
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figures to be both “sticky objects” (Ahmed 2004) but also ones that can evade
representational dualisms. In other work, this can take the form of analyzing controversial
events and the symbols that publics reach for to become legible.
At the same time, reading for evidence of feeling is also political. A final
implication of this project takes up recent work on studies of race and queer theory to
complicate universalist theories of affect (Palmer 2014, Yao 2021). They show that
reading for affect is not a power-neutral task. It, like other frameworks, involves a
decision to foreground issues and bodies and read them for their legibility. Bahdala is
one framework for considering the structuring of feeling and its role in political life.
This recognition of vulnerability and materiality provides a kind of opportunity
for new political imaginaries which take seriously the role of embodiment in modes of
communication. These imaginaries can be cultivated not necessarily by toppling the
failed leader, but by attending to the directions in which we are pulled. This means not
only a reorientation in the way that we claim our politics, but also in the way we
intellectualize them. I think here of the social media groups that began at the height of the
Lebanese revolution to identify politicians who were dining in restaurants, at beaches, or
at stores to publicly shame them and demand that they leave. This was a reclaiming of
space which worked not only on the politicians through a transfer of shame to them, but
as a collective refusal. Shame is wielded regardless of whether the target feels it or does
not, cohering collectivities that can build new political imaginaries. In this way,
attributions of responsibility can serve a less obvious function, which I argue is more
important than those they point toward. Pointing out a source of violence or pain does
political work for those doing the pointing, regardless of what is on the other side of the
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finger. As Ahmed (2004) has written, affects cohere collectivities, creating a ‘we’ that
needn’t be completely national in character.

What is to be done?
Looking forward, the events of countries like Lebanon and Egypt foreshadow the kinds
of events that are becoming unexceptional in the world. From economic collapse to
security crackdowns to environmental disaster, there is a sense in which what happens
here is what can and will happen everywhere. We are witnessing reactions to this in the
expressions of shock by Euro-American press around war scenes in Europe, reflecting
entrenched modes of not only national but civilizational exceptionalism. All the while, a
global pandemic which has not subsided is a stark reminder of our inescapable
relationality.
If I have argued that bahdala does the work of cohering collectivities, then this
means that we can analyze similar events and examine the grounds through which affects
like shame are mobilized. This means examining rhetoric to think through the kinds of
emotions that are being invoked to mobilize collectivities. Further, we must consider the
rhetoric we turn toward to make sense of national events. As Ahmed (2004) notes,
expressions of shame do distancing work by creating a “we” that is ashamed rather than a
“we” who is implicated. What might get us closer to the feeling of being implicated in
issues of corruption, sexual harassment, and exploitation, as if they are happening to an
“us”? Could it be a different kind of cosmopolitanism, or even something else? More
specifically, what might we take from historical transnational solidarities, such as panArab movements, pan-African movements, and the Third World wave, as well as
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solidarities which lay outside of identarian and geographic framings, such as those
relating to labor, class, and climate change?
I offer that a relational approach to communication can recognize that intellectual
work requires a meaningful foregrounding of issues, objects, bodies, and histories. This
could look like considering the resonances between the ways that imaginaries like panAfricanism and pan-Arabism are conjured and revived across geographic contexts,
articulating through similar material relationships, such as class, but also through shared
temporal structurings. This dissertation, in making different transnational connections in
each chapter, shows how new knowledge is produced by opting for new comparisons.
With the knowledge of relational forms of affective labor which are required to
sustain such national exceptionalisms, we are better able to examine the asymmetrical
power relations which undergird nation imaginaries and attendant mobilizations of
feeling. These cases alert us to the distribution of resources which affects the kinds of
performances that larger corporations, networks, and personalities can channel.
Television networks owned by figures affiliated with the state, media hosts who leverage
social media followings, and international institutions like the WEF have a role in
channeling and distributing capacities for feeling. This shows us how, for example, in the
case of the kafala system in chapter three, where the digital pressure group operates
through the paranoia of implicated employers as well as the empathy of invested
audiences, then it stands to reason that redistributing resources to those in the kafala
system would help shift the need to focus on the feelings of diaspora and other
international audiences.
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Finally, I will end with a reflection on a moment from the second case study with
the mother of the Lebanese tourist who called out the Egyptian nation for its
backwardness. When Mona Mazbouh’s mother did the press circuit for her daughter’s
release from Egyptian jail, one of her main stops was the stage of talk show program,
al’Asher Masa’an (“10 in the Evening”). As part of this, she sat on the set couch as
Egyptian callers called in to the show to berate her for her daughter’s actions. In the
YouTube clip from this segment, several comments express their empathy for the mother
and her tears. However, amongst these, one comment reads: “I really feel hers are
crocodile tears. I don’t know why” [ ﻣﺎ ادري ﻟﯿﺶ. ( ]وﷲ اﺣﺴﮭﺎ دﻣﻮع اﻟﺘﻤﺎﺳﯿﺢAppendix B3:6).

Figure 28: Appendix B3: 6, A still from talks how interview with Mazbouh's mother
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I turn to this comment because it depicts the illegible body which resists an easy reading.
The commenter doubts the sincerity of her tears, offering that they have no real reason for
doing so. It mirrors the readings of Tufa’s body in the second case, where viewers read
her body for signs of violence. Across these pieces of content, audiences debate the truthvalue of these scenes, looking for evidence of shame. It suggests that Mazbouh’s mother
may not truly care about the state’s perception of her daughter, but that she puts on a
performance to free her.
In doing so, I do not deny the real systems of violence which structure such
moments of visibility—it has been my aim to analyze their mechanics. Mazbouh’s future
depends on her mother’s performance. However, I hope to take seriously the importance
of performance implicit in this moment of communication. As Xine Yao (2021) has
written of such accounts, “Unfeeling is the detachment to attachment to hegemonic
structures of feeling and the potential for striving toward a radical politics of liberation”
(p. 17). If our doubt about her performance upends the line between genuine and fake,
revealing how culturally, socially, historically constituted this line is, then performance
takes on a powerful role in political life.
With anxieties around the ability of algorithms to capture our emotional states and
know our bodies better than we do, this moment serves as a reminder of the politics of
emotional legibility. However, these slippages alert us to a possibility in the gap between
what is said and what is done, and what is detect and what is undetectable. The gap
between encoded and recoded meaning can be politically powerful because it attunes us
to our malleability—a non-discursive dimension wherein lies the capacity for change.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix note: The following Twitter posts were selected by a) identifying major actors
in the scandal and searching their content for hashtags, b) conducting keyword searches
with these hashtags as well as relevant keywords ("#GBinDavos,”
“#”ﺟﺒﺮان_ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ_ﻻ_ﯾﻤﺜﻠﻨﻲ, “#“ ”ﺟﺒﺮان_ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ _ﯾﻤﺜﻠﻨﻲ#”ﺟﺒﺮان_ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ_ﻻ_ﯾﻤﺜﻞ_ﻟﺒﻨﺎن,
“#ﺟﺒﺮان_ﺑﺎﺳﯿﻞ_ﯾﻤﺜﻞ_ﻟﺒﻨﺎن,” “Bassil Davos,” “Bassil WEF”) and c) analyzing the most
popular content related to these keyword searches. I selected from the “Top Tweet”
results and incorporated Tweets which circulated in media coverage about the events.
After collecting data which referenced the event as a bahdala, humiliation, or joyful in
some way, I had a collection of 254 Tweets which I then narrowed down to 41 Tweets for
the final discussion (Table 1). I also collected three videos which relate to the case and
offer a comparison to other political performances at the WEF as well as local political
programming (Table 2). These served as counterpoints to the WEF interview and
highlighted its status as a scandal. All videos were referenced in the Twitter data I
collected.
Table 1
Number

Date

Tweet URL

1

1/21/20

https://twitter.com/ToniAoun15/status/1219581589962797056

2

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/ElzaSeferian/status/1220335177500676096

3

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/saleemkaterji/status/1220363155248906242

4

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/alam_mikel/status/1220360823132106752

5

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/najighaddaf/status/1220369509472788480

6

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/Rafka_FB/status/1220381305571086337

7

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/AhmadiehRawad/status/1220398018458984450

8

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/VivoFarah/status/1220397263106846721

9

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/Croatoan24/status/1220406689050120193

10

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/wtvrzz/status/1220422435146739714

11

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/datbeachh/status/1220390036946006019

12

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/hamaduet/status/1220519723080790019

13

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/PTilchatta/status/1220231389364142082

14

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/WalidMRihane/status/1220374662313627654

15

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/bassaminaty/status/1220361776992268288

16

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/YdeRsan/status/1220379630630326273

17

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/jenniferawad2/status/1220320160847925248

18

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/AzarTannous/status/1220378729828044800

19

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/Jay_Aoun/status/1220338277116497920
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20

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/imanechaccour/status/1220381840197988356

21

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/ArabicChe/status/1220361923839000576

22

1/23/20

https://twitter.com/boukhdoud3/status/1220392160694087681

23

1/24/20

https://twitter.com/AbdulJa92620370/status/1220801138599047168

24

1/25/20

https://twitter.com/neoamaru/status/1221006030957633537

25

1/25/20

https://twitter.com/samradan/status/1220971321183686656

26

1/26/20

https://twitter.com/SulomeAnderson/status/1221491734334640128

27

1/26/20

https://twitter.com/Hammadapk/status/1221444601950691330

28

1/26/20

https://twitter.com/AmberRShamsi/status/1221336234368421888

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

3/20/20
1/22/20
1/23/20
1/23/20
1/23/20
1/24/20
3/01/20
1/23/20
1/27/20
1/22/20
1/23/20
1/21/20
5/22/21

https://twitter.com/_HadleyGamble/status/1240937984209362944
https://twitter.com/Chanty_khoury/status/1219955495408148482
https://twitter.com/nourdaou8/status/1220464597288865793
https://twitter.com/ZietoonHeba/status/1220384040425074689
Since deleted
https://twitter.com/hbkabbara/status/1220647419840475136
https://twitter.com/Kanaan71Nada/status/1234150194079502338
https://twitter.com/Shadithe1st/status/1220377997427068928
https://twitter.com/MohemedChe/status/1221747959546687488
https://twitter.com/BeirutCalling/status/1220046403298349056
https://twitter.com/Roukoz_G/status/1220393173299736576
https://twitter.com/Layal8087/status/1219575179518586881
https://twitter.com/RimaSleiman8/status/1396107974607785984

Table 2
Numbe
r
1

Date

Video title

YouTube handle

Video URL

1/23/20

Full Interview: Former Lebanon
Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil
| CNBC International

CNBC International TV

2

1/8/20

ﺣﺴﺎب ﺟﺒﺮان

Al Jadeed News

https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=X4gt7jL0rP0
https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=IyMf71iO8Ec&
ab_channel=ALJ
adeedNews
https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v
=vPuSK6220hA

[“Gebran's Account”]

3

1/24/18

A Conversation with Saad
Hariri President of the Council
of Ministers of Lebanon
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World Economic
Forum

Appendix B
Appendix note: In the second case study, I selected the videos by conducting keyword
searches on YouTube in English and Arabic as well as collecting videos from the top
news networks covering the Mazbouh case ("Mona Mazbouh,” “Mazbouh,” “”ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح,
“)”ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح. I then followed each of the accounts by ordinary YouTube users to
analyze their trajectories over the years following the incident. This allowed me to detect
a group of YouTube content creators who have made livings on nationalist media
production. I have separated all kinds of content into the following tables which include
the original responses to Mazbouh by ordinary people on YouTube (Table 1; N=19),
news coverage by major news networks in Lebanon and Egypt about the Mazbouh case
(Table 2; N=15), and the top three most viewed videos from four YouTubers who appear
to belong to MCNs (Table 3; N=14).
Table 1
Numbe
r
1

Date

Title

Translation

URL

5/29/1
8

Mazbouh’s Facebook Live
video (Original has since been
deleted)

N/A

2

5/30/1
8

Mazbouh’s Facebook Live
apology video (Original has
since been deleted)

N/A

3

6/2/18

ﺧﺎﻟﺪ ﺟﺎد# اﻟﺒﻨﺖ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ اﻟﺤﻘﯿﺮه
اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ ﺧﻂ اﺣﻤﺮ#

4

6/4/18

اﻟﺮد اﻟﺼﺎروﺧﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﻰ
... ﻣﺬﺑﻮح اﻟﻠﻰ ﺷﺘﻤﺖ ﻣﺼﺮ
ھﺘﻨﺪم ﻟﻮ ﻣﺸﻮﻓﺘﺶ اﻟﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ دة

5

6/1/18

ﻣﺬﯾﻊ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲ ﯾﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﺗﺸﺘﻢ
ﻣ ﺼ ﺮ و ا ﻟ ﻤ ﺼ ﺮ ﯾ ﯿ ﻦ – ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح

6

6/8/18

Amessage to people of
Lebanon

The Lebanese ?? #Khaled
Gad #Egyptians are the red
line
The Egyptian reply to
Mona Mazbouh who
insulted Egypt…You’ll
regret if you don’t watch
the video
Lebanese announcer
responds to the Lebanese
woman who insulted
Egypt and the Egyptians –
Mona Mazbouh
N/A

Original has since
been deleted but
shared across
various URLs
Original has since
been deleted but
shared across
various URLs
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Xj2
nFlzRtJc
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=AE
3r5of_QGw

7

6/6/18

اﻗﻮى رد ﺳﻮري ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ
ﺗﺸﺘﻢ ﻣﺼﺮ وﺷﻌﺐ ﻣﺼﺮ

8

9/9/18

وإﻟﻐﺎء 😣ﺑﺮاءه ﻣﻨﻲ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح...
اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻮي اﻟﺮﻓﯿﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺪارس

Strongest Syrian response
to the Lebanese who
insulted Egypt and its
people
Mona Mazbouh’s
innocence… and
cancelling higher level
education in schools
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https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Dd
Ac3Ibq6gs
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Y6
fmc0UP8rU&featur
e=youtu.be
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=mft
06Keo4xM
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=BdI
g5MnDkek

9

5/30/1
8

رﺳﺎﻟﮫ اﻟﻲ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ اﻟﻠﻲ ﻏﻠﻄﺖ
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ واﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ

10

6/4/18

ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻓﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع3 اﺧﻄﺮ
اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح

11

6/3/18

اﻗﻮي رد ﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﻨﻲ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح اﻟﺤﺎج
رﻣﻀﺎن ﻣﺮﻋﻲ

12

6/2/18

– ﻣﺤﻤﻮد ﺣﺴﻦ | ﻣﻨﻲ – ﻣﺬﺑﻮح
| ﺗﺤﺮش – ﻛﻔﯿﻞEl Banna

13

5/30/1
8

👿اﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﺎھﺮة اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ
اﻟﻠﻲ ﻏﻠﻄﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ

14

6/13/1
8

اﻗﻮى رد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﮫ اﯾﻤﻰ
ﻧﺸﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺒﻨﺖ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺪﺑﻮح

15

6/13/1
8

اﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح ﻣﻦ اﺑﻮ
ﺣﺴﺎم

16

10/21/
18

اﻗﻮي رد ﻣﻦ ﺑﻨﺖ ﻣﺼﺮﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ
اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح اﻟﻠﻲ ﺷﺘﻤﺖ
اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ

17

6/1/18

اﻗﻮى رد ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ اﺑﻦ اﻟﺒﻠﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ
اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ ﻣﻨﻰ ﻣﺬﺑﻮح اﻟﺘﻰ اھﺎﻧﺖ
.... ﻛﻞ ﻣﺼﺮ

18

5/31/1
8

ﺷﺎھﺪ ھﺎذ اﻟﻔﺪﯾﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﮫ اﻟﻲ ﻣﻨﻰ
ﻣﺬﺑﻮح اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﮫ

19

N/A

N/A

A message to the Lebanese
woman who wronged
Egypt and the Egyptians
The 3 most dangerous
pieces of information
about the case of Mona
Mazbouh the Lebanese
woman
Strongest response to
Mona Mazbouh, Mr.
Ramadan Merhy
Mahmoud Hassan | Mona
– Mazbouh – Harassment
– Sponsor| El Banna
Response to the Lebanese
whore that wronged the
Egyptians
Strongest response from
Egyptian Amy Nashaat to
the Lebanese woman
Mona Mazbouh
Response to Mona
Mazbouh to Mona
Mazbouh – About Hossam
Strongest response from an
Egyptian girl to the
Lebanese woman, Mona
Mazbouh, who insulted the
Egyptians
Strongest response from
the ‘son of the country’ to
the Lebanese, Mona
Mazbouh, who insulted all
of Egypt….
Watch this video directed
to the Lebanese woman
Mona Mazbouh
N/A

https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=sr0
g1yaqong
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Qu
oRO8A07Wg
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=7J1
uQ_a9Sqw
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=0v
TyaLZl1_4
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=lto
OtYu87zk
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=HO
m1LSYZyTQ
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=2fu
Vj1i7zZs
https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=R0
ngVyxqNak
https://youtu.be/P3EhhCqowU

https://www.youtub
e.com/watch?v=Jzb
8hpCZbfw
Since deleted video

Table 2
Number

Date

Title

Translation

Details

URL

1

6/1/18

اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| ﻣﻨﻰ
ﻣﺬﺑﻮح ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﺗﺴﺐ
ﻣﺼﺮ
واﻹﺑﺮاﺷﻰ..وﺷﻌﺒﮭﺎ
 دى ﺑﺠﺎﺣﺔ:ﯾﺮد
ووﻗﺎﺣﺔ

10 in the evening | Mona
Mazbouh swore at Egypt
and her people…and ElEbrashy responds: This is
rude and shameless

Egyptian
network

https://youtu.
be/y5EyYbc
5yDA
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2

7/7/18

3

7/8/18

4

7/22/18

5

7/22/18

6

7/22/18

7

7/22/18

8

7/22/18

9

7/29/18

10

7/7/18

اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| ﺷﺎھﺪ
رﺳﺎﻟﺔ واﻟﺪ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ
ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﻟﺸﻌﺐ
ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ ﻋﻠﻲ
اﺑﻨﺘﺔ
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| اﻋﺘﺬار
واﻟﺪة اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﮭﻮاء
ﻟﻠﺸﻌﺐ اﻟﻤﺼﺮى ﺑﻌﺪ
اﻟﺤﻜﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺑﻨﺘﮭﺎ
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| راى
ﺻﺎدم ﻣﻦ ﺳﻤﯿﺮ
ﺻﺒﺮى اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻰ ﺣﻮل
ﻗﻀﯿﺔ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| واﻟﺪة
ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﺗﺸﻜﻒ
اﻟﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﺤﻘﯿﻘﻰ ﻟﻠﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ
اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺸﺮ ﻻﺑﻨﺘﮭﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ
اﻟﯿﻮﺗﯿﻮب
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| ھﺠﻮم
ﻧﺎرى ﻣﻦ ﺳﯿﺪات ﻣﺼﺮ
ﻋﻠﻰ واﻟﺪة اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| ﻣﺤﺎﻣﻰ
ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﯾﻜﺸﻒ
ﺳﺮ اﻧﺪﻓﺎﻋﮭﺎ وﻧﺸﺮھﺎ
ﻟﻠﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ اﻟﻤﺴﺊ ﻟﻠﺸﻌﺐ
اﻟﻤﺼﺮى
اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﺴﺎء| ھﺠﻮم
ﻧﺎري ﻣﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﻮد ﻋﻄﯿﺔ
اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﮭﺎﺟﻤﻰ
واﻟﺪة اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح
واﻟﺪة اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻲ
ﻣﺬﺑﻮح ﺗﻮﺿﺢ اﻟﺴﺒﺐ
وراء ﺳﺐ اﺑﻨﺘﮭﺎ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ
اﻟﻤﺼﺮي
ﻣﺴﺎءdmc  | ﺣﺒﺲ8 اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح
ﺳﻨﻮات ﺑﺘﮭﻤﺔ ﻧﺸﺮ
ﻓﯿﺪﯾﻮ ﻣﺴﻲء ﻟﻠﺸﻌﺐ
| اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

10 in the evening | Watch
the message from the
parents of the Lebanese
Mona Mazbouh to the
Egyptian people after the
verdict of their daughter
10 in the evening | Mona
Mazbouh's mother's
apology on-air to the
Egyptian people after her
daughter's verdict

Egyptian
network

https://youtu.
be/lr5K_sQz
ADw

Egyptian
network

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=LJ
mV2GInxm
w

10 in the evening |
Shocking opinion from
Samir Sabry, the lawyer
regarding the case of the
Lebanese Mona Mazbouh

Egyptian
network

https://youtu.
be/Ga-ZuuLdqQ

10 in the evening | Mona
Mazbouh's mother
reveals the real reason her
daughter's video spread
on YouTube

Egyptian
network

https://youtu.
be/Ved_HG3
pP30

10 in the evening | A fiery
attack from the women of
Egypt to the mother of
the Lebanese Mona
Mazbouh
10 in the evening | Mona
Mazbouh's lawyer reveals
her secret motive to post
the offensive video to the
Egyptian people

Egyptian
network

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=j5
L4HP2g9M8

Egyptian
network

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=Cv
UCbxY6Yjg

10 in the evening | A fiery
attack from Mahmoud
Attia the lawyer on those
that are attacking the
mother of the Lebanese
woman Mona Mazbouh
The mother of the
Lebanese Mona Mazbouh
explains the reason
behind her daughter's
swearing at the Egyptian
people
DMC in the evening | The
Lebanese Mona Mazbouh
jailed for 8 years on
charges of spreading
offensive video to the
Egyptian people

Egyptian
network

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=Lv
Xm8hKBEY

Egyptian
network

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=db
cTY4S7qUs
&ab_channel
=AhramGate
https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=m
PHN_MQMxM&ab_c
hannel=dmc
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Egyptian
network

11

7/24/18

ﻋﺎﺋﻠﺔ ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح
ﺗﻄﺎﻟﺐ ﺑﺈﻋﺎدﺗﮭﺎ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎن
- ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ
2018/07/24

Mona Mazbouh's family
demands her return after
the ruling

Lebanese
TV network

12

9/14/18

اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﺗﻌﻮد اﻟﻰ اھﻠﮭﺎ
وﺗﺮوي ﻟﻠﺠﺪﯾﺪ ﺣﻜﺎﯾﺔ
– ﺣﻜﻤﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
ﻟﯿﺎل ﺳﻌﺪ

Mazbouh returns to her
parents and tells Al
Jadeed the story of her
conviction In Egypt -Layal Saad

Lebanese
TV network

13

9/16/18

 ﺷﺎﺗﻤﺔ: ﺗﻔﺎﻋﻠﻜﻢ
اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ ﻣﻨﻰ
اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح ﺗﻜﺸﻒ أﺳﺮار
ﻗﻀﯿﺘﮭﺎ

Your engagement: The
insulter of Egyptians
Mona Mazbouh reveals
the secrets of her case

Saudi
owned,
Dubai based
outlet

14

6/25/18

ﻣﻨﻰ اﻟﻤﺬﺑﻮح أﻣﮭﺎ ﺳﯿﺪة
ﻓﺎﺿﻠﺔ ﻟﺒﻨﺎن ﻗﺎﻟﺒﺔ اﻟﺪﻧﯿﺎ
ﻋﺸﺎﻧﮭﺎ اول ﺣﻮار
ﺗﻠﯿﻔﺰﯾﻮﻧﻰ ﻣﻊ اھﻠﮭﺎ

15

10/3/15

 اﻧﮭﯿﺎر وواﻟﺪة..ﺑﺎﻟﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ
ﯾﺎﺳﻤﯿﻦ اﻟﻨﺮش ﺧﻼل
ﺟﻠﺴﺔ ﻣﺤﺎﻛﻤﺘﮭﺎ ﻓﻰ
""واﻗﻌﺔ اﻟﻤﻄﺎر

Lebanese
TV network

In the video…The
collapse of Yasmine elNarsh's mother during her
trial for the "airport
incident"
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Egyptian
online
publication

https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=X
YzyT_Gn86
8&ab_chann
el=MTVLeb
anonNews
https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=s8
aYU6tts4Y&
ab_channel=
ALJadeedNe
ws
https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=97
9dBMpv8Vs
&ab_channel
=AlArabiya
%D8%A7%
D9%84%D8
%B9%D8%
B1%D8%A8
%D9%8A%
D8%A9
https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=N
Md94SyhjU
Y&ab_chann
el=hamdynas
raldeen
https://www.
youtube.com
/watch?v=ljL
Yr8W4SVU
&ab_channel
=VideoYou
m7%7C%D9
%82%D9%8
6%D8%A7
%D8%A9%
D8%A7%D9
%84%D9%8
A%D9%88
%D9%85%
D8%A7%D9
%84%D8%
B3%D8%A7
%D8%A8%
D8%B9

Table 3
Number

Date

Title

Translation

URL

1

1/26/18

اﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻛﻮﯾﺘﻲ ﻓﻲ
اﻟﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ ﺗﻄﺎول ﻋﻠﻰ
🇬🇪اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ
5 اﻟﻔﯿﺪﯾﻮ اﻟﻠﻲ ﺣﻘﻖ
ﻣﻠﯿﻮن ﻣﺸﺎھﺪة ﻋﻠﻲ
اﻟﻔﯿﺲ ﺑﻮك

The response to every Kuwaiti
in the video insults the
Egyptians 🇪🇬 The video that
got 5 million views on
Facebook

2

7/14/19

ﻓﯿﻦ اھﻞ اﻟﻌﯿﺎل دي!!! ؟
| اﻓﺼﻠﻮا اﻟﻨﺖ ﻋﻦ
ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻘﻰ | ﻛﻔﺎﯾﺔ ﻛﺪه

Where are the parents of these
children!!! ? | Cut the internet
in Egypt already| That's
enough

3

7/30/18

4

1/14/20

5

4/2/20

https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=iZEewse
AcXw&ab_channel=k
arimalaa%D9%83%D8%B1%
D9%8A%D9%85%D8
%B9%D9%84%D8%
A7%D8%A1
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=M4mPc9
LXltI&ab_channel=ka
rimalaa%D9%83%D8%B1%
D9%8A%D9%85%D8
%B9%D9%84%D8%
A7%D8%A1
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=XYRd3O
slGU&t=126s&ab_cha
nnel=karimalaa%D9%83%D8%B1%
D9%8A%D9%85%D8
%B9%D9%84%D8%
A7%D8%A1
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=RrH2B0
Xfn4M&ab_channel=
%D8%B9%D8%A8%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%84%D9%
87%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%B8%D8%A7%
D8%A8%D8%B7AbdullahAl-Zabet
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=nw9_ZP
7J34&ab_channel=%D8
%B9%D8%A8%D8%
AF%D8%A7%D9%84
%D9%84%D9%87%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%B8%D8%A7%D8%
A8%D8%B7AbdullahAl-Zabet

 اﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺸﺎذ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﻲResponse to the gay
( | اﻟﻠﻲ ﻏﻠﻂ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞderogatory) Lebanese | The
one that wronged all Egyptians
اﻟﻤﺼﺮﯾﯿﻦ

 ﻓﺪﯾﻮھﺎت ﺗﯿﻚ ﺗﻮكReally strange Tik Tok
!!  ﻏﺮﯾﺒﮫ اوويvideos!!

 ﻓﺪﯾﻮھﺎت ﺗﯿﻚ ﺗﻮكTik Tok videos…Abdallah Al! رﯾﺄﻛﺖ ﻋﺒﺪﷲ اﻟﻈﺎﺑﻂ. Zabet React
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6

9/13/21

 ھﺬا اﻟﻔﺪﯾﻮ ﺑﺮﻋﺎﯾﺔ ﻟﺒﻦThis video is sponsored by
 ﻣﺸﻮﻓﺘﺶ اﻗﺬر/ اﻟﻤﺮاﻋﻲMarai Milk…You haven't seen
dirtier than this!
!!. ﻣﻦ ﻛﺪا

7

7/10/21

 اﻟـ ﺗﯿﻚ ﺗﻮك ﺑﻘﻲ اﺗﻮﺑﯿﺲTiktok has become a bus, and
" واﻟﻜﻞ ﻓﯿﮫ راﻛﺐeveryone's a passenger!

8

2/15/22

ﻗﻠﻌﺖ وﺑﯿﻨﺖ اﻟﺤﺠﺎت
.ﻋﺸﺎن ﺗﺠﯿﺐ ﻻﯾﻜﺎت
ارﺧﺺ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺪا ﻣﻔﯿﺶ
!!.

9

12/21/1
9

 ﯾﺎﻟﮭﻮي ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺒﯿﺤﺼﻞOh dear, what is happening on
..  ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﯿﻚ ﺗﻮكTik Tok! Curse that!
!! ﯾﺨﺮﺑﯿﺖ ﻛﺪا ﯾﺎﺟﺪع

10

12/12/1
9

 اﻟﺘﯿﻚ ﺗﻮك ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮTikTok in Egypt is ??? of
 ﻋﻨﻮان اﻻدب واﻻﺧﻼقcivility and respect??
2# ..

11

2/10/20

 ﻣﺶ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻠﻲWhat's happening on TikTok is
ﺑﯿﺤﺼﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟـTik Tok unbelievable

She stripped/took off her
clothes And showed her stuff
to get likes. It doesn't get
cheaper than this!
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https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=Ry7x8lo
ejNA&ab_channel=%
D8%B9%D8%A8%D
8%AF%D8%A7%D9
%84%D9%84%D9%8
7%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%B8%D8%A7%
D8%A8%D8%B7AbdullahAl-Zabet
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=PcIP2LLiEU&ab_channel=
%D8%B9%D8%A8%
D8%AF%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%84%D9%
87%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%B8%D8%A7%
D8%A8%D8%B7AbdullahAl-Zabet
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=DiAsSk7
gdEE&ab_channel=%
D8%B9%D8%A8%D
8%AF%D8%A7%D9
%84%D9%84%D9%8
7%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%B8%D8%A7%
D8%A8%D8%B7AbdullahAl-Zabet
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=dDaKRR
8koI&ab_channel=%D9
%85%D8%AD%D9%
85%D9%88%D8%AF
%D8%A7%D9%84%
D8%AF%D9%8A%D
8%A8MahmoudEldeep
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=6h1mqa
GP9VU&ab_channel=
%D9%85%D8%AD%
D9%85%D9%88%D8
%AF%D8%A7%D9%
84%D8%AF%D9%8A
%D8%A8MahmoudEldeep
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=yDszbb1
dHPU&ab_channel=%
D9%85%D8%AD%D
9%85%D9%88%D8%

 ﻟﯿﮫ اﻟﺒﻨﺎت دي ﺑﺘﻜﺒﺮھﺎWhy do these girls grow up
 اﺳﻮء ﻣﺤﺘﻮي.. ﻛﺪا ؟like this? The worst content on
the Internet!
!! ﻋﻠﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ

12

2/28/22

13

4/9/21

اﻟﺒﻨﺎت دي ﻋﺪت ﻟﭭﻞ
 اﻻﺣﺘﺮام ﺑﻤﺮاﺣﻞ..!!

14

1/5/22

اﻟﺘﻌﻠﯿﻢ ﻋﻠﻲ واﺣﺪة وﻧﺺ
💃🔴⁉

These girls have trespassed the
level of decency by many
levels
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AF%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%AF%D9%8A%
D8%A8MahmoudEldeep
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=7kie9SV
Jlqg&ab_channel=%D
9%85%D8%AD%D9
%85%D9%88%D8%
AF%D8%A7%D9%84
%D8%AF%D9%8A%
D8%A8MahmoudEldeep
https://www.youtube.c
om/watch?v=Gkztlt4V
fF0
https://youtu.be/qVz3FfV4G4

Appendix C
Appendix note: For the final case study on TIL, whose most active presence is on
Facebook, I recorded all of TIL’s posts about Tufa in a one-year period. To cross-check I
had found these and later posts about the case, I conducted keyword searches for Tufa’s
name, variations of her name, and her employers’ names (“Tufa,” “Lelisa,” “Lensa,”
“Ajami-Khalil”). I collected a total of 24 posts related to Tufa’s case (Table 1). I also
followed the page for a one-year period and collected posts which related to notions of
embarrassment or shame. 16 of these posts were included in my final discussion of the
case (Table 2).
Table 1
Number

Date

Title/Description

Post URL

1

3/29/18

Support #IAmLensa

2

4/6/18

3

5/28/19

"Lensa's Hospital Bed Wheeled into Studio
so she can be Humiliated on Live TV with
Slaveholders Eleanore Couture #IAmLensa"
Middle East Eye link

https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3658
47137225667
https://www.facebook.com/
watch/?v=369027166907664

4

3/31/18

Ajami Khalil family messages

5

4/18/19

Threats from Eleanore Couture

6

4/25/18

Link to countdown to release

7

11/27/18

Lawsuit against reporter Timour Azhari

8

5/23/18

Link to Equal Times article

9

6/28/18

Link to media host Rima Karaki's profile

10

4/20/18

Directions to report story to celebrities

11

3/29/18

Link to Sun article

12

4/25/18

Link to Daily Mail article
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https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/6061
74103192968
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/photos/a.2
63064384170610/36596952
3880095/
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/videos/373
742239769490/
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3768
00359463678
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/5104
74449429601
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3878
54041691643
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/4099
80729478974
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3745
46689689045
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3659
32373883810
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3768
22816128099

13

5/11/18

Screenshot to countdown to release

14

4/12/18

News.com.au link to article

15

3/30/18

Link to Al Modon article

16

3/28/18

Daily Star article link

17

4/12/18

Global Voices article link

18

3/28/18

Image of Tufa's feet

19

3/28/18

Image of Eleanore Couture's GPS location

20

3/29/18

Link to Daily Mail article

21

7/13/18

Video of case in Swedish media

22

5/3/18

The Turban Times article link

23

5/2/18

Legal Agenda article link

24

8/6/19

Tufa documentary by TIL

https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3831
60518827662
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3713
22983344749
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3663
53493841698
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3653
88793938168
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3711
81096692271
https://www.facebook.com/e
vents/842347605972820/?po
st_id=842943589246555&vi
ew=permalink
https://www.facebook.com/e
vents/842347605972820/?po
st_id=842964939244420&vi
ew=permalink
https://www.facebook.com/e
vents/842347605972820/?po
st_id=843201769220737&vi
ew=permalink
https://www.facebook.com/
watch/?v=423553781455002
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3799
14369152277
https://www.facebook.com/T
hisIsLebanon961/posts/3795
05192526528
https://www.youtube.com/w
atch?v=yHZHOHd8pFU&ab
_channel=THISISLEBANO
N

Table 2
Number

Date

Title/Description

Post URL

1

4/24/19

Independent article link

2

7/2/19

Video of Howa Al Horiya show

3

12/26/19

Link to TIL website

https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/587
228188420893
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/videos/60
7673026391066/
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/753
557175121326
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4

1/2/20

Video of secret recording

5

6/7/20

Foreign policy article - policy brutality

6

6/11/20

Link to Phoenix Daily article

7

9/29/20

Video account of a case

8

1/21/21

Video of another case

9

1/28/21

Video account of a case

10

7/26/21

Video of another case

11

9/23/21

Image of a document

12

10/13/21

Video account of a case

13

11/9/21

Video of Inie and Jenny

14

12/29/21

Video account of a case

15

9/25/20

Vice News link

16

12/19/20

Dutch article link
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https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/759
616814515362
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/870
151326795243
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/872
909556519420
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/videos/71
5758529152571/
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/102
2150588261982
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/104
6656605811380
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/116
2917034185336
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/120
3066636837042
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/121
7156225428083
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/videos/30
7174111226226/
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/127
0191920124513
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/951
995135277528
https://www.facebook.com/
ThisIsLebanon961/posts/102
0521368424904
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